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This thesis is a hermeneutical dialogue between Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji. The main aim of the thesis is to creatively weave together their 
key thoughts of sexuate difference and śūnyatā. I do this by juxtaposing key 
points in their philosophical oeuvres, thereby developing my own position 
which includes the insight of sexuate difference within the insight of śūnyatā.  
 
The philosophical position I come to is one that satisfies and strengthens 
both Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji’s requirements for overcoming nihilism, 
while at the same time, taking further each of their respective relational self-
understandings. I argue that a relational self-understanding is dependent on 
bodily practices and the need to understand sexuate human being as integrated 
with nature. The philosophical problem of non-duality is examined with respect 
to sexuate difference, and I propose a non-dual position based on the insight of 
śūnyatā that still includes sexuate difference as a fundamental relational 
difference. Finally, interpersonal relationships are re-examined from an 
integrated position of the human being, as a living breathing body wh0 is always 
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INTRODUCTION, MOTIVATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction  
The main aim of the thesis is to creatively weave together Luce Irigaray 
and Nishitani Keiji’s creative philosophies of sexuate difference and śūnyatā. 
The method I use to do this is one of juxtaposition. This involves a close 
hermeneutical reading within the parameters of the emerging discipline of 
feminist comparative philosophy. For this to be possible, I have chosen points 
of intersection in Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray’s philosophies and have 
juxtaposed them freely in the structural order which best suited the ideas being 
put forward. I have also, often quoted at length, so that their positions may 
speak for themselves. 
 
After introducing each philosopher, I establish the common ground of 
nihilism at the root of their philosophical journeys. I then go on to show their 
creative ways of overcoming nihilism – through breathing practices and a 
reintegration of the body with nature, through their re-envisioning of aesthetic 





Buddha and the Virgin Mary. Throughout this creative overcoming I show how 
both Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray’s philosophies can supplement each 
other. Moreover, by juxtaposing key points in their philosophical oeuvres, I 
develop my own position which includes the insight of sexuate difference within 
the insight of śūnyatā. By juxtaposing Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray, I 
demonstrate a third position: that the problem of nihilism is our problem (I-he 
and I-she) and that we have the potential for a liberated existence within 
śūnyatā together, as non-she and non-he.  
 
Throughout this thesis I argue that the formation of the self must go from 
the alienated subject, to the sexuate subject, to the pure subject (which 
transdecends while still including the sexuate) as stages of development in the 
awareness of a liberated subject who is no longer alienated from themselves. 
Liberation from alienation and nihilism, is brought about when śūnyatā 
includes the sexuate difference of men and women, understandable as two 
subjects who are different, but who on the non-dual field of śūnyatā are 
absolutely intertwined with each other. Philosophy, with the inclusion of 
Eastern practices, thereby becomes a vehicle for the unfolding of awareness of 
both I-he and I-she (as two subjects who are different) and then proceeds to a 
self-understanding of two pure selves as non-he and non-she who are always 









The reasons behind this philosophical comparison are firstly, 
accidental, and secondly, as I later came to appreciate, necessary. In accidently 
reading these two very different philosophers side-by-side, I saw a number of 
similarities in their orientations which related directly to each other as well as 
to my own experiences.1 The main points which bring us together are: valuing 
the existential standpoint, the experience of living between traditions and the 
position that refuses to separate thought and practice but remains between 
them. After several years of reading Western philosophy I had finally stumbled 
across two relatively contemporary philosophers who saw themselves as 
occupying a place which they call “between” East and West and doing so in a 
very personal and creative manner.2 A place that I too found myself occupying 
on returning to England after several years of traveling in Asia and Europe, 
where I had been studying diverse practices and systems of thought tied to those 
practices.3  
 
Unlike the majority of philosophers Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji 
consider this between place as I do, to be a positive place for practice, 
transformation of ourselves, and our way of thinking; a place from where we 
                                                             
1  Examining the coincidental in philosophy from different ‘cultures’ is itself a viable 
motivation and method of comparative philosophy, if only to see that those coincidences 
themselves are revealing about ourselves (Ivekovic, 2000).    
2 Both Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji speak in terms of “East” and “West”. I do not follow 
them in such a claim. These practices and world views clearly are not from a single origin 
which we might call the “East” or the “West”. We shall discuss this later. 
3 I practice disciplines such as Yoga, Buddhist meditation, Traditional Thai massage and 
Aikido, alongside reading diverse Western philosophical texts, including texts on 





might practice and think from perspectives as diverse as Yoga, Zen Buddhism, 
Psychoanalysis and Western philosophy simultaneously; a place from where we 
might develop supplemental philosophies which both rejuvenate the Western 
tradition of philosophy, shaking it from its self-imposed isolationism, and 
create a philosophy for the future based on our own unique personal positions 
and dialogue between them; a place from where this creative philosophical 
dialogue might create new practices, new models for subjectivity, new ethical 
paradigms, and therefore, an alternative global culture, which is not based on 
what I, and they, see as a predominantly nihilistic Western model. 
 
After the initial personal intuition and recognition of coincidences in 
Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji, I soon realised that this work was not merely 
personal, although the personal owing to the form of inquiry cannot necessarily 
be excluded from it either. This work is in fact necessary owing to the wider 
implications of socio-cultural globalisation and the perceived threats of 
technology, the demise of religion, cultural relativism, sex/gender inequalities, 
all recognised by Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji as real problems (except the 
latter in the case of Nishitani Keiji.) This intuition is shared by a number of 
scholars in a relatively new discourse termed ‘feminist comparative philosophy’; 
a discourse with a specific methodology which is inclusive of sex/gender and 
cultural diversity, with the aim of shifting the inherent biases within philosophy 
as taught in academia (and we can assume some other subjects) as well as the 
wider socio-political horizon, including self-transformation. It makes sense to 





methods, and to thereby allow me to critically situate this thesis within the 
emerging field of feminist comparative scholarship.  
 
 
1.3. Feminist comparative philosophy 
‘Feminist comparative philosophy’ is a term recently coined by 
Jennifer Mcweeny and Ashby Butnor (2009; 2014) to mark out an emerging 
disciplinary field that lies between feminist theory and comparative philosophy. 
By recognising a basic similarity in feminist theory and comparative 
philosophical aims and methods, while at the same time acknowledging some 
important deficiencies within each field which can be highlighted and overcome 
through combining them, they attempt to establish a renewed discourse which 
is more inclusive and open, and ultimately, has more potential for the political 
(and spiritual) liberation of women (and men.) What I outline here draws on 
their concise elaborations of its aims and its methods, and thereby situates my 
own thesis within this emerging field. 
 
For Mcweeny and Butnor, in general, and taking into consideration 
that both fields of scholarship are diverse and complex, a work of philosophy 






‘regards the voices and experiences of women as philosophically 
significant in a manner that is not sexist or discriminatory, but instead 
promotes the expression and flourishing of those who have been 
oppressed due to this social location’ (2014, 4) 
 
While a work of philosophy can be called comparative if it:  
 
‘regards the ideas of more than one disparate tradition of 
thought as philosophically significant in a manner that respects each 
tradition’s individual integrity and promotes its expression’ (2014, 4) 
 
The aim of feminist comparative philosophy then is ‘the practice of 
integrating feminist and non-Western philosophical traditions in innovative 
ways, while still being mindful of the unique particularity of each, in order to 
envision and enact a more liberatory world’ (2014, 3). As they admit, what they 
are doing is nothing new, but rather a recognition of a ‘distinct kind of 
philosophical practice’ which is constituted by a ‘guiding methodology’ (2014, 
4) already common to both disciplines. 
 
This guiding methodology draws on the commonalities we sometimes 





attempting to address the deficiencies in each discipline. The three main 
commonalities within their methodologies are:  
 
1)   They both treat diversity as a philosophical resource 
2) They both recognise that a hermeneutic of openness and respect for 
difference are necessary for engaging with this diversity 
3) They have both traditionally been critical of assumptions of 
objectivity, neutrality, and universalism in the wider discipline of 
philosophy  
(Butnor and Mcweeny, 2014, 9)  
 
The primary difference between the two disciplines is that comparative 
philosophy works across traditions which are culturally diverse, whereas 
feminist theory focuses on sex/gender diversity. The problem is that, as 
Mcweeny and Butnor (2014, 5-6) rightly point out, there is a distinct lack of 
cross-over in the two focal points of each discipline.4 
 
On the one hand, for all their sensitivity to cultural diversity and the 
benefits of understanding one’s own prejudices through the creation of distance 
to one’s own tradition by engaging with another, comparative philosophers do 
                                                             
4 Although they note the lack of existing intentional interdisciplinary work between feminist 
theory and comparative philosophy, Butnor and Mcweeny also recognise a small amount of 
important existing scholarship dating back to the 1990’s. See their very helpful ‘Bibliography’ 






not necessarily take into consideration women’s voices, and tend to focus on 
philosophical comparisons between male figures from patriarchal cannons in 
their research and in the courses they teach. On the other hand, there has been 
a distinct lack of comparative philosophical engagement from female 
philosophers and feminist theorists – even though there has been ample 
criticism of white middle-class feminism in feminist theory, it has remained 
somewhat internal to the feminist discourse and has not made the leap to a 
fully-fledged feminist comparative philosophy. For them, it is this specifically 
philosophical engagement that differentiates feminist comparative philosophy 
and its methodology from the other disciplines which work across both cultural 
or traditional boundaries and the sex/gender dichotomy at the same time: 
 
‘what distinguishes feminist comparative philosophy from 
transnational/global/postcolonial feminist theories is that feminist 
comparative methodology engages an analysis of original and primary 
philosophical sources from the tradition[s] in question’                         
(Butnor and Mcweeny 2009, 5)   
 
 The deficiencies found in both disciplines are to be addressed by the 
discipline of feminist comparative philosophy, with its specific methodology 
and focus on philosophical texts. However, Mcweeny and Butnor argue further, 
that if we were to bridge the gap between the two disciplines of feminist theory 
and comparative philosophy – including the positive sides of them both in a 





discipline would be highly advantageous to our aims of political and spiritual 
liberation:  
 
‘Our express goal in fostering such comparative, coalitional 
thinking is to cultivate liberation at the philosophical level by examining, 
recovering, and reweaving the very conceptual fabrics and patterns of 
thought that are operative in our cultures and traditions of origin’     
(Mcweeny and Butnor, 2014, 1) 
 
This liberation from narrow and insular ways of perceiving the world 
around us, and the conceptual matrix of self-other-world-cosmos which we 
inherit and contribute to, is therefore challenged on a philosophical level 
through engaging with another tradition; while at the same time, the 
hierarchical, patriarchal practices of discrimination based on sex/gender 
difference are also challenged for the same limiting and insular frameworks 
which they perpetuate.  
 
To summarise, what is being proposed is a methodology with two 
dynamics and a liberational aim:  
 
‘the idea that philosophical insight and the personal, intellectual 





to acknowledge and embody, rather than ignore and transcend, her own 
subjectivity, and 2. Makes genuine authentic contact with another 
philosophical perspective’ (Butnor and Mcweeny, 2014, 12)  
 
In short, we can say that feminist comparative philosophy is 
liberational in the sense of being simultaneously self-transformational and 
socio-culturally transformational. It is no wonder then that Asian philosophy is 
an ideal partner for dialogue with feminist theory, owing to its long-preserved 
traditions of self-exploration through bodily practices, meditation and 
contemplation. However, the heightened political consciousness raising found 
in feminist movements, through their sensitivity to sex/gender diversity is now 
included in the foreground, making these perhaps older traditions more 
politically and ethically aware, and results in a new discourse of feminist 
comparative philosophy. But as they state:  
 
‘Most importantly we wish to emphasize that feminist 
comparative methodology fosters the development of original, creative 
concepts and ideas that may not have emerged had the philosopher been 
thinking within the confines of one tradition only’                                       
(Butnor and Mcweeny, 2009, 5)   
 
This thesis contributes to the emerging discourse of feminist 





dialogue which I construct here is between traditions and includes the insight 
of sexuate difference. Luce Irigaray’s thought is already transgressing the 
borders of comparative philosophy and sex/gender diversity, which makes her 
work as a uniquely creative female philosopher, ideal for further juxtapositions. 
Nishitani Keiji’s too is moving across the conceptual borders of different 
traditions, but he is limited in his appreciation of sex/gender diversity. By 
bringing the two together I follow McWeeny and Butnor’s prescription by 
creating a position drawing on both of their strengths with the aim of 
establishing a model for both self-transformation and socio-cultural 
transformation (aims which they themselves also share).  
 
However, as McWeeny and Butnor say themselves the feminist 
comparative method is nothing new, it is philosophical hermeneutics. The 
modern tradition of philosophical hermeneutics which originates with Martin 
Heidegger and is elaborated further by Hans-Georg Gadamer is part of the 
patriarchal tradition of western philosophy. However, this tradition’s primary 
concerns are with the to and fro between text and reader, the transformation of 
the self through exposing our prejudices, engaging with historically different 
texts or in dialogue with another. What we have in feminist comparative 
philosophy is philosophical hermeneutics with a heightened awareness of 
sex/gender and cross-cultural diversity, and, a way of reading a text from a 
particular subjective position between those texts and places. The method 
McWeeny and Butnor suggest is, in its essentials, in-line with philosophical 





philosophers, feminists and cross-cultural philosophers. It is to this 
philosophical tradition that I now turn.  
 
 
1.4. Philosophical hermeneutics 
Nishitani Keiji, Luce Irigaray and Hans-Georg Gadamer are all greatly 
influenced by Martin Heidegger from whom the modern form of philosophical 
hermeneutics and its shared terminology originate. Although the juxtaposition 
of Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji could be explored through their relation to 
Martin Heidegger, here I have chosen to bring H. G. Gadamer into the dialogue, 
as his work takes Heidegger’s more explicitly into the hermeneutic process of 
reading, dialogue and ethics, and his work has been more thoroughly engaged 
with by comparative and feminist philosophers. In this section we shall make a 
brief examination of philosophical hermeneutics and some of its essential 
terms. It is helpful for us to understand these terms, if any dialogue is to be 
possible between us (ourselves, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji and the Western philosophical tradition and the reader) within 
a shared language and framework of mutual understanding.  
 
The tradition of hermeneutics is probably as old as the philosophical 
tradition itself, if not older. In its pre-modern sense, it was the rules for the 
correct interpretation of a text in Biblical hermeneutics (Madison, 1994, 290). 





guarantees the right reading and meaning to emerge from the texts under 
examination. It is seen as objective. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics 
underwent a very significant change within the larger movement of 
phenomenology. And although some scholars continued a tradition of 
hermeneutics in its classical meaning – of interpreting a text according to 
certain rules – Martin Heidegger appropriated the meaning of this term for his 
own purposes, to be concerned with fundamental ontology: ‘a properly 
philosophical elucidation or interpretation of the basic (ontological) structures 
of human understanding which is to say, human existence itself’ (Madison 1994, 
299).  
 
At the root of this appropriation was the problem of dualism in 
philosophy, and the desire in phenomenology to overcome the diremption 
between the objective and the subjective (Madison 1994, 297-299). A division 
which, as we shall see, is crucial in both Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray, who 
both continue this tradition of self-understanding in new directions, by 
reworking the subject-object divide in their own philosophy, and from their own 
ontological positions. In short, as we shall see, by two different versions of non-
dualism. To summarise, we can say that philosophical hermeneutics was no 
longer a mode of knowing (objective interpretation) but was now a mode of 
being (an understanding of oneself in the world). 
 
Whenever we face another person, a text, engage in dialogue, or simply 





things (the world) are mutually altered through that engagement, even if this is 
implicit and never recognised. What is most interesting is the fundamental 
structures of our existence, or more appropriately, our interpretation of the 
fundamental structures of our existence, completely condition our 
interpretations. They are in effect our fundamental prejudices which allow for 
all interpretation to be possible while conditioning that interpretation. 
Furthermore, this leads to the obvious conclusion – even though there can never 
be a conclusion, because meaning is infinite and transformation in the sense of 
self-understanding is unlimited, because we can never know anything 
completely – for both Gadamer and Ricouer, as Madison points out, that ‘not 
only is understanding … a form of self-understanding, but all self-
understanding is ultimately a matter of self-transformation’ (1994: 317). The 
aim of philosophical hermeneutics, therefore, is one of self-transformation, 
which is in-line with the aim of feminist comparative philosoph. It is also the 
ultimate aim of philosophy for both Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji.  
 
At first glance an attempt to make a conversation between myself, the 
reader, and two such diverse philosophers as Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji 
might appear strange, I hope so. The idea of an encounter with the strange in 
order to draw out what we take to be familiar (all the while becoming familiar 
with the strange) is the practice of philosophical hermeneutics, which is ‘based 
on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness’ (TM, 295) where neither the 
familiar nor the strange remain unaffected.5 Hermeneutics is located in the ‘play 
                                                             
5 ‘All understanding involves a process of mediation and dialogue between what is familiar and 





between the traditionary text's strangeness and familiarity to us, between being 
a historically intended, distanced object and belonging to a tradition’ (TM, 295). 
Therefore, ‘the true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between’ (TM, 295). The 
text here is taken to be an object which is situated historically distant from us. 
We ourselves belong to a tradition. The mediation between our tradition and 
the text which lies within its own tradition, and which we are interpreting, is the 
in-between space where the hermeneutic encounter can take place. Gadamer 
does not theorise this between space further, but it is crucial for his 
hermeneutics to be possible. And as we shall see, it is crucial for both Luce 
Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji who both claim to work in this “between”. In short, 
a relational endeavour of self-understanding. 
 
For Gadamer, ‘the meaning of “belonging,” – the element of tradition 
in our historical-hermeneutical activity – is fulfilled in the commonality of 
fundamental, enabling prejudices’ (TM, 295). Belonging and tradition are 
inseparable, and we might even say that they are the same thing. We belong to 
a tradition because we have shared or common prejudices which originate 
owing to our proximity to that tradition; that which is so familiar to us, that we 
don’t even know it. They colour everything we see, but without them, we 
wouldn’t be able to see. In Truth and Method (1960) Gadamer reclaims the term 
prejudice from its pejorative sense to give it a positive meaning and to make it 
a recognised necessary aspect of the practice of hermeneutics. We all have our 
prejudices, our fore-understandings, our pre-judgements and these are what 
enable us to make interpretations. And, at the same time, in the engagement 





the hermeneutical dialogue with the strange. In fact, without this encounter 
with the strange our prejudice cannot be uncovered. It is only by opening 
ourselves to that which is other or different that we can uncover our prejudice, 
or raise it to the level of self-understanding (and therefore self-transformation) 
as Gadamer clearly states: 
 
‘It is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it 
is constantly operating unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak, 
provoked. The encounter with a traditionary text can provide this 
provocation’ (TM, 298) 
 
More dramatically stated: ‘Our own prejudice is properly brought into play by 
being put at risk’ (TM, 298). Our shared prejudice therefore, make a purely 
subjective position impossible; and at the same time, make an objective 
position, a neutral position, one outside of history, also impossible. The method 
of understanding which avoids both subjectivism and objectivism is captured in 
the term “hermeneutic circle”, as Gadamer states: 
 
‘The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective 
nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the 
movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter … Tradition 
is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves 





and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of 
understanding is not a "methodological" circle, but describes an element 
of the ontological structure of understanding’ (TM, 293) 
 
We see clearly that what is at stake here is not the objective 
interpretation of a text, but rather the fundamental ontology of understanding 
itself. Moreover, we see emphatically why no pre-ordained methodology can be 
imposed on a dialogue between what is different or strange and with that which 
is familiar. It would be, in short, and as we shall discuss shortly, unethical. 
 
Our “horizon” or our “situatedness” is therefore directly related to our 
tradition. We have a horizon which is imbedded or situated within a tradition 
and from here is where we understand, and which is as much a movement of 
self-understanding, as Weinsheimer and Marshall explain:  
 
‘For Gadamer “tradition” or “what is handed down from the 
past” confronts us as a task, as an effort of understanding we feel 
ourselves required to make because we recognize our limitations, even 
though no one compels us to do so. It precludes complacency, passivity, 
and self-satisfaction with what we securely possess; instead it requires 






Hermeneutical understanding, therefore, always takes place within 
history and from a specific position, which is shared with others, and from 
where we can become aware of our own horizon, which is from where we face 
the world with all our prejudice. This place is one of self-questioning, a practice 
as we shall see, this is fundamental to both Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji.  
 
The hermeneutical encounter then is a dynamic between self-
understanding (ourselves and our shared tradition) and the understanding of 
what is foreign, strange or simply different to us (in this case a text which is 
historically distant to us and from or within another tradition.) By interpreting 
a text which belongs to a tradition, and which constitutes that tradition as such, 
we are brought into the hermeneutic dynamic: we must enter the horizon of the 
text in order to understand it, this brings out our own prejudice for examination, 
showing us our own horizon; and without such a dynamic only a limited 
understanding of the text or ourselves, and our different or shared tradition, is 
possible (Malpas, 2014). It is, in the end, an activity of self-transformation, 
albeit one of textual and philosophical nature.  
 
However, we must note here that Gadamer's work has a distinct ethical 
thrust. His hermeneutics is not limited to the interpretation of texts. In fact, we 
could argue that it is the ethical or practical philosophy which informs his 
hermeneutical approach to interpreting traditionary texts. It is precisely for this 





take place between Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji. Any dialogue must be 
grounded in a basic framework which is ethical and therefore open to difference.  
 
Central to Gadamer's work is the concept of dialogue and a dialogue (at 
least in written form) works according to minimal parameters at best, what we 
might call “checks and balances”. When reading Truth and Method the ethical 
dimension of his thought jumps out at us, for at times we are not sure anymore 
if he is speaking of interpreting a text or engaging in a dialogue with another 
(man or woman?) For Gadamer all texts refer back to ‘lived life and spoken 
language’ (Kearney, 2004, 176). We are the living other who faces the text and 
whom must bring it to life in and through the dynamic of our own self-
understanding. I take this point very seriously. When dealing with a text we are 
not dealing with a set of dead words available for dissection. We are in fact 
speaking with and listening to the other. Our ability to bring the text to life, and 
to dialogue with it, is fundamental to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutical 
approach. It is a central aspect of philosophical hermeneutics (as he re-
envisions it) and without this the ethical dimension it is easily lost.  
 
Bringing texts to life, or speaking with the texts, and therefore, 
speaking with the philosophers themselves, is an essential part of this thesis. 
Even if I am engaging with the texts, I argue that we are in fact engaging with 
the speaker themselves, and that our job in interpreting the texts is precisely to 
bring to life the thought of the speaker who wrote them.  Ultimately, they are 





remain dead words, that is in part my own failing to bring them back to life 
through an engaging discussion between themselves and ourselves. It might 
also be a sign of one of our own shared prejudices: to see the written word as 
dead or stale words, rather than making an effort to re-embody them, or 
creatively revive them. 
 
When it comes to the practice of dialogue itself, somewhat later in life 
Gadamer reflects on the ethical inherency to his practice of philosophical 
hermeneutics. For him it always was an endeavour of practical philosophy or 
phronēsis with the other (Gadamer, 2003, 21), who is also the one who is 
strange or foreign to us:  
 
‘Precisely in our ethical relation to the other, it becomes clear to 
us how difficult it is to do justice to the demands of the other or even 
simply to become aware of them. The only way not to succumb to our 
finitude is to open ourselves to the other, to listen to the "thou" who 
stands before us’ (Gadamer, 2003, 29)  
 
Everything which has been said above, therefore, can in fact be referred 
to engaging in an ethical dialogue with another man (but perhaps not with a 
woman according to certain feminists, and Luce Irigaray as we shall see.) What 
this means is that the concepts of ‘tradition’, ‘prejudice’, ‘the between’ and 





we interpret historically distant texts. Gadamer outlines three basic modes with 
which the dialogue with a text or another (I-Thou) can take. Here, in a brief 
account of Gadamer's threefold dialogue, we will see the slippage into dialogue 
with another, as opposed to the mere interpretation of a text. 
 
Firstly, we can speak about another, that is, we can objectify them as 
an “it” according to a method, allowing us to calculate the response of others; 
secondly, we can speak for another, or take the place of the other as if we can 
know them better than themselves. If both sides do this then a struggle for 
domination ensues; or thirdly, we can be in a relationship of mutual listening 
and interchange, in other words, a dialogue of mutual recognition where both 
are open to the encounter and are themselves changed through it (TM, 352-
355).  
 
The first two examples of dialogue both deny the prejudicial character 
of self-understanding, and therefore deny the possibility of understanding the 
other or one's self further within a situated historical position. The third brings 
in the prejudicial character of all hermeneutical encounters and opens the 
possibility for mutual recognition and mutual further self-understanding within 
and through the situated dialogue. This is the risk we take. I repeat an earlier 
quote: ‘Our own prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk’ 
(TM, 298) As I said then, it is no surprise that when reading this section of Truth 





relationship which has structured textual hermeneutics, rather than the other 
way around. 
 
Finally then, it is also no surprise that Bernstein (1983) Dallymayr 
(1996) and Warnke (1987; 2002) have all claimed that Gadamer's 
understanding of dialogue has great potential for engagements in cross-cultural 
dialogue. It does have great merits, but we should not be too hasty to 
appropriate it wholesale, for it has also been criticised for its Eurocentrism 
(Jantzen 2003, 292), and conservatism (Warnke 1987, 134-139; Warnke 2002, 
79-80) which leads to some reservations concerning any comparative 
philosophical dialogue. It has also been recently engaged with by several 
feminists, such as Wright (2003) and Jantzen (2003) who also consider it to 
have potential for a dialogue of mutual recognition between men and women. 
Although as Jantzen (2003, 303) points out, Gadamer himself never speaks of 
differences of race, culture, sex/gender, which means we should be cautious 
about the dialogical ethics he proposes, and not be too hasty to appropriate his 
hermeneutical approach without adapting it to the participants who take part 
in the actual dialogue. We should note that for the most part minor re-workings 
of Gadamer are suggested by both sets of scholars; irrespective of whether they 
are working on issues of cultural difference, or sexual difference or both. And as 
we have already reflected above hermeneutics, according to Butnor and 
Mcweeny, must include the above sensitivities to the two forms of diversity 






The point is, that philosophical hermeneutics cannot be a 
hermeneutics of exclusion; but must instead be a hermeneutics of openness to 
diversity, through a positive inclusion of differences in traditions and 
sex/gender, by including other voices in the philosophical dialogue, as well as 
having a heightened awareness to the issues of discrimination, injustice and 
domination that can be found in both texts and lived experience. Finally then, 
we can posit that perhaps the most important point we can take from 
philosophical hermeneutics is its aim of the cultivation of a broad open horizon. 
Gadamer himself states in Truth and Method:  
 
‘The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that 
can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking 
mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of 
horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth … A person who 
has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what is 
nearest to him. On the other hand, "to have a horizon" means not being 
limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.’ (TM, 301) 
 
There is one final point of Gadamer’s thought which we should 
acknowledge: this openness of our horizon is in fact what he terms ‘truth’. Truth 
is no longer objective or eternal; but is rather the open space where the 
encounter can take place. Here Gadamer is taking up Heidegger’s reworking of 
the Greek concept ἀλήθεια (rendered in English as aletheia) usually translated 





means by “truth” tends to coincide with the notion of openness’ (Madison 1994, 
308), as Gadamer himself states: 
 
 ‘The Truth of experience always contains an orientation 
towards new experience. … The dialectic of experience has its own 
fulfilment not in definitive knowledge, but in that openness to experience 
that is encouraged by experience itself’ (TM 319 cited in Madison 1994, 
308) 
 
What we have seen here is a very basic framework and aim from where 
to begin nuancing the creation of a dialogue between Nishitani Keiji and Luce 
Irigaray, according to the perceived needs of the participants who take part in 
that dialogue. This is certainly not something Gadamer would reject:  
 
‘working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the 
right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with 
tradition’ (TM, 302) 
 
Substitute the other or the thou for tradition and I think we have a clear 
way of working through a dialogue between Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray, 
which is flexible towards those partaking in the dialogue and the questions 





of their positions. In short, by engaging on the third level of mutual recognition, 
openness and listening that Gadamer suggests, we have a framework for further 
self-understanding and mutual understanding between differences, and 
certainly in a philosophical dialogue such as the one I propose here.  
 
Furthermore, we should note, that this ‘acquiring the right horizon of 
inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition’ might in fact 
require a limiting of this openness. This vast open horizon, as we shall see, 
something Nishitani Keiji pushes to its furthest limit with his standpoint of 
śūnyatā; while on the other hand, Luce Irigaray has her reservations about such 
open horizons, and instead prefers a hermeneutics of naivete which prioritizes 
sexuate difference. As we shall see, for Luce Irigaray, a woman might find the 
encounter with a predominantly masculine tradition requires delimiting of this 
openness of horizon by the concept of sexuate difference, in order to preserve 
and enable her own subjective position in the face of patriarchal and masculine 
prejudice. A radically open horizon as we find in Hans Georg Gadamer, or 
Nishitani Keiji, is not the most suitable for Luce Irigaray and her ethical vision, 
for it may accidentally or implicitly white wash the horizon, covering over some 









1.5. Juxtaposition and hermeneutics as a framework  
In the close reading of texts, the terminology used, and the dialogical 
toing and froing between Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji, this thesis is firmly 
within the philosophical hermeneutical tradition and its approach to 
understanding, truth and dialogue as self-transformation. The method of 
philosophical hermeneutics, as we have seen, is an attempt not to have a fixed 
or pre-established method of inquiry. This is because each study and every 
dialogue is unique, and therefore, requires acquiring the right horizon of 
inquiry, or we might say, acquiring an enabling form appropriate for a dialogue 
to take place. We must approach each study and inquiry with the most open of 
horizons in order to lay bare our own prejudices; at the same time, this horizon 
might require limiting in order to create a dialogue across traditions which are 
informed by sexuate difference.  
 
With this foregrounding of dialogue now in place, it is important to 
stress that the close hermeneutical reading of Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji 
is required for a juxtaposition of their thought between East and West. A close 
reading takes place through extensive quotations, allowing the philosophers to 
speak through the text, and for meaning to arise between them. This 
juxtaposition has value in as far as the effects or findings of that juxtaposition 
give new insight into our own lives, and in-line with the existential 
understanding of philosophical hermeneutics as transformational. The 
problems that Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji engage in, are to some extent 





This is what gives meaning to the existential inquiry. In the sense of 
comparative philosophy however, the justification for the juxtaposition itself, 
stands or falls, on the findings of that inquiry. This is not therefore, a new kind 
of methodology, it is a joining together of hermeneutic, existential, feminist and 
comparative methods of inquiry. And, it is the result of this juxtaposition, the 
conjoining of sexuate difference and śūnyatā, and the possibility of two 
standpoints (a non-he and a non-she) being established on that field, and how 
viable or insightful that is for our own experience, justifies the approach taken 












































In part one of this chapter I shall overview both philosopher’s life and 
work. We begin with an analysis of their respective work according to their 
autobiographical understanding of themselves, which they both self-reflectively 
consider to be in three phases. This serves to give us a good foundational 
understanding of their written work, and the changes in focus that take place 
within it over the long duration of their philosophical careers.  
 
In the second part of this chapter I explain Nishitani Keiji and Luce 
Irigaray’s “methods” of cross-cultural dialogue. Luce Irigaray as we shall see, 
attempts to foreground a hermeneutic of naiveté, which is in brief, a 
hermeneutical horizon that privileges sexuate difference in the cross-cultural 
encounter and all interpretation (Deutscher, 2002; 2003). Nishitani Keiji also 
finds himself uniquely between traditions. However, his hermeneutic of 





with no borders or conceptual limits likened to the open expanse of the sky 
(Davis, 2011, 2004, 2013; Ueda, 2011; Heisig, 2001). This as we shall see, is 
problematic for Luce Irigaray as it may eradicate the opening of sexuate 
difference within a hermeneutic of global philosophy. 
 
In the third part of this chapter I introduce each philosopher’s 
fundamental self-understanding. Here we will see the key philosophical concept 
that is the pivotal thought or hermeneutical lens through which they interpret 
the self, as well as create philosophy. We shall see that they both critique any 
notion of a fixed or separate ego, and they both consider the self to be relational 
in its fundamental essence. By introducing the fundamental self-understanding 
they become familiar to us from the beginning, and with each of their 
fundamental hermeneutical standpoints, we can foreground the dialogue 
between them. Dialogue, etymologically, is a speaking across (ety. dia- legein). 
For this to happen there must be a between, a place where this dialogue takes 




2.2.a. Luce Irigaray: A life in three acts 
Luce Irigaray is probably the most important female philosopher living 
and working today. She was educated in Belgium and France where she received 





under Jacque Lacan as a psychoanalyst and went on to have her own personal 
psychoanalytic practice for over forty years. These different strands, along with 
her engagement with Eastern traditions and the practice of yoga, have woven 
together throughout the course of her life resulting in a unique philosophy, 
which she calls sexuate difference.6 To explain her unique philosophy Luce 
Irigaray uses a three-phase developmental model:  
 
‘the first, a critique, you might say, of the auto-mono-centrism 
of the western subject; the second, how to define a second subject; and 
the third phase, how to define a relationship, a philosophy, an ethic, a 
relationship between two different subjects’ (JLI, 97)  
 
In her first phase, she wants to show ‘how a single subject, traditionally 
the masculine subject, had constructed and interpreted the world according to 
a single perspective’ (JLI, 97). In her controversial first book Speculum of the 
Other woman ([1974] 1985) Luce Irigaray critiques this patriarchal tradition, 
from Plato through to Freudian (Lacanian) psychoanalysis. Because a woman is 
                                                             
6  In her early works, Luce Irigaray uses the term sexual difference. However, from the mid-
1990's she changes this to sexuate difference and sexuate identity. She changed from the use 
of sexual to sexuate for reasons of clarification, for her, sexual is easily misunderstood to mean 
something to do with sexual relations, sexuality, or sexual orientation. She clearly considers 
sexual choice a secondary parameter to sexuate identity and sexuate difference. (See her 
comments in JLI, 112) For her sexual choice is free, it has nothing to do with sexuate 
difference, or sexuate identity (Personal communication, June 2013). In this thesis the term 
sexual difference will not be used unless in directly quoting her earlier works, and my usage of 





an object for man, defined by him and has no recognised subject position of her 
own, in her critique Luce Irigaray is forced to mimic the male voice of the 
masculine culture’s tradition as found in the text. She mimics this male voice in 
a hysterical female manner, playing on the definition of woman as defined by 
men in a discipline such as psychoanalysis, which leads to a novel style and form 
of critique (See Jones 2011, 19; Grosz 1989, 132-139; Whitford 1991, 70-72).7 It 
results in a work of cutting genius that takes on the entire Western philosophical 
tradition from Plato to Freud. At the same time, it results in her expulsion from 
the university and the Lacanian school of psychoanalysis in Paris.8  
 
In her second early work, This Sex which is not one ([1977] 1985) Luce 
Irigaray further develops this first phase, building on her critique of the 
psychoanalytic and Western philosophical tradition; specifically, by taking up a 
Marxist informed critique of the phallo-centric consumerist-capitalist economy 
of male dominated society, masculine culture and its commodification of 
women as objects (Whitford 1991, 20-22). In short, in this early phase, the 
understanding of a subject according to the tradition of Western philosophy and 
                                                             
7 These stylistic considerations have been taken into account when presenting and juxtaposing 
Luce Irigaray with Nishitani Keiji. The two main points being: Firstly, it means that there are 
inherent problems when analysing her work if I begin to systematise it, analyse it or take a 
critical and reflective position; for that position is, according to her, inherently phallocratic, it 
is a position derived from this very history of the single male subject. Secondly, it means that by 
placing her alongside another diverse and complex thinker such as Nishitani Keiji, we must be 
extra careful not to assimilate her back into a patriarchal tradition of philosophy, even if this 
tradition is extended across conceptual limits usually referred to as East and West. 





the masculine culture which it underpins, is critiqued from the perspective of a 
woman who has no subject position of her own within that culture, i.e., 
paradoxically, an external perspective from within the masculine Western 
cultural tradition. 
 
In the mid 1980’s her work enters what she considers to be a more 
positive second phase. This is seen as the period from the publication of An 
ethics of sexual difference ([1984] 1993) onwards. This first step towards a 
constructive position for Luce Irigaray, had the aim of defining ‘those 
meditations that could permit the existence of a feminine subjectivity – that is 
to say another subject’ (JLI, 97). In this period, she takes up a more sympathetic 
dialogical form within her texts, which is still nevertheless stylistically 
innovative and idiosyncratic, as she takes up an affectionate and passionate 
mode of engagement with the history of philosophy (Lehtinen 2014, 193). Her 
critique of the male-centric history of philosophy continued, as she went on to 
engage with thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger in two 
separate and influential texts.9 This phase therefore, began a more constructive 
and positive elaboration of a woman’s subject position and perspective, while 
remaining more sympathetically in dialogue with the Western philosophical 
tradition.  
 
                                                             
9 See, Marine lover of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) and 





This second phase must also be seen in close connection with the third 
phase of the 'between-two'. The development of a female subjectivity or female 
subject, as these terms are used interchangeably, is closely linked with a 
development of an irreducible sexuate difference, what she calls a 'between-
two'. This for Luce Irigaray is an attempt to ‘define a new model of possible 
relations between man and woman, without the submission of either one to the 
other’ (JLI 96). This phase clearly emerges in the early 1990’s and can best be 
seen in texts such as i love to you ([1992] 1996) and to be two ([1994] 2000).10 
This third phase showed an even greater focus on the poetic and the evocative, 
where her written work becomes a creative art of philosophy. Although she 
continues to explicitly and implicitly engage with the masculine Western 
philosophical tradition.  
 
We can see that Luce Irigaray's work develops over her long career as 
a philosopher and a writer. Beginning with a damning critique of the 
psychoanalytic and Western philosophical tradition, she goes on to positively 
think through the implications of her critique for women as a different subject 
defined in her own right, before finally elaborating a creative and dynamic 
philosophy which operates between two different subjects. We have seen that 
she does not rest in a critical philosophical perspective, but instead goes on to 
elaborate a creative philosophy based on an ethics of sexuate difference between 
subjects who are not the same. With this in place, we can now juxtapose 
Nishitani Keiji’s threefold autobiographical understanding of his work.  
                                                             






2.2.b. Nishitani Keiji: A life in three acts 
There are two principle autobiographical documents where Nishitani 
Keiji demarcates his oeuvre according to his own self-reflexive understanding. 
The first is the autobiographical essay ‘The standpoint of my philosophy’ 
published in 1963. The second is the message in absence to the symposium held 
in his honour, entitled ‘Encounter with emptiness’ published in 1984. These two 
short works together offer us a clear self-reflexive perspective on his 
fundamental philosophical orientation and its three phases. In ‘The standpoint 
of my philosophy’ Nishitani Keiji explains his development as follows: 
       
‘I myself turned to philosophy from out [of] … a pre-
philosophical nihilism [nihility]. Therefore, the fundamental direction I 
followed was, first of all a philosophical development of the nihilistic 
standpoint itself. Secondly, it was a philosophical and critical inquiry into 
the problems of ethics and religion. And finally, the fundamental 
direction I followed was one of going through nihilism and finding a way 
to overcome it. These three threads were naturally entwined into one’ 
(SP, 29) 
 
In his youth and through his student days Nishitani Keiji experienced 
a great despair, something which he called a pre-philosophical nihilism: a loss 





included or necessitated for him a turn to a study of Western philosophy. In 
short, it is an existential inquiry. This included key figures of the European 
philosophical tradition (Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, to name 
just a few) under the guidance of his first teacher and the first modern Japanese 
philosopher Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945). From here, he followed his inquiry 
into religion and ethics (his middle phase) before finally overcoming nihilism 
by going through nihilism. This overcoming of nihilism being that which 
demarcates the middle to later period of his thought (a path which was foreseen 
in The Self Overcoming of Nihilism some fifteen years earlier.) 
 
At the end of this same autobiographical piece ‘The standpoint of my 
philosophy’, we are told that the overcoming of nihilism was made possible by 
the realization of the Buddhist standpoint of śūnyatā. In fact, in the very first 
line of this short essay Nishitani Keiji states that he has ‘come to understand 
things according to the Buddhist way of thinking’ (SP, 24). It is this openly 
Buddhist way of thinking, along with his personal overcoming of his pre-
philosophical despair, which combine to mark the final phase of his work. This 
is, moreover, the central turning point of his thought which takes place in 1963 
(Ueda, 2001; Davis, 2006). It is from this mid-point onwards where we see a 
real commitment to a creative philosophical working out of a Zen philosophy 
(with increasing focus on aesthetics qualities including Zen literature, poetry 
and imagery) that will come to occupy Nishitani Keiji for the last third of his life 






For our purposes then, we can date his ‘early period’ from approximately 
1930 to the mid-late 1940’s (depending on whether it is marked by the end of 
the Second World War in Japan, or his publication of The Self Overcoming of 
Nihilism in 1949.) His ‘middle period’ is seen usually to begin from this point in 
the 1940’s and runs up to the publication of Religion and Nothingness in 1962. 
The ‘mature’ or ‘later’ period is then considered to be from Religion and 
Nothingness onwards until his death in 1990.11   
 
I consider this simple juxtaposition of each philosopher’s 
autobiographical works to be hermeneutically interesting. The fact that at a 
certain point in their lives both Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji look back and 
see the unfolding of their own philosophical development in three phases is 
quite revealing. Here I have shown that they both begin with an existential 
critique, before moving into a phase of positive exploration, before becoming 
more creative in style and content. Luce Irigaray is very conscious of this 
unfolding and considers the movement from the negative to the positive to the 
creative to be an intrinsic demand to the philosopher’s life and practice. To 
remain in critique, is for her, a philosophical failure. According to her own 
standards of philosophical inquiry and development, therefore, Nishitani Keiji 
is a philosopher and a worthwhile partner for dialogue. It is to the Eastern 
                                                             
11 The major consensus in the small amount of scholarship available in translation, is to divide 
Nishitani Keiji’s work into three stages. (Some suggest a fourth late phase of Pure Land Buddhist 
influence (Van Bragt 2006; Carter, 2006; Hase, 1997b). Hase (1997), Horio (1997) and Mori 





influences of both philosophers, especially in the realm of Eastern practices, 
which I now want to turn.  
 
2.3.a. Luce Irigaray: between east/west, between text/practice  
Alongside her work in psychoanalysis, linguistics and philosophy, Luce 
Irigaray has also been engaged with what she terms the East. This blending of 
yogic practices, and the broad studies which Luce Irigaray has undertaken over 
the last thirty or more years, has led her to begin to include in her writings from 
the early 1990's onwards, several oblique references to the Buddha, Yoga, 
Tantra and Krishnamurti, as well as references to South Asian and East Asian 
religious practices and myth.12 However, it is not until her work between east 
and west: from singularity to community (2002) that her Eastern influences 
become explicit. Apart from the fact that it This is the first text where she 
explicitly discusses her encounter with Eastern practices and thought; it is also 
highly personal and biographical, something which up until this time in her 
oeuvre was always minimal. In many ways, this text sits between her middle 
phase of work and her latter phase of work. For this reason, I consider this text 
to be a significant turn in her thought, as she becomes increasingly entwined 
between East and West.  
 
                                                             
12 The first examples of this are found in the collection of lectures known as Sexes and 
Genealogies ([1987] 1993), for example the essay 'Women, the sacred, money' (See SG, 77), i 





I think it is important to be clear on what Luce Irigaray means by the 
East, and to examine some of the scholarly criticism she has received for her 
Eastern excursions. We can group the criticisms of Luce Irigaray's thought 
under four main points:  
 
a) that she fails to elaborate an adequate theory for cultural 
difference on two related counts: the first, as a cross-cultural 
theory between different cultures, the second, as a theory which 
is adequate for the already existing political issues of 
multiculturalism and the problems of migration (especially of 
women) found in Western nations (Deutscher 2002, 2003; 
Mookherjee 2005) 
  
b) that she is guilty of orientalism by idealizing and essentializing 
the East as a monolithic entity where alternative and more 
sympathetic thought on femininity can be located and 
appropriated for their use in the further development of sexual 
difference (Deutscher 2002, 2003, Mookherjee 2005, Joy 
2006) 
 
   
c) that she makes the mistake of applying a psychoanalytic (and we 
should add philosophical) critique out of cultural context, 





philosophy?) cannot apparently be applied to non-Western 
cultures (Mookherjee 2005, Deutscher 2002) 
 
d) that she is not adequately grounded in the Eastern traditions, 
having learnt only the practices (of Yoga in a Western context) 
and not the languages, philosophies, textual traditions of the 
multiple South and Far Eastern traditions she makes reference 
to (Sokthan Yeng 2014). This leaves her open to both mistaken 
understandings but also risks of appropriating practices or 
concepts which in fact defeat her purposes. For example, 
appropriating a practice or idea with hidden patriarchal bias 
which reinforces the very limitations she is attempting to change 
(Joy 2006) 
 
It is true that Luce Irigaray does at times make generalisations which 
by all accounts appear as essentialist idealisations of a monolithic East. This 
means that at times in between east and west (2002) we are often not exactly 
sure which tradition or which aspect of which culture she is talking about. At 
one moment she may be referring to the East, and then in the next moment to 
Tantra, and then in the next sentence to Indo-Aryan patriarchy and its 
opposition to more feminine Aboriginal culture. At times it is, and at times it 
isn't exactly clear what aspect of this multiplicity of traditions she is referring 






On the other hand, Luce Irigaray does in fact have a nuanced 
understanding of the East – as a multiplicity of traditions with a complex 
stratified history. In her defence she states, the East is quite clearly not a single 
cultural monolith, but is rather, a general term which she uses to cover 
‘multiple’ traditions (BEW, 15). This multiplicity is a complicated one, not only 
because she makes various differentiations within the East without clarifying 
them (and uses various terms interchangeably, such as Far East, yoga, 
Buddhism, Tantra, India, Vedas and Hindu) but because she also makes even 
more general grand historical/pre-historical differentiations such as Aboriginal 
and Indo-Aryan cultures.13  
 
It is not possible to go into these differences in depth here. I can only 
affirm that the East is not a singular monolithic entity, rather, it is a multiplicity 
of traditions with a complicated and stratified history, and that I do think Luce 
Irigaray is fully aware of this, even if she uses terms such as the East in her 
work.14 In my opinion there still appears to be a lacuna when it comes to 
understanding the influence of Eastern traditions on Luce Irigaray’s middle to 
later phases of work. This thesis, through a dialogue with Nishitani Keiji, goes 
some way towards addressing this. It is impossible to pinpoint the exact 
influences on a person’s thought, especially someone as complex as Luce 
Irigaray, as she herself states, ‘to explain what Western culture has given me – 
                                                             
13   Here as Morny Joy rightly points out this last point is taken from Mircea Eliade's analysis 
which has been questioned (see Joy 2006, chapter six).  
14  Stratified history meaning that some aspects are repressed and forgotten, and some aspects 
are preserved and furthered, giving a multilayered history depending on who is writing it and 





and not given me – and what the practice of yoga and its tradition have given 
me – and not given me is not a simple task to carry out’ (BEW, 49). Still, I 
consider it worth drawing out the major points of influence from three key 
sources, as it may help to facilitate a passage between Nishitani Keiji and Luce 
Irigaray. There are three major influences that I want to highlight here. Firstly, 
the most explicit, and the least we can analyse textually is Yogic practice itself; 
secondly, are the fundamentals of Tantra; and finally, there is Jiddu 
Krishnamurti, who I suggest is of great influence on her philosophy. 
 
Luce Irigaray began a long-term commitment to the practice and study 
of yoga in the early 1980's. She first explicitly discusses this in between east and 
west (2002). However, she returns to this in one of her most recent works 
Through Vegetal Being (2016), where she recounts her entry into a Yogic 
practice (TVB, 25-26). It was through a car accident that she came to practice 
Yoga. Her instructor was French and trained in the South Indian school of 
Krishnamacharya. He gave her exercises to cultivate spinal health and the 
breath, as well as recommending texts for her to study, and masters to meet. 
Here she also mentions Jiddu Krishnamurti and the Buddha. She herself admits 
that she did not have the cultural context of Indian life and language, but she 
studied texts such as the Vedas, the Sutras, especially the Yoga sutras by 
Patanjali, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, the Bhakti, and also novels and 
poetry, as well as good commentaries: Swami Sananda-Sarasvati, Sri 
Aurobindo, Mircea Eliade, Alain Danielou, Lilian Silburn, Jean Varenne and 
Heinrich Zimmer (TVB, 25-26). Here then we have a very good record of the 





then is primarily practical, as she looks to Eastern practices to regain her health, 
to help her understand herself, her body and her breath. 
  
In her book between east and west (2002) Luce Irigaray discloses 
lessons learned or remembered from her Yogic practice and study. These are: 
to breathe and its relation to the body and speaking; to respect and cultivate 
sensible perceptions; to learn and to teach or the importance of the living 
teacher-student relationship; to live spiritually in the body and the flesh (BEW, 
49-64). It is also important to note here, that at the end of her essay ‘Eastern 
teachings’ she also says what Yoga has not taught her, and this is threefold, one, 
sexuate difference, two the importance of reciprocity between persons (which is 
found in sexuate difference), and three, the importance of a woman’s virginity 
(BEW, 64-71). We shall discuss these in more detail later as they are central 
contentions in the juxtaposition of Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji.  
 
There are many other points of intersection between Luce Irigaray’s 
thought and Asian philosophy, such as the centrality of masculine and feminine, 
what might be called Yin/Yang or Loma/Viloma in Chinese or Indian thought 
respectively (SG, DBT). And there is also the connection to her idea of the divine 
couple, Śiva and Parvati, as the mythological model of the dynamic between two 
subjects who are male and female lovers (BEW, TVB, TBB). There is cultivation 
through desire (BEW). There is also the mention of energy, what might be called 
Chi or Prana, in Chinese or Indian thought (BEW, TVB, TBT). There is also an 





TBB). These evocations in her texts are often easily missed or over looked, but 
they all point to a certain tradition in particular, which is influential across 
traditions of Buddhism and Yoga in South and East Asia. Here I am speaking of 
Tantra. 
 
Space does not permit a full exploration of Luce Irigaray’s relationship 
to Tantra here, if indeed there is one, for I cannot be sure that she has any real 
experience or study of its practices. However, as soon as we speak of energy, 
spiritualised coupling, chakras, Hatha Yoga, cultivation of the breath and 
senses, returning to a (divine) body, or overcoming the dualism of a 
transcendent heaven as good and the world of everyday sensible suffering as 
bad, or perhaps most of all, that desire itself is the path to emancipation, then 
we are in the realm of, or a realm akin to, Tantra. Georg Feuerstein (1998, x) 
defines Tantra as, ‘an exceptionally ramified and complex esoteric tradition of 
Indic origin’ which ‘made its appearance around 500 CE’ in the Indian Sub-
continent as a fully-fledged movement or style but may well be of a much older 
origin. This complex and fluid movement spanned across Hinduism and 
Buddhism, greatly influencing practices of ritual and bodily cultivation for over 
a millennium. Practices such as Hatha Yoga, the most prominent Yoga practiced 
in the West, are in fact unthinkable or would be unrecognisable without the 
existence of Tantra.15  
                                                             
15 Hatha is translated as Sun and Moon, which falls under the Yogic philosophical polar 
concepts of Loma/Viloma. Here we see a polarity which has multiple implications for the 






Perhaps most significantly, much like Luce Irigaray, Tantra holds 
kama or desire to be the means to salvation; the path is not an ascetic one 
sacrificing the world for liberation, it is rather to emancipate one’s self through 
this very world of desire and its cultivation. It is what Feuerstein (2011) calls the 
‘transmutation of desire’ or ‘the path of ecstasy’16 where we can see that the 
cultivation of desire for the purposes of liberation are fundamental to both 
Tantra and Luce Irigaray’s philosophy of sexuate difference. We could add here 
also that her recent advocation of Śiva as a god for our times is also greatly 
influenced by her Tantric leanings, as Śiva is also of great importance to the 
Tantric traditions esoterical understanding of the transmutation of desire and 
the cultivation of energy (See Feuerstein 1998, 226-232).  
 
In her most recent works, such as Through Vegetal Being (2016) Luce 
Irigaray reflects on her work between east and west (2002). Here she also 
dwells on Śiva and his relationship to his consorts Parvati and Kali, which 
reinforces her model of two lovers who are different, from a perspective between 
East and West. Śiva is, for her, a god for our time as he is a god of transition: he 
is the god ‘who is in charge of the passage from one age to another’ (TVB, 70), 
he is also the ‘god of love’ (TVB, 70) and he is the god who partly offers a solution 
to the crisis that faced Nietzsche and our epoch – the problem of nihilism or the 
                                                             
not completely Tantric in nature. See Feuerstein, Tantra: The path to ecstasy (1998) and 
D.G.White (2000). 
16 See the chapter of the same name in G. Feuerstein’s book The path of Yoga (2011), and the 





problem of sexuate difference. Śiva then, becomes the archetypical god for our 
times according to Luce Irigaray’s most recent East-West adventures. He is a 
god of the elements and the body, a god who dances, a god of change, a god who 
is often coupled with one of his consorts Parvati or Kali.  
 
Finally, the Sanskrit word Tantra literally means something woven 
together. This could be an ordered philosophical system or system of rituals, or 
even simply a text. This is where the English word textile comes from and it 
means that when Luce Irigaray describes her work as woven between traditions, 
she does so with this etymological understanding in mind. Her texts are 
weavings of her own practices, and her thought between traditions, much like 
Tantra was a weaving of diverse practices, rituals and texts, across multiple 
traditions (including Buddhism and Hinduism) in the first millennium C.E.  
 
Another great influence on Luce Irigaray is Jiddu Krishamurti (1895-
1986). It is unclear if she ever met him, but I consider Krishnamurti to be a 
major influence on her philosophy. For many people, especially in the Western 
academic world of philosophy, Krishnamurti is unknown.17 Luce Irigaray makes 
only a handful of references to Krishnamurti in her texts. One of the most 
explicit references is found in between east and west is quite revealing, she 
                                                             
17 For an excellent biographical account of Krishnamurti’s relation to the Theosophical society 







states:   
 
‘It is necessary to learn again to think without centering on the 
object, for example, to think in a living and free manner, unattached, 
neither egological nor possessive. This does not mean not thinking but 
being capable of going beyond the inertias of thought in order to set its 
energy free. Is this not the path shown by Buddha and, in our age, in his 
own way, by Krishnamurti’ (BEW, 67)  
  
Krishnamurti and the Buddha are clearly related for her. We shall 
examine her use of the image of the Buddha later, where we shall see the 
importance of our relation to the object. In fact, I consider Buddhism to have 
had only a minor influence on her thought, whereas Krishnamurti is without 
doubt a great influence, both explicitly and implicitly. His spirit is certainly 
woven into her texts as we find resonances between Luce Irigaray and 
Krishnamurti in the image of Buddha looking at a flower; as well as the idea of 
natural flowering of the human being; the objectification and technification of 
man; the cultivation of perception; the need for a return to nature in order to 
become human; and the fact that we live always in relationship, that is, that a 
human being is a relational being.18  
                                                             







For over thirty years Luce Irigaray has been engaging in both a Western 
education, writing and practice, alongside a sustained practice and study of 
Yoga. This means that any analysis of her thought overall is no easy task. In fact, 
such a task is probably impossible, and certainly difficult as she herself claims. 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that this cross-cultural adventure she undergoes 
underlies many of her later developments, and I suggest it is one of the main 
driving forces of her three phases: the shift to her middle phase occurred at the 
same time as she began a regular yogic practice; and the role of cultivating the 
breath in order to return to our bodies and the vegetal, is given as much 
importance as sexual difference, or even seen as a necessary pre-stage to 
understanding and realising sexual difference, in her latter phase and her most 
recent works (e.g. TVB, TBT). It is also this thorough engagement with Eastern 
practices that makes her work an example of feminist comparative philosopher, 
worthy of further fruitful hermeneutical dialogue across traditions. 
 
2.3.b. Nishitani Keiji: between east/west 
The influence and use of Eastern thought and practice is implicit to 
much of Luce Irigaray’s thought from her middle phase onwards, and she does 
not appear to engage with the tradition as embodied in text. In Nishitani Keiji’s 
works we find the most explicit attempt to move between East and West, and to 
bring together insights from Japanese Buddhist thought and practice, as well as 
the wider Buddhist philosophies found in South and East Asia. Nishitani Keiji 





between them throughout his life’s work.  
 
Nishitani Keiji’s writings clearly show a wide gathering of ideas from 
various Buddhist traditions. However, we should not think that this Buddhist 
thinking is by any means tied to a definite school of Buddhism. Scholars take 
different views as to what the major Buddhist influences on Nishitani Keiji are, 
but much like when examining Luce Irigaray, I think it is very difficult to draw 
out these influences as they are often modified and deeply entwined.19 Nishitani 
Keiji therefore, does not hold a specifically Buddhist position. In fact, he is 
critical of various Buddhist traditions in calling for their reformation in the 
contemporary world.20 Therefore, he rather takes what Waldenfels (1980) 
describes as a very ‘common’ or ‘everyday’ Buddhist understanding; one broad 
in its textual appropriation. Most significantly however, during what we have 
called his mature period, Nishitani Keiji took up a momentous study of Dōgen 
Zenji (1200-1253) Shōbōgenzō from 1966-78. Both lecturing and publishing on 
probably the most important Zen master and medieval philosopher in Japanese 
history (Horio, 1997, 20). It was also during this time that we see his writings 
take an overtly Zen stance. Although he did draw copiously on the Zen tradition 
throughout his middle period, it is once he takes up the Buddhist standpoint, 
                                                             
19  Jan Van Bragt sees him as taking up a position akin to the classical Buddha (which is 
problematic at best and highly unlikely) and also the central influence of Nāgārjuna (1983, 
1992); Waldenfels (1980) also works from a perspective of Nāgārjuna's influence on him; 
Carter (2006) sees the later work of Nishitani Keiji more influenced by Pure Land Buddhism; 
and several others make arguments showing his ideas and concepts to follow different key 
ideas in various pan-Asian Buddhist traditions. 
20  See for example ‘Encountering no-religion’ (1985), and ‘On what I think about Buddhism’ 





that he begins to title his essays with explicit reference to Zen. For example, the 
article ‘Science and Zen’ (1965) is the first of many philosophical essays that he 
writes explicitly on Zen, along with 'The standpoint of Zen' (1967) perhaps being 
one of the definitive essays of his mature period.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I tentatively follow Stambaugh (1999), Heisig 
(1996) and Parkes (2014) that the foremost Buddhist influence on Nishitani 
Keiji is Dōgen, and this goes well beyond philosophical inquiry, and well into 
the realms of practice and realization. Religion and Nothingness is permeated 
by Dōgen's thought and the practice of 'just sitting’ (RN, 186-187) ‘body-mind 
dropping off’ (RN, 184-193) or 'thinking non-thinking’ (EE, 4) are all direct 
references to him. It is Dōgen  who in many ways shows Nishitani Keiji how to 
grasp more clearly the insight into the reality of man through reality itself (RN, 
5), and the conversation he cites in ‘Encounter with Emptiness’ (1984) which 
exemplifies the final standpoint from which he wants to philosophize is a 
conversation from Dōgen's works and a classic story of Zen Buddhism.  
 
Before we move on to a philosophical analysis of Nishitani Keiji’s 
method of dialogue, we should make one further and important note. Alongside 
his personal despair and struggle, his philosophical development and his 
dialogue across traditions, Nishitani Keiji was an arduous practitioner of Zazen 
meditation. Zazen is a deceptively simple sitting meditation practice found in 
most schools of Zen Buddhism. His meditation practice is extremely significant 





exposition, and we shall discuss it in detail in chapter four.  
 
Nishitani Keiji took up Zen training as a layman in the 1930’s and 
practiced regularly for over twenty years to complete his official training in the 
1950’s. We cannot simply ignore these many hours of Zen practice which he 
undertook for many years, they go hand in hand with his philosophical 
development. In fact, Horio (1997) offers us an outline of Nishitani Keiji’s Zen 
practice which is once more set up in three stages which parallel his 
philosophical development. The first is of an interest in Zen meditation already 
in his youth; the second, is one of official lay practice for more than twenty 
years; the third, is finally working through philosophically a standpoint of Zen 
in his later writings exemplified as a ‘thinking non thinking’. We can see then 
that Nishitani Keiji’s increasing rigour in Zen practice parallels his 
philosophical development to the point where he wants to bridge the gap 
between Zen practice and his philosophy. In short, he wants to think from this 
Zen insight of śūnyatā.  
 
It is reasonable therefore to demarcate Nishitani Keiji’s thought into 
three phases. However, in keeping with the three phases approach, but 
including both his philosophical and his practical development, we could say 
that, the first phase is the critical assimilation of Western philosophy from his 
own personal background as a Japanese man who is educated in a university 
institution and discipline which is based on a European model. The second 





the traditional texts of Zen and the wider Buddhist textual traditions. This 
results in his overcoming of what he sees as alienation caused by a loss of his 
own traditional roots, and the globalisation being brought about by the 
advancements of science and technology, which are mechanizing society and 
human beings on an unprecedented scale, which of course, at least in these 
forms, originate in Ancient Attica. The third mature phase is the poetic-
aesthetic creative phase where his thought becomes more poetic and imagistic, 
evocative of the position he now embodies. This final phase is distinctly marked 
by his Zen practice and study, and his creative process of writing a unique 
philosophy, a process which he is engaged in for over thirty years. It is this more 
inclusive demarcation of three phases to which I am referring throughout this 
thesis, and for the most part I am using the publication of specific texts as the 
dates for demarcation: early, is prior to the publication of The self overcoming 
of nihilism (1949); the middle, is up until the publication of ‘The starting point 
of my philosophy’ (1963); and everything after this is the late period.  
 
From this juxtaposition of Nishitani Keiji’s and Luce Irigaray’s life and 
texts, we can see that there is a constant engagement which for both of them is 
a weaving between East and West making any attempt to separate their thought, 
practice and lives impossible. In this sense of weaving between East and West 
both Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray are unique in the history of philosophy, 
as philosophers who engage in this space between traditions and texts, and who 
live this engagement in their daily bodily practices. In fact, I suggest that this 
creative drive within their respective philosophies is driven forward by their 





middle phase when these practices are clearly fundamental to their lives. This 
facilitates a certain creativity to their thought and work, and again all the more 
reason to bring them into dialogue.  
 
 
2.4.a. Luce Irigaray’s Cross-cultural method of naiveté 
In this section we shall analyse the method of Luce Irigaray's cross-
cultural dialogue: naiveté. Naiveté is entwined with the notions of the between 
or passages between and renaissance. As we have seen, Luce Irigaray's cross-
cultural dialogue has received plenty of attention and ample criticism. The main 
aim here is to understand the method of naiveté, and its requirements for cross-
cultural dialogue, so we can begin the dialogue between Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji.  
 
As we might suspect, the main aim of Luce Irigaray's cross-cultural 
dialogue is to further support her fundamental thought of sexuate difference. 
The method of naiveté therefore, is not naive, it is a prejudice of sexuate 
difference in interpretation. In short, all other binary oppositions (nature-
culture, matter-spirit and so on) can be set aside, including all theoretical 
reflections based on them, while we engage in cross-cultural dialogue, but not 
the binary of sexuate difference which is primordial and universal (we shall 
address these fundamental dimensions in more detail later.) It is enough to 





respect sexuate difference if it is to be an acceptable cross-cultural engagement 
for Luce Irigaray. Sexuate difference may then be more in-tune with feminist 
comparative philosophy than hermeneutics in general.  
 
Nowhere to my knowledge does Luce Irigaray define precisely what she 
means by culture. It is clear for her, that there is a relation between the term 
‘culture’ and the verb ‘to cultivate’ (See for example the essays, JTN and CD). 
Luce Irigaray also uses culture within the binary opposition of nature-culture. 
This is taken over from Hegel's use of culture as an individual's (the father's) 
transcendence of the family (nature) where we enter the realms of history and 
politics (EIC, BMH). Culture in the Hegelian sense would be a step upward from 
nature as a movement of spirit (geist) on its journey to higher realms including 
those of art, religion and philosophy. It is questionable whether nature is 
actually cut off and left behind in this case, or if it is the substrate of a continuum 
upwards towards higher levels of spirit. Whatever the case, for Hegel culture is 
masculine and civilisation is the realm of men, whereas women are left behind 
as nature (Lloyd, 1993; Stone, 2006).  
For Luce Irigaray we have the possibility of masculine and feminine 
cultures (Joy, 2006, 96-91). In French masculin and féminin are broader in 
scope then their English equivalents masculine and feminine. Mâle and femelle 
are used in the strict biological sense (as in the classification of animals for 
example.) Masculine and feminine when used in the English language are 
considered to be the social and cultural attitudes, roles and gestures of an 





to a sex/gender distinction in the English language which does not necessarily 
map directly onto the French equivalents. For Luce Irigaray masculin and 
féminin encompass bodily existence as well as the socio-cultural significances 
of that bodily existence. This means that for her there is no strict sex/gender 
distinction. I use the English terms masculine and feminine with the same 
broader meaning as found in the French language and as used by Luce Irigaray 
(Jones, 2011, 4-7, Stone, 2006, 9-10). Luce Irigaray’s work is in many ways an 
attempt to recover, discover and establish a feminine culture, while at the same 
ultimately she aims at cultivating a culture of sexuate difference between the 
two cultures of masculine and feminine.  
 
In many ways, at least at the outset, Luce Irigaray’s East-West 
engagement is one which attempts to sidestep an intentional or philosophical 
cross-cultural dialogue of words and speech (examples of this are found 
thoughtout BEW and ILTY). Instead, she grounds her very personal exchange 
in gesture, practice and her insights as a woman, from bodily activities such as 
hatha yoga, with a great focus on the breath (See BEW, TVB). This does not 
mean that she completely ignores the Eastern discourses of myth, religion, 
(pre)history and philosophy (and she herself makes use of words, speech and 
writing) but, it is a dialogue in the broadest of sense, not limited to or giving 
primacy to speech, words, texts or discourses. In other words, what she tries to 






We should note here from the outset that Luce Irigaray’s method 
results from the encounter; rather than an establishing a dialogue on a pre-
established method. Her work is not self-reflexively grounded in scholarly 
methods of cross-cultural dialogue and there are good reasons for this. First of 
all, how could it be, if as discussed above, her engagement is one based in 
practice, gesture and bodily activities? Secondly, the reason for this appeal to 
gesture, practice and body is because for her, speech and discourse (especially 
philosophical discourse) is a man's province. Therefore, to speak across cultural 
differences as a woman is inherently problematic.  
 
The danger is that woman erases herself by taking up a man's subject 
position and language, so she might enter a dialogue across cultural traditions. 
And third, in relation to this, we might say that she considers all discourses, 
categories of thought, and philosophy as such, to be prejudiced or dominated 
by the masculine culture and the predominantly male sex of all philosophers 
until the Nineteenth Century – we can recall from above: ‘I speak as a woman 
and that the thing most refused to a woman is to do philosophy’ (JLI, 97) and 
that ‘any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the “masculine”’ 
(SP, 133).  The implications of these claims require a rather unorthodox cross-
cultural engagement. Hence, a different method (or form) of cross-cultural 
dialogue based on the two terms: naiveté and between.  
 
There are three terms naiveté, the between and renaissance which are 





what she terms the East, and they have received scant attention in the 
scholarship surrounding her East-West encounter. I see naiveté, the between 
and renaissance as inextricably linked. Luce Irigaray's approach is one which 
she terms naïve and leads to what I call here the ‘method’ of naiveté. Finding 
herself between is a central pillar of her cross-cultural encounter which goes 
hand in hand with naiveté, and it is through naiveté that passages between 
different cultural horizons are attempted, leading to her sensing that she herself 
is ‘woven between’ two traditions (BEW, 10).  
 
In the first instance naiveté is not really a method but more of an 
unskilled encounter with another who is different. It is in effect, very similar to 
Gadamer’s concept of hermeneutics, i.e., a meeting with the strange. Naiveté is 
opened up by the interaction with another person (male or female) from 
another cultural horizon. At this level it is an accidental unskilful encounter, 
tallying with the standard definition of naiveté as ‘showing a lack of experience, 
wisdom or judgement’.21 We can see this in her autobiographical account of her 
encounter with a (male) yoga teacher:  
 
‘To tell the truth, my first encounter with a yoga teacher, which 
was rather conflictual, took place around the possibility of everything 
becoming conscious, as he declared to his students. As a psychoanalyst, 
                                                             





I made him understand his naiveté. I could not see my own! And no more 
the fact that we were speaking from two different horizons’ (BEW, 6-7)  
 
Such an encounter brings to light of our own prejudices through the 
meeting between two people (male or female) from different cultural horizons. 
The point is that meeting another who speaks from a different horizon, with a 
different understanding of fundamental concepts such as ‘conscious’ and 
‘unconscious’, shakes or challenges our own position, concepts and ingrained 
understanding. In the naïve meeting – which is nothing out of the ordinary, 
such meetings take place all the time in the rapidly globalising world in which 
we are living – the two in the encounter are shown their own blind spots, and 
their own naiveties, in their respective (mis) understandings which come to 
light through an accidental dialogue.22 It is a sort of accidental uncultivated 
disposition toward another. 
 
Somewhat ironically Luce Irigaray has been criticised for being naïve 
in her engagement with other cultures and for her multiculturalism. Penelope 
Deutscher (2002, 2003) is critical of many dimensions of Luce Irigaray's 
encounter detailed in between east and west (2002). However, Deutscher is one 
of the few people who does mention Luce Irigaray's naiveté as a method or 
disposition. Unfortunately, she does not go far enough in her analysis of what 
                                                             
22  Notably here, it is in relation to two respective cultural horizons, both concrete and actual 
in two different human beings. In this case male and female, but we are not discussing sexuate 





Luce Irigaray means by the term naiveté, which would go a long way towards 
answering some of the criticisms we saw levelled against her in the introduction. 
 
Deutscher states merely that naiveté is a ‘foetus like openness to the 
new’, and secondly, that it is being ‘born to my life’ (Deutscher, 2002, 5).23 
Neither of these really grasp the full significance of naiveté in the sense that 
Luce Irigaray is using it. These two claims are interconnected, and it is 
somewhat difficult to address them separately. We should begin with the second 
of them – that naiveté is being ‘born to my life’ – because this is not really the 
case. Luce Irigaray when she says she is ‘born to my life’, is in fact referring to a 
second birth which is not naiveté as such but what she more specifically calls a 
renaissance. In Old French renaissance means literally “rebirth”, and usually in 
a spiritual sense. It also has a relation to nature, this time plants, from renastre 
to “grow anew”, and in Modern French it is to “be reborn”. Its roots lie in the 
Latin renasci ‘be born again, rise again, reappear, be renewed.’24 ‘Being born to 
my life’ is actually what Luce Irigaray calls her personal renaissance – an event 
which is intimately linked to naiveté, perhaps the result of naiveté, and even 
necessary for naiveté to be possible as a method, but it is not naiveté itself.  
 
Naiveté is, as Deutscher claims, a ‘foetus like openness to the new’ but 
it requires a little more fleshing out than she affords it. He or she, in the placenta 
                                                             
23  The quotations here are taken from p.5 of Luce Irigaray’s between east and west (2002) 





of the mother, is in a naïve state: natural, innocent and unaffected.25 However, 
when we are born we are no longer foetus like. Our mother breathes for us prior 
to birth. When we are in the foetal state we are dependent on her for our breath. 
To be born from our mother means that we breathe for ourselves and this is our 
first autonomous gesture. For Luce Irigaray, ‘to be born’ is to breathe for one's 
self (BEW, 73). However, the birth from our mother, and our first autonomous 
gesture, are further enveloped by a culture which acts like a socio-cultural 
placenta where we breathe stale air (BEW, 74). This means that we are born 
from one foetal state into another ‘socio-cultural’ foetus like state. To be born to 
‘this life’ means a man or woman must, ‘move away from a socio-cultural 
placenta. Thus I can begin to be born, to no longer live from the breath of 
anyone, as the foetus does in the womb of its mother and as man often does 
inside a given historical horizon’ (BEW, 5)  
 
Luce Irigaray claims that she is born again to her own life (BEW, 5). A 
life beyond the limitations of her first socio-cultural placenta with its stale air. 
This is intimately linked to learning to breathe anew. She states, ‘first, I learned 
to breathe. Breathing, according to me, corresponds to taking charge of one's 
own life’ (BEW, 50). She learnt to breathe again, through her encounter with 
another culture, specifically through her practice of Yoga. She learnt to breathe 
again ‘naïvely at first and then with the aid of masters from the East, or trained 
in the East’ (BEW, 6). It was a gradual process but one which came to constitute 
                                                             





the very possibility of a new understanding of herself, her relationship to the 
other, to her cultural horizon and the world.  
 
This learning to breathe anew lead to nothing less than what she terms 
a personal renaissance, what we might call a rebirth or an enlightenment; what 
we might call a spiritual awakening, where we perceive the world, the good and 
the beautiful anew (BEW, 5). It was a moving away from the socio-cultural 
placenta, via a meeting with another socio-cultural horizon, resulting in being 
(re)born woven between socio-cultural horizons. Luce Irigaray was effectively 
reborn through the breath to a new autonomy. This we should remember is the 
paternalistic and patriarchal socio-cultural placenta which she is so heavily 
critical of in her earlier phase of work. The breath is the source of this rebirth 
and it is the central lesson of Luce Irigaray's own encounter, the central lesson 
she wishes to pass on as a ‘way’, and the central essay of between east and west.  
 
Naiveté then is the openness to being born anew, and as a birthing, it 
occurs through encountering a new world, a new horizon and the act of 
breathing anew. It is a bodily realisation and once again subversive. It is best 
seen through our birth from within the mother's placenta to the world outside 
our mother. In short, our cultural horizon is also like our mother, where we 
breathe without autonomy and are yet to be born to our life; or we could say 
that our cultural horizon is our father (as the patriarchal masculine society we 
live in) and hence the need for being born anew from it is paramount; so that 





beyond patriarchy. Naiveté then is not so naïve. It is a strategy for effectively 
exiting this patriarchal placenta and one of the main avenues for this to open up 
as a possibility is through cross-cultural dialogue – encountering the strange, 
and learning from it, such as practices for cultivation of the breath.  
 
We have already mentioned passages between above. In between east 
and west (2002) there are several passages (nature, the body, the breath, life as 
vitality, human consciousness) which are suggested as connecting paths 
between or prior to cross-cultural dialogue. Here we can take the same key 
example of the breath to demonstrate what are passages between and how we 
might cultivate them. We have already mentioned one very significant passage 
between and that is the breath. Luce Irigaray makes a reference to the Ancient 
Greek philosophers Aristotle and Empedocles in relation to the breath and the 
soul (BEW, 7). Here her point is that the breath is related to the soul and for 
her, cultivation of the breath is spiritualisation of the soul which includes the 
body (as breath is a bodily activity). She relates this to the Yogic masters from 
the East and suggests that there is a repressed or forgotten link between 
traditions here, a passage between two cultures which has been forgotten. These 
repressions make it difficult to restore ‘bridges between traditions’ (BEW 7). 
Here it seems then that when she speaks of passages between, and even the 
position of being woven between, she is speaking about underlying connections 






However, for her, reconstituting passages between cultural differences 
must be made upon the fundamental difference of sexuate difference. Cultural 
difference for Luce Irigaray, is ultimately secondary; if we cultivate passages 
between such as the breath they are still to be sexuated – men and women are 
I-he and I-She because they breath differently. Sexuate difference is the real 
primordial difference which underlies any passage between socio-placentae. A 
culture of sexuate difference, therefore, must underlie any cultural differences:  
 
‘Sexual difference is an immediate natural given and it is a real 
and irreducible component of the universal. The whole of human kind is 
composed of women and men and of nothing else. The problem of race 
is, in fact, a secondary problem’ (ILTY, 47)26  
 
The main point which we can draw out from Luce Irigaray's method of 
naiveté is that although all other differences are subject to naiveté, sexuate 
difference is not. She grounds her philosophy on sexuate difference as 
irreducible. The method of naiveté then is in some sense a bracketing off, of the 
usual conceptual frameworks of understanding in favour of seeing two subjects: 
male and female, who have different bodies and ways of breathing, and two 
cultures, masculine and feminine, conjoined in a culture of sexuate difference. 
Ultimately, for her, a beyond East and West, would be a global culture of sexuate 
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difference. Naiveté may bracket off the dualistic conceptual framework in order 
that we might be born anew and think something new. Nevertheless, sexuate 
difference remains primordial to the method of naiveté, or we might say, is 
placed at its fundamental ground, i.e., it is Luce Irigaray’s fundamental enabling 
prejudice or her ultimate horizon. It is her standpoint, as a bodily-breathing 
position on a sexuate field of understanding.  
 
2.4.b. Nishitani Keiji’s dialogue between East-West 
It is necessary if we are going to understand Nishitani Keiji’s 
philosophy to examine two very frequently used hermeneutical concepts – field 
(K. 場Pr. ba) and standpoint (K. 立場Pr. tachiba). They are both taken from 
everyday Japanese speech, but they are given more philosophical weight by 
Nishitani Keiji. The two terms are used hermeneutically to give a distinct quality 
to the interpretive analysis of our existence. They relate closely to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics; although there is no necessary connection, the terms rather fulfil 
similar purposes with differing functionalities.  
 
The first term ba (場) can be used in everyday language to mean place, 
spot, space, discipline, sphere or realm.27 Interestingly, in Japanese, it is also 
                                                             
27  Interestingly it is made up of three parts: 土 日 勿. The first means earth, ground; the 
second, sun, Japan or counter of days; the third, means not, must not, be not. The 
combination from the position of etymology then is quite interesting. It is earth and sun, two 





used to translate the concept “field” from gestalt therapy. However, it is also 
used by Nishida Kitarō in his concept of “logic of place” (場所 basho) note the 
presence of the same character 場 (ba) for field here. It is important for us to at 
least foreground this concept because Nishitani Keiji speaks often of the field of 
self-consciousness, the field of nihility, and the field of śūnyatā. The translation 
as field gives a spatial and temporal quality to a philosophical concept which is 
in-keeping with his existential philosophy. In many respects, “field” is used in a 
similar manner as tradition and prejudices that we discussed earlier in 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. The main difference is the spatial 
everyday quality of “field” and that it must be given content, for example, the 
field of (…). It includes the textual quality Gadamer gives to tradition, but also 
spatialises it. This will be clearer when we discuss the second of these concepts 
tachiba (立場) or standpoint. 
 
Heisig (2001, 222) is one of the few people to discuss Nishitani Keiji’s 
use of standpoint. He points out two reasons behind it: first, it is a shift towards 
Nietzsche’s perspective on reality as opposed to a logic of reality; and second, it 
better serves his attempt to express:  
 
‘the Buddhist ideal of the middle way between the outright 
acceptance of the world as objectively real and the outright objection of 





both ideas as two sides of the same reality’ (Heisig, 2001, 222) 
 
Tachiba (K. 立場) or standpoint is Nishitani Keiji’s extension of the 
character ba (field) to tachiba (standpoint, position, situation) a term 
frequently used in all his works from the middle period onwards. In Japanese, 
it tends to mean a perspective or an opinion on a subject, for instance, the 
Professor's tachiba was pro-democratic. Although Nishitani Keiji never 
explains its precise use in his thought it seems to both include and go further 
than this common usage. It denotes an individual's position: spatial, temporal, 
conceptual, cultural. It is the position of the determinate individual’s existence 
which is where he or she stands (tachi) on a field (ba) which might be one of 
self-consciousness, nihility or śūnyatā for example. It is used in the title of many 
of his essays, for example, ‘the standpoint of śūnyatā’, or ‘the standpoint of Zen’. 
 
In short, I want to suggest that philosophical concepts are also rooted 
in place and time which is not only historical, but also, metaphysical. We as 
individuals stand on a field, and where we stand has a particular way of framing 
our understanding of our existence. It allows us to see some things but not 
others. I want to suggest that tachiba or standpoint is therefore similar in many 
respects to prejudice as found in Gadamer’s thought. The difference here is that 
this is more firmly individualised and localised in the body, even though a 
standpoint can still be shared, as in shared prejudices. My reading of Nishitani 





bodily quality to our horizon. It is the very bodily place of our individual 
perspective on the field on which we stand, and from where we engage in 
dialogue with another.  
 
One of the major distinguishing features of Nishitani Keiji’s work is his 
persistent engagement in what he calls a dialogue between East and West. 
Nishitani Keiji himself states in response to criticism of his thought and his 
relation to politics of his time, that fundamentally his position is one of dialogue, 
and I think we should not take this claim lightly.28 The centrality of East-West 
dialogue is obvious in Nishitani Keiji’s work and has received plenty of scholarly 
attention (Davis, 2011, 2017; Ueda, 2011; Heisig, 2001; Waldenfels, 1980). 
Much like we saw with Luce Irigaray, it is somewhat problematic to attempt to 
analyse or categorise his thought by discerning what is Eastern and what is 
Western within it. His thought is also so thoroughly woven between different 
traditions from different geographical locations, with their own textual 
traditions and their own practices and rituals, that it makes little sense to try to 
separate out the different strand within it.  
 
Nishitani Keiji himself considers himself to be ‘between’ traditions; 
that is, between what he considers to be East and West, between different 
religious traditions, between philosophy and religion as such, and between 
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thought and practice, as he takes a stand ‘at one and the same time’ both ‘within 
and without’ of the confines of tradition (RN, xlix) and as he engages in the 
discussion between religious thought and antireligious thought he positions 
himself in a ‘no man’s land … whose borders shift unevenly’ (RN, xlviii). We can 
analyse Nishitani Keiji’s understanding of the East/West dialogue into three 
dimensions: 1) a reflection on Eastern culture with the help of Western 
philosophy; 2) a broadening of the tradition of Western philosophy into an East-
West delimited thinking with the emergence of a Japanese philosophy; and 3) 
an emerging global world defined as the age of no-religion with a specific global 
thinking which, in brief, is technical and scientific.  
 
Nishitani Keiji considers his work to be philosophy; but, according to 
him, we must expand our understanding of what is usually called philosophy in 
the European tradition with its Ancient Attic origins (EE, NK). This new 
understanding of philosophy will take place through a dialogue between Eastern 
thought and Western philosophy, as he states that ‘we are faced with the 
ineluctable necessity of re-thinking once more Oriental thought and philosophy 
with the help of what we learned from Western philosophy’ (EE, 2). The aim is 
therefore, no less than a mutual transformation of both Eastern and Western 
philosophical traditions through the conjoining of śūnyatā and reason (Davis, 
2011, 40). His Zen philosophy is a way of working towards or within that 
existential path towards intuitive wisdom or Prajñā (Davis, 2011, 40). 
Philosophy, in a sense, becomes a tool of Nishitani Keiji’s religious inquiry, 






The main problem of Nishitani Keiji’s life long thought was to think the 
problem of nothingness, and to approach it ‘as a problem of philosophy’ (EE, 
2). In short, Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy is a thorough engagement with the 
problem of nothingness (nihility, nihilism and śūnyatā) through which he 
elaborates a modern-Buddhist perspective as a ‘thinking non-thinking’, which 
includes many references to/and elaborations of Zen poetry; Zen kōan, mondō 
and slogans,29 and facilitates the self-overcoming of nihilism which necessitates 
an overcoming of traditional metaphysics, and what he considers to be the false 
self which depends on it. His thought then is inescapably bound up with the 
Western philosophical tradition and it conspires with the rapidly globalising 
European culture with its accompanying prejudice toward subjectivity and 
thinking. 
 
                                                             
29 Heine and Wright (2000, 3) define the term kōan as ‘enigmatic and often shocking spiritual 
expressions based on dialogical encounters between masters and disciples that were used as 
pedagogical tools for religious training in the Zen (C. Ch'an) Buddhist tradition.’ Kōan became 
a literary pedagogical tradition which first arose out of spontaneous question and answer 
meetings (mondō) between Zen master and disciple or between two Zen practitioners/masters 
in given situations (See Dumoulin 1979, 65) and Zen slogans are, Welter (2000) suggests, even 
more ancient than many codified kōan or mondō. These 'slogans' are often referred to in Zen 
teachings, and they have perhaps even more unconscious cultural weight in East Asia 
(particularily China and Japan where the Ch'an and Zen traditions were so influential). The 
slogans show evidence of a non-scriptural oral-practice based tradition. Zen slogans such as 
'transmission from mind to mind' and 'a special transmission from outside the teaching' are 
short encapsulations of the fundamental message of Zen. This aids in their attempt to refute 





We can agree that Nishitani Keiji’s engagement with the Western 
philosophical tradition is as he states, ‘a detour’ (SP, 29). It is a detour required 
because of the problem of nothingness, and the nihilism which he locates in the 
Western philosophical tradition, and which he fears is the root of what is 
becoming a global phenomenon (we shall explore this in the next chapter). This 
he feels most evidently from his own experience and understanding of the rapid 
modernisation (and Europeanization) of Japan in the Meiji period (1868-1912). 
However, he clearly sees in his own heart that a spirit of another living tradition 
exists: ‘In our hearts the spirit fostered in that Eastern culture exists as a living 
tradition’ (EE, 2). It is from the well of this Eastern tradition that he wants to 
draw, to offer something ‘other’ in response to the problems of the 
contemporary world. He considers this long history of Eastern culture to be a 
living tradition of which he is a part. He wants to re-think this tradition 
therefore, with the help of Western philosophy, in order to make a ‘fundamental 
reflection on our [Eastern] historical and cultural legacy’ (EE, 2). For him this 
is a mutually beneficial impetus behind an East-West dialogue. In many 
respects then, we can see that this dialogue between East and West is for 
Nishitani Keiji, a dialogue of difference necessary for mutual understanding and 
transformation. 
 
I hope it is apparent that Nishitani Keiji wants to broaden the 
philosophical horizons of the Western tradition. In doing this, he is quite 
ambitious in scope. He wants to redefine ‘philosophy’ so that he can include his 
standpoint within it, even if he takes a very different approach to the tradition 





philosophy’ (SP, 24). As he firmly states, ‘I myself think that from now on 
philosophical thought should transcend the distinction between East and West 
and establish itself on a broader foundation’ (SP, 24). This broader foundation 
will include insights from different traditions, such as the Buddhist traditions 
that he is most influenced by, and it will now transcend distinctions between 
East and West, distinctions that were perhaps always false to begin with. We 
can see then that this East-West dialogue is a stage to a dialogue which shall 
take place on a broader or more fundamental grounding.30 
 
Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy, therefore, can be considered as a dialogue 
between East and West in the usual sense that we might use these terms. His 
aim is to expand the modern discourse of (mono)philosophy beyond its narrow 
and particular origins, into a global category of (poli)philosophy which allows 
for heterogeneous differences in philosophical practice (EE, TWD). The first 
step for this is the possibility of an ‘other philosophy’ which can offer another 
position in dialogue with the European tradition of philosophy. We might want 
to call this a Zen philosophy which he wants to bring into an East-West dialogue 
with the existing tradition of European philosophy, to gain insight into how to 
face the problems of today's global world. Or we might want to make a bolder 
claim that it is a Zen philosophical hermeneutics which actually supercedes the 
other philosophies and offers a field on which they all take place and a 
standpoint of standpoints as Heisig calls it (2001, 223).31 
                                                             
30 For an excellent discussion of this see Davis (2017, SEP).  






Nishitani Keiji is well aware of the differences in what he sees at this 
stage as two ‘philosophical’ traditions, and whether his new synthesis can even 
be considered philosophy from the European philosopher’s standpoint:  
 
‘the basic character of Buddhist thought is in some respects 
[qualitatively] different from the thought that has dominated Western 
philosophy... so there may be some problem in calling this standpoint of 
mine 'philosophical'’ (SP, 24)  
 
The main reasons for this qualitative difference are its new-found 
origins, its basis in śūnyatā, rather than being or nothingness; its denial of 
abstract metaphysical thinking, in favour of existential thinking; and its 
situatedness between traditions, religions, geographical locations, disciplines, 
and thought/practice. All of these are held together for Nishitani Keiji in his 
living standpoint of Zen.  
 
In fact, I consider this qualitative difference in Nishitani Keiji’s 
philosophy to be much more significant than he himself modestly underplays. 
Following Jin Y. Park (2010, 7) we can think of a Buddhist engagement with 
Western philosophy as subversive of an exclusively European philosophical 





sense of dialogue and co-operation; but it is still the questioning of the universal 
philosophical claims of Western philosophy by the ‘other’ which is not 
dissimilar to the colonial, post-colonial, black American and feminist 
movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Park, 2010, 7). And in a 
way it is the simplest critique, if we think in terms of Zazen; and the simplest 
overcoming of nihilism in Western thought, if we think in terms of a new ‘self-
awareness of reality’ (RN, 5).32 To be a living example of a position which is 
inherently critical of the dominant tradition around you is surely the most 
threatening and subversive act, as well as it being a great risk. Especially when 
the practice of this subversion requires nothing but the re-orientation of one’s 
way of thinking, through one’s own body, breath and awareness. I think this 
subversive quality of bodily practice coupled with dialogue, thought and writing 
is one of the main points of similarity between Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji. 
 
However, for Nishitani Keiji the key to opening up the problems of 
Western culture is through philosophical and religious dialogue, as part of a 
mutual dialogical transformation of traditions, thereby creating a truly global 
culture (ENR, 344). The Buddhist teaching of śūnyatā, is discovered through 
such a dialogue, and he considers it to be the most significant contribution of 
what he calls Eastern thought to the possibility of an emerging global 
philosophy (Ueda, 2011). His unique philosophy, therefore, brings the concept 
                                                             
32  Here consider the article ‘Awakening of self in Buddhism’ (1966), where Nishitani Keiji 
claims the Buddhist insight of no-self changes the caste system and re-orders Indian society 
on more equal grounds of enlightenment available to all. According to him then, an insight 
into 'true self' is necessarily an insight into intersubjectivity, and, therefore, ethics and politics 





of śūnyatā into dialogue with Western philosophy. For him, ‘the whole world is 
rapidly becoming one world’ (RTA, 147). The East and the West are being 
transcended, but Nishitani Keiji is deeply sensitive to what this means and the 
demands it places upon us, and moreover, whether this transcendence is taking 
place on the appropriate field. Writing in 1966 he states:  
 
‘with the encounter of East and West proceeding in all fields of 
human activity at a surprisingly rapid tempo, mutual understanding is, 
needless to say, one of the most important tasks facing mankind today’ 
(RTA, 145) 
 
He goes on,  
 
‘among the many difficulties lying hidden along the way of this 
task, the greatest appears when, trying to penetrate in some degree the 
inner thought, feelings and purposes of our copartners, we find words 
and concepts, the inevitable vehicles of this communication, rising up 
time and again to bar the way’ (RTA, 145) 
 
From this we hear Nishitani Keiji’s very direct intention to open lines 
of communication between people or ‘copartners’. This dialogue is crucial for 





in this new global world. Philosophy, if it is to have a future, must strive to 
penetrate deeply into our self-understanding, in order that we might be able to 
speak with each other in new ways, with old and new concepts and words. It 
must be a way of thinking which points the way to bring about a fundamental 
shift in our self-understanding: 
 
‘The only possible way of a true encounter and mutual 
understanding of East and West in the most basic locus of human 
existence... seems to be discovered solely through candid self-exposure 
to the deep complexities of the actual world and by grasping therein some 
new point of departure. That would mean, in truth, to delve into the basis 
of existence itself through and through until we reach the hidden source; 
the source in which originates the present emergence of the one world 
with its thorough and universal secularisation of human life, and from 
which are arising now all sorts of social “progress” through the rapid 
development of science and technology, as well as the devastation of 
traditional culture progressing side by side with the “progress” of 
modern civilisation’ (RTA, 147)   
 
This is his Nishitani Keiji’s hermeneutics – the open space of truth 
where dialogue or heart to heart encounter can occur. In this section, I have 
outlined two approaches to cross-cultural dialogue. We can see clearly that this 
focus of an open encounter between different traditions, however, does not take 





that such a global philosophy between East and West could eradicate the 
emerging (or remnants of) a feminine culture as understood by Luce Irigaray, 
unless I can suggest a way of weaving together their respective key fundamental 
standpoints and self-interpretations. It is to these that we must now turn.  
 
2.5.a. Sexuate difference and self-understanding 
Luce Irigaray finds the historical philosophical subject extremely 
problematic. She states conclusively that subjectivity is never neutral; for there 
is no abstract neutered perspective or point of view, and no possible abstract or 
neutral subject. For her, ‘any theory of the subject has always been appropriated 
by the “masculine”’ (SP, 133). She explains that the “subject” is ‘father, mother, 
and child(ren). And the relationships between them. He is masculine and 
feminine and the relationships between them’ (SP, 133). What Luce Irigaray is 
stressing here is that all definitions and theories in the history of Western 
philosophy can be considered as “masculine” which finally bring about a 
(masculine) neuter subject in modern philosophy, i.e., a reduction of everything 
to the same, which for her results in nihilism, as we shall see in the following 
chapter. If a woman doesn’t first learn to speak for herself she will be subsumed 
as a neutral subject within this same. She will simply remain as ‘entities or 
things, earth, depths, reserves which give birth, mother, do housework, with 
whom one makes love, etc. but not partners in discourse’ (TD, 43). If a woman 
merely obtains a voice in the existing phallogocentric order, if she manages to 
speak as a subject, as an 'I', without differentiating that subject sexuately, then 





(masculine) neutral voice, and woman as woman, therefore, still does not exist 
as a subject.  
 
Fundamentally, the self then, according to Luce Irigaray, is relational: 
I exist always in relation to others. This is demonstrated by the primacy of our 
relationship to our mother, ‘we would not exist without having made up a 
relational world with our mother’ (CN, 42). Although this relationship is not 
strictly speaking intersubjective because we are not autonomous and conscious 
subjects (who breathe autonomously, speak for themselves, and are conscious 
of our sexuated intersubjectivity) we are still indebted to this relationship to our 
mother for our existence; and this existence is still relational (if not wholly 
intersubjective) even prior to birth, ‘we are not yet two subjects in a certain way, 
but we already are two subjective worlds in relation with one another’ (CN, 42). 
In short, for her, to be, is to be conceived. We, ourselves and our culture, tend 
to forget this origin of our existence which is unconscious to us at the time. If 
we do not actively remember our origin rooted in a (pre-conscious) 
intersubjectivity, then we can never really become (or understand) ourselves as 
a conscious intersubjective self in a world made up between subjects who are 
different, i.e., sexuate difference.  
 
This necessarily intersubjective self, for Luce Irigaray, is a combination 
or mixture of the subjective and the objective. The subjective side is that ‘which 
belongs to the subject as such, a subject which is not always the same’ (CN, 41). 





transcendence Luce Irigaray means that which in myself (male or female) and 
the other (male or female) always escapes me (ILTY, 103). In the first case it is 
my birth, something I can perhaps never understand and something which 
transcends my existence in that it precedes me. I cannot know how I came to 
be. I was completely unconscious of this. In the second case it is that which I 
am, that which I can never “know” (as an object of cognition for a subject) and 
it is that which I can never see: I am invisible to myself. It is the mystery that I 
(he or she) am to myself via both my birth and my current existence. In the third 
case, it is founded on the fact that myself and another (whether he or she) ‘may 
not be substituted for one another’ (ILTY, 103) or that ‘I cannot understand nor 
even perceive the other in its totality’ (CN, 42). This radically individualizes the 
intersubjective self because each self, even though intersubjective, is also 
unique according to their transcendence. However, this radical 
individualisation, or mystery of the irreplaceable self that I am, is always 
grounded in my objectivity. The transcendence of subjectivity is not immediate 
or outside of the world but always found in objectivity.  
 
For Luce Irigaray, the objective is that ‘which exists outside the subject 
and his, or her, intervention in a pre-given world’ (CN, 41). In order to explain, 
she gives the example of living-thing such as a tree:  
 
‘meeting with a tree, I could say that I meet with something which is 
objective with respect to me. One could object that there exist ways of 





could also object that in a table made by an artisan or an artist, there 
remains a part of the objective material while the actual form has been 
given by a human subjectivity’ (CON, 41) 
 
Here we see a sort of gradation or fluidity between the subjective and 
the objective. This will be important later when we return to this in our 
discussion of non-duality. For now, it is enough to say that the tree in its 
uncultivated existence is objective to us. But, if it was planted, tended and grown 
by us, it becomes mixed with the subjectivity of the male or female who tends it.  
 
According to Luce Irigaray, gender is our primary objectivity. Our 
gender is our bodily relational sameness or difference to our mother and it is a 
pre-given or an objectivity for us. It is at first a pre-given (objective) bodily 
relational difference or sameness to our mother received at (or even before) 
birth. It is then possible to attain to this gendered objectivity by cultivating our 
relations to our mother, through our bodies, our breath and our speech. This is 
what she calls genre (Jones, 2011, 191; ) a style of cultivation which she later 
calls, sexuation; a frame, or set of limits to our existence which is our ‘horizon’ 
of gender (Lorraine, 1999, 87-89), within which we can cultivate our singularity 
without getting lost in an infinite becoming (TBT, 3; Lorraine, 1999, 87).  
 
It seems that on both sides of our self-existence there rests an 





between two unknowables: one, of birth; and the other, who I am right now in 
this moment. This mystery of the intersubjective self and its transcendence is 
heightened in the case of meeting another autonomous intersubjective self, 
especially for Luce Irigaray, if they are of a different gender (CN, 42). But even 
if they are the same gender, this other is radically different to me because of this 
subjective transcendence that they are. The other (he or she) is for me radically 
other, they or I, am unique and cannot be exchanged or known, and of course 
vice versa. I may be able to perceive the other's body, actions etc. through my 
senses and mind but I can never be them, they are different to me, and what 
they are in their deepest sense beyond me, i.e., transcendent (CN, 42). 
 
Luce Irigaray acknowledges that even though she explains her work in 
three phases sexuate difference is the central theme of her thought. It is so 
important to her that she claims, ‘Sexual difference is one of the major 
philosophical issues, if not the issue of our age... [it] is probably the issue in our 
time which could be our ‘salvation’ if we thought it through’ (ED, 5). For Luce 
Irigaray, sexuate difference is without doubt the single question which she has 
pursued throughout her life’s work, as she struggled to find herself, and her own 
salvation in a world where her existence as a subject in her own right is denied.  
 
As we have seen, this thinking through of sexuate difference is in its 
first phase, a direct engagement with the symbolic male order: the phallocratic 
order, and the need for intelligent and creative methods of subversion. The 





subject position and a feminine between women culture, with a corresponding 
language, symbolic order, imaginary and civil identity of their own. The sheer 
scale of ambition in this first and second phase is quite incredible. Not to 
mention the third phase, where a relational difference between two ‘equal’ and 
different subjects with their own respective languages, symbolic orders and civil 
identities is to be brought about. Unfortunately, this also presumes the existing 
male symbolic order is a desirable one for men, something I question, and I 
suggest Nishitani Keiji does also, as we see it as inadequate and at its root 
nihilistic. 
  
We need to clarify two key points on sexuate difference here, before we 
enter dialogue with Nishitani Keiji. The first, is its relational quality which is 
structured by our birth or our origin. The second, is its relational quality 
between two different subjects, who relate differently to the phenomenon of 
birth, and therefore create a dynamic between two different kinds of subject. 
These two are thoroughly entwined, but for hermeneutical reasons it might help 
to pull them slightly apart. Sexuate difference, for Luce Irigaray, is a relational 
difference resulting in two different and irreducible subjects: 
 
‘To be born a girl of a woman, someone belonging to the same 
gender, and with the ability to engender like her, or to be born a boy of a 
woman, someone of a different gender, and with whom subjective 
relations will be complex, notably because it will be impossible for him 







Our birth is our origin, and our mother is the fundamental relation 
which structures our existence. The fact that one subject is capable of the same 
act of engendering human life within themselves, and another is not capable of 
this same feat of creation within themselves, causes a split in subject formation; 
because we cannot relate to the first other, the mother, in the same way - a little 
boy cannot relate to his mother as the same as him, whereas a little girl can. This 
means, that the first other for a girl is a subject like her, while the first other for 
a boy is a subject different to him. As Luce Irigaray states, this causes a 
fundamentally different orientation of two different subjects:  
 
‘For a girl, conditions for inter-subjective relations will be 
favourable, whereas a boy will have to interpose objects and the 
construction of an own homocultural and homosocial world, in order to 
protect himself from the mystery, indeed the abyss, that his origin, his 
mother, represents for him’ (ILTY, 90) 
 
We shall return to this question of the constructed homosocial world 
and the abyss in chapter three. For her, it is the fundamental cause of nihilism 
in masculine culture and Western philosophy. For now, it is important to grasp 
the basic primacy of birth in her thought and how it structures our self-






Luce Irigaray stresses again and again, that sexuate difference is not a 
simple difference due to educational stereotypes, nor does it make sense to 
speak of essentialism according to biology or sociology.33 For her, a subject is 
context bound, he or she, is a living breathing body, born into a world of subjects 
and objects, and language, which shapes him or her relationally. Therefore, a 
subject is never reducible to biology, psychology, or any kind of essence. I 
consider Luce Irigaray's thought as non-essential in the sense that an essence is 
a fixed substantial existence. Her thought is thoroughly relational – it is what 
she calls a material ontology, paradoxical in many ways, but only to the 
essentialist ear that hears words and concepts as fixed objects thereby giving 
them a fixed existence.  
 
Finally, what is sexuate difference as it pertains to two subjects who are 
different, what Luce Irigaray calls the ‘between-two’? For her:  
 
                                                             
33  Much of the debate concerning Irigaray's work is concerning her essentialism. It is held that 
her early work was 'politically' or 'strategically' essentialist in defence of her early work. Her 
later work however, has been defended as a 'realist; essentialism. See, Alison Stone, Luce 
Irigaray and the philosophy of sexual difference (Cambridge: CUP, 2006) Chapter 1, p.18-51. 
Here a good survey of the four main critiques of sexuate difference is also made. See also, 
Alison Stone, 'From political to realist essentialism' in Feminist theory, 2004, London, Sage 
Vol. 5:1 [5-23]. Although I also have a sympathy for a (reworked) nature orientated 
perspective, I have trouble with the categorisation of 'Realist' essentialism. For another good 
overview of this debate and an alternative defence of sexuat difference, see Braidotti, R. 





 ‘in order for the between-two to subsist, transcendence must be 
kept between the two... it is a question of the transcendence of an 
irreducible difference between two, of which the most universal 
paradigm lies between man and woman’ (IBSW, 18) 
 
Sexuate difference then, is not limited to the separate existence of man 
on the one side and a woman on the other, it is rather the between space that 
operates as an irreducible difference of man and woman and a transcendence 
in relation. This is, according to her, the most universal paradigm for bringing 
about this transcendence in relation. It is:  
 
‘a third woven each time by the two ... possible through the 
passage from sharing our needs to sharing our desire ... [This] requires 
an alternation of being and letting be in each one and not a division of 
these kinds of behaviour between two subjects’ (IBSW, 19)  
 
Sexuate difference is a living relation which emerges through the on-
going relating of two sexuate identities which are ontologically irreconcilable, 
resulting in ‘a third’, a difference between which preserves them. This is for Luce 
Irigaray, a containment of the negative, a between that can never be 
surmounted by either side of the mystery (JLI, 110). As she says, speaking with 






‘you have a different body, you are in a different relational world, 
you are a boy born of a woman and that implies on your part a whole 
world-construction different from mine, a different relational world, a 
different cultural world. Between us there is really a mystery. Yes, there's 
an irreducible mystery between man and woman’ (JLI, 110)  
 
It is a thoroughly interdependent relating of man and woman which 
guarantees a transcendental ethical between: a mystery. But this is not 
something to think and then to know. It is not something we can capture in 
words and concepts and appropriate as a thing for our ownership. It is a living 
relating possibility, a born possibility, with no guarantees for women or men. It 
is for her always 'completely new' and opening out on to a future where new 
values can be created (JLI, 96).  
 
We shall discuss Luce Irigaray’s fundamental thought in more detail over the 
coming chapters. We can already see here that the completely new is within the 
bounds of the sexuate, and is not completely new, as we might think of it in 
terms of śūnyatā. Clearly for her, all things intertwine, including words, 
concepts, language, bodies, living things, the breath and so on. It is here where 
we find common ground in Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji’s thought, and 
where each can supplement the other. The self we might say is textual, and genre 





understanding, I think we need to forge two standpoints on the non-dual field 
of śūnyatā. It is a foregrounding of Nishitani Keiji’s self-understanding on the 
field of śūnyatā which we must now turn.  
 
2.5.b. śūnyatā and self-understanding 
For Nishitani Keiji, religion ‘has to do with life itself’ (RN, 2). It is not 
a set of beliefs in another world or a transcendent God, nor mere rituals and 
rites by which a community is bound together, it is not the study of religions 
and what they have been historically, nor is it to consider the utility of religion 
as a moral basis for society. According to Nishitani Keiji, religion has two main 
facets: it is existential, that is, it is the concern of each individual and their own 
life, and it is found in the individual’s asking of the question ‘for what purpose 
do I exist?’ (RN, 2-3). Fundamentally, it is an individual quest for meaning and 
purpose in life and must be approached as a living question. This is captured in 
the term self-awareness of reality, which means ‘both our becoming aware of 
reality and, at the same time, the reality realizing itself in our awareness’ (RN, 
5). It is this realization of ourselves, and at the same time reality, which is 
nothing more than reality itself realising itself through us that is the aim and 
purpose of our lives. The main point for us here is that religion according to 
Nishitani Keiji is an existential quest of each individual, which requires a break 
through by each of us, through the questioning of one’s purpose here in our own 
life. Religion then is the pursuit of each individual for self-realisation and in 
many respects, philosophy is a tool of the religious way of life. We can see then 





quest for the self.34 
 
The self is the main thrust of Nishitani Keiji’s life’s work, it is the focus 
point of his philosophical inquiries, and it is the place in which all these 
inquiries entwine, seen no more so than in the existential religious quest. For 
him, the self itself, must become a question (Parkes, 1990, 198). But what does 
he mean by the terms self, subject and subjectivity? Although his schematic for 
understanding the self changes over time, there are three basic pillars which can 
help us to orientate ourselves here. There is the Western self as ego found in 
Descartes. There is the self as intersubjective, found in the Japanese term 
ningen (人間). And, there is the perspective of the Buddhist understanding of 
self as non-self or non-ego (Van Bragt, 1983, 300), which for Nishitani Keiji is 
understood as the interpenetrational self, Muga (無我). 
 
First, there is the Western view of self, which for him in it modern day 
form, is based on a Cartesian view of self as ego. Nishitani Keiji sees the 
dominant perspective of the self in the West to be Cartesian in essence. He 
maintains this throughout his lifelong study. For him, the ‘self of contemporary 
man is an ego of the Cartesian type, constituted self-consciously as something 
                                                             
34 Unno (1989, 315) points out that Nishitani Keiji’s thought is a modern hermeneutic of Zen 
Buddhism, but he is not using that in the same sense as I mean here. It is not merely a modern 
interpretation of Zen Buddhist thought through the lens of Western philosophy; it is a 
philosophical hermeneutic in the Gadamerian sense, that is, a hermeneutic of self-





standing over against the world and all the things that are in it’ (RN, 13). When 
Nishitani Keiji uses the term subject, he does so in this Cartesian sense (Van 
Bragt, 1983, 300). A subject is an ego, set against a world of objects. For him, as 
we shall see, this Western philosophical concept of self understood as ego or 
subject, leads to an alienated subject and its culture of nihilism.35   
 
The second term used for self-understanding and which we should 
grasp here in a preliminary way is human existence or ningen (人間). Ningen is 
an interesting concept which was first elucidated philosophically by Watsuji 
Tetsurō (1889–1960). Ningen is the Japanese term used for human being, 
mankind, or person. In Japanese philosophy Watsuji Tetsurō gave more weight 
to ningen as a philosophical concept in his Rinrigaku (translated literally as the 
principles that allow us to live in friendly community) originally published in 
1937. He used the term to define a human being as fundamentally relational or 
intersubjective; as opposed to being an autonomous, or separate self.36 Crucial 
to his understanding was the etymological interpretation of the two characters 
                                                             
35 We can of course question this claim that all Western views of the self are Cartesian. There 
are many other conceptualisations of self which differ to the ego and the subject as found in 
Descartes; whether the Freudian ego, or the subject of woman in feminist thought for example. 
The main point that Nishitani Keiji would stress is the fundamental duality at the root of all of 
these self-concepts. That is, there is always a subject set against a world of objects. The exact 
formulation of this may differ, but at the most primordial level, the self in Western thought is, 
with very few exceptions, one based on some form of dualism. This is Nishitani Keiji’s claim at 
the most general level and it is a difficult one for us to deny.  
36 Robert E. Carter (2001, 126) analyses three meanings of Ningen: 1) Human being as 
individual; 2) Human being as enmeshed in relationships; 3) The space between in which 





of 人 (nin) and 間 (gen). The first character 人 (nin) is usually translated as 
person, while the second character 間 (gen) is translated as space or between.  
 
Watsuji Tetsurō analyses that a person is always both an individual and 
a social being which is captured by the term nin. In order to be defined as an 
individual we must negate the social and in order to be a social being we must 
negate the individual. This means that in essence the human being is in fact 
always between the individual and social. For Watsuji Tetsurō:  
 
‘Ningen is the public and, at the same time, the individual 
human beings living within it. Therefore, it refers not merely to an 
individual “human being” nor merely to “society.” What is recognizable 
here is a dialectical unity of those double characteristics that are inherent 
in a human being’ (RR, 15) 
 
This analysis was in fact similar to what Nishida Kitarō called identity 
of self-contradiction. That whichever form of analysis we choose to take we must 
negate one side of the human being’s contradictory totality of the individual and 





2001, 126-127).37 We need to bear this in mind then when we consider that for 
Nishitani Keiji human existence on its basic level is a contradiction between the 
individual and the social, where one must be negated for us to arrive at a 
definition of the other. And, to take one of these as more fundamental and then 
analyse the human being from that perspective would be to take up a limited 
and abstract perspective. Instead what we must try to do is hold them both 
together at the same time, that is, to stand as the paradox between them. 
 
The second term, gen, is even more interesting for us here. Watsuji 
Tetsurō in his etymological analysis traces the term gen which means 
betweenness to an earlier term aida or aidagara which means place or location. 
The shift of focus here then is that a person always exists in a place or space in 
and with, or between other people (Carter, 2001, 126).38 It gives the human 
being(s) a simultaneous singularity-plurality and location-spatiality. It was the 
stressing of this spatiality of a person(s) which he believed addressed a 
prejudice for temporality in the Western philosophical tradition, as well as a 
tendency towards individualism (Carter, 1996, 5).   
 
 The concept of ningen has in fact been used already in the most 
                                                             
37 For an excellent and simple overview of Nishida’s almost impenetrable thought see chapter 
six of Robert E. Carter’s Encounter with Enlightenment (2001). For Nishitani Keiji’s 
perspective see the excellent collection of essays on his teacher’s thought entitled Nishida 
Kitarō (1991).  






significant comparative work between Luce Irigaray and non-European 
philosophy in Erin McCarthy’s Ethics Embodied (2010). McCarthy establishes 
a feminist comparative ethics which she calls an embodied ethics by linking 
together the phenomenological tradition and the idea of an embodied selfhood 
Martin Heidegger, Watsuji Tetsurō and another Japanese philosopher Yasuo 
Yuasa (1925-2005). She also establishes links between the relational quality of 
care ethics found in feminists such as Carol Gilligan to the relational quality of 
human existence found in Martin Heidegger and Watsuji Tetsurō. Ultimately, 
she brings together Luce Irigaray and Watsuji Tetsurō to establish a concept of 
ningen which is no longer sex neutral. She does so through their shared 
intimacy orientation, which in this case is a reliance on a relational embodied 
selfhood as essential for establishing a sexed care ethics. It is an excellent study 
which paves the way for my own. 
 
The point we need to make here is that Nishitani Keiji uses this same 
term ningen when he discusses the human being in his works. He does so 
according to Carter, in approximately the same manner that Watsuji Tetsurō 
does (Carter, 2006, 16).39 For my purposes, it is firstly important to note that 
both Nishitani Keiji and Watsuji Tetsurō’s use of ningen, if we are at our most 
generous, is at best sex neutral. Much as McCarthy’s attempt to blend sexuate 
difference and ningen through education is admirable, my aim here is to follow 
Nishitani Keiji’s thought on the no-self, and whether it is possible to replace that 
                                                             
39 See page sixteen of his introduction to the translation of a series of six Nishitani Keiji 
lectures entitled On Buddhism (2006). Lectures four and five are the most revealing where we 





with an understanding of sexuate difference as non-he and non-she instead.40  
 
Nishitani Keiji’s final understanding of the self is the Buddhist view of 
self. When Nishitani Keiji uses the term self, it is usually this he means (Van 
Bragt, 1983, 300). This takes on a number of different guises depending on the 
relational quality which is present. For example, there is the relation of self and 
things which is for him Muga (無我) or that each and every thing, self and all, is 
empty of any inherent existence. There is explained by the circuminsessional 
self (egoteki) which means that self and all things interpenetrate each other with 
neither self nor thing having independent existence, while paradoxically, each 
and everything is only truly itself when it is realised to exist in this way. There 
is the non-ego and the true-self, understood in the classical sense of anātman. 
That is that the self itself, has no substantial or permanent existence such as an 
unchanging soul. And there is the self as true-self or the self in its suchness 
(tathātā) which tends to designate the quality of the self when it has undergone 
a non-dual realisation, in other words, that it and each every other and all things 
are now manifest in their suchness or thusness, a way of expressing the true 
quality of each self and/or a things existence (Van Bragt, 1983, 304).41  
                                                             
40 McCarthy (2014) does tackle the problem of non-dual subjectivity in relation to 
intersubjectivity and fluid relations.  
41  The number of different terms and the inevitable loss of style and meaning found in 
translation make it especially hard at times for us to keep up with the exact meaning and 







There is one final term which we must address here and that is 
subjectivity. Subjectivity for Nishitani Keiji is freedom. It is the standpoint that 
arises in the thought of Kierkegaard, it is where man thinks with passion ‘in 
which one strives resolutely to be oneself and to seek the ground of one’s actual 
existence’ (SN, 2). Secondly, it is subjective in the sense that the self can never 
be an object. That as subjectivity we can never be reduced to the objective. This 
is first felt positively when we break through onto the field of nihility: 
 
 ‘to feel this nihility underfoot is to break through the existence 
of things all at once, to pass beyond that dimension in which each and 
every thing in the world is thought to have an objective existence, and to 
recover for man a standpoint of subjectivity that can never be reduced to 
mere objective existence’ (RN, 54) 
 
However, this does not mean subjective as in reduced to our own 
private little world (Van Bragt, 1983, 304). Finally, subjectivity is freedom. It is 
the realisation of the non-self in the sphere of subject-object, where a 
standpoint arises that cannot be reduced to an object, and where the self that 
comes to realise its actual existence as absolutely free. Subjectivity, like self 
therefore, can be seen from different perspectives. In essence, true subjectivity 
is the same as non-self or non-ego (OB, 87-88). It is a self that interpenetrates 





free from all attachments.  
 
In this thesis I follow the basic rule that subject and ego are the Western 
views of self as found on a dualistic field of subject and object. Non-self, is a self 
which is no longer bound to the dualistic world of subject and object. For the 
sake of simplicity, I follow Stambaugh (1999) and Unno (1989), by positing 
Nishitani Keiji’s most fundamental view of non-self as that of the 
interpenetrational self (muga 無我).  
 
The term śūnyatā is taken from the Mahāyāna (great vehicle) later 
school of Buddhist thought which developed out of Theravāda (the elder school 
or lesser vehicle.) It is estimated to have emerged from Northern India circa 1st 
Century B.C. to 2nd Century C.E. The Tibetan, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and 
Japanese traditions of Buddhist thought are primarily considered to be part of 
the broad geographical-cultural movement of the Mahāyāna. It should be 
noted that the Mahāyāna is not a school of Buddhism as such but rather an 
overarching name for a movement consisting in a variety of schools and 
traditions which developed somewhat later than the Theravāda and in 
culturally diverse and various geographical regions of South, Central and East 
Asia. 
 





The Self-overcoming of nihilism [1949] and is used in relation to nihilism.42 
Here at the end of his analysis of nihilism in Western thought and culture he 
addresses the meaning of nihilism for Japan, and the relation of Buddhism to 
nihilism. He states that, ‘there is in mahāyāna a standpoint that cannot be 
reached even by nihilism that overcomes nihilism, even though this latter may 
tend in that direction’ (SN, 180). After he advocates the mahāyāna standpoint, 
he goes on to quote Nāgārjuna’s fundamental treatise on the middle way 
(mūlamadhyamakakārikā) ‘by virtue of emptiness everything is able to arise, 
but without emptiness nothing whatsoever can arise’ (SN, 180). Nāgārjuna is 
estimated to have lived in the second Century C.E. The mādhyamika school, is 
said to originate with him, and is named after his principal work the 
mūlamadhyamakakārikā. It is in this work that he formulates the most 
profound thought of the mahāyāna, that is śūnyatā. This work is generally 
translated as the treatise on the “middle way”. The middle way stands for the 
way of thinking between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism 
(Gethin, 1998. 237-238), in Nishitani Keiji’s Western philosophical terms, 
between the extremes of nihilism and absolutism (Davis, 2017, SEP).  
 
Fundamentally, the mādhyamika concept of śūnyatā is a 
reinterpretion of the Buddha's word regarding the true interdependent nature 
of all beings and phenomena. Without wanting to complicate things (as there 
are further developments of this thought within the Buddhist tradition) it would 
                                                             






be easiest to say śūnyatā is usually understood as ‘the direct realisation of the 
absence of inherent existence of all phenomenon’ (Geshe Tashi Tsering (2005, 
112).43 This must be clarified, by saying that it does not mean that nothing exists, 
as Davis (2017, SEP) states, ‘it is not a vacuum of relative nothingness … it is an 
open clearing wherein beings are neither nullified nor reified’. It is not nihilism, 
as this would be one of the extreme views and non-existence is itself refuted by 
the concept of śūnyatā.44 As Nishitani Keiji himself states:  
 
‘śūnyatā is the point at which we become manifest in our own 
suchness as concrete human beings, as individuals with both body and 
personality. And at the same time, it is the point at which everything 
around us becomes manifest in its own suchness’ (RN, 90) 
 
What this means is that nothing exists as it appears to – in the sense of 
a self-originating separate phenomenon – everything is dependent on causes 
and conditions, and all phenomena, including most importantly the self as non-
self is empty of inherent existence: what we have is an interdependent web of 
phenomena sustaining any sense of a permanent existence, originally 
understood as co-dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda).45 
                                                             
43   See also Davis (2017, SEP) 
44  See also Davis (2013, 206)  
45  The Buddha’s teaching of Pratītyasamutpāda (Sanskrit) paticcasammupadda (Pali) as Rhys 
Davids explains is ‘that all dhamma (phenomena physical and mental) are paticcasamuppanna 
(happen by way of cause)’ Rhy Davids (2009, 1) In co-dependent origination, we see the ten 






For Nishitani Keiji, a non-dual subjectivity is a subjectivity no longer 
bound by the primary distinctions of inner and outer, subject and object, self 
and other, and therefore, no longer having a felt sense of isolation and 
separation from the world. For the self that realises itself on the field of śūnyatā 
it is impossible for it to be ego self-centred, in fact, ‘the absolute negation of that 
very self-centredness enables the field of śūnyatā to open up in the first place’ 
(RN, 158). By negating our false view of ourselves completely we find ourselves 
no longer ego self-centred but literally at the absolute centre. This is because 
our own home ground is settled in what he calls the ‘middle’ (Davis, 2017, SEP). 
We are interpenetrated along with all things, therefore, ‘on the field of śūnyatā, 
the centre is everywhere’ (RN, 158). Here we have a modern existential 
philosophical exegesis of the middle way.  
 
The field of śūnyatā is where we exist from the standpoint of muga in 
Nishitani Keiji’s thought. His thought does not remain with classical Buddhism, 
because he makes it a modern day hermeneutic in relation to Western 
philosophy, which has passed through the fire of nihilism (Davis, 2017; Ueda, 
2011). In this thesis I take śūnyatā to mean Nishitani Keiji’s highest stage of 
                                                             
 
‘Thus then is it, Ananda, that cognition, with name-and-form as its cause; name-and-
form, with cognition as its cause ; contact, with name-and-form as its cause; sensation 
with contact as its cause ; craving, with sensation as its cause; grasping, with craving as 
its cause ; becoming, with grasping as its cause; birth, with becoming as its cause; old 
age and death, with birth as its cause; grief, lamentation, ill, sorrow and despair, all 





self-understanding. Here we should recall one final point, that śūnyatā is a 
realisation which results in a standpoint from where we can see reality and 
ourselves simultaneously for the first time. In fact, it is reality that sees itself for 
the first time through this standpoint which is non-dual, as Heisig explains,  
 
‘the standpoint of emptiness, then, is not so much a 
philosophical “position” as it is the achievement of an original self-
awareness (our self-nature), compared to which all other consciousness 
is caught in the fictional darkness of ignorance, or what the Buddhists 
call avidya. It is a point from which to philosophize, not a doctrine’ 
(Heisig 2001, 223)  
 
Śūnyatā, therefore is not a doctrine but a field on which we can take a 
standpoint. If śūnyatā is the field of interpenetration, then the no-self is the 
new standpoint from where we can philosophize.  
 
My own view of the self is based on joining Nishitani Keiji’s 
understanding based on the self as interpenetrational (muga 無我) and on the 
field of śūnyatā, with the sexed nature of the self as sexuate found in Luce 
Irigaray. Joining together their own terminology we can say that the I-he and I-
she as two standpoints on the field of sexuate difference, can be expanded to 





suggest that we need to hold these two standpoints simultaneously, that the self 
is ultimately empty of any inherent existence; but relatively, as breathing-living-
speaking bodies, it is sexuate all the way down. That in our relation to all things 
we exist on the field of śūnyatā, but we relate fundamentally as two subjects 
who are different, we are always within a standpoint of either I-he or I-she. 
Therefore, when if we realise we are on a field of interpenetrating existence 
(śūnyatā) we must explore the possibility of two subjects as I-he and I-she as 













































In this chapter, I am going to juxtapose Nishitani Keiji and Luce 
Irigaray’s thoughts on nihilism. I shall begin by analysing Nishitani Keiji’s more 
negative view of the East-West dialogue found in his later writings; before going 
on to examine his philosophical understanding of the self, and the cause of 
cultural nihilism, as a self-consciousness suspended over nihility. (This can be 
understood as a philosophy of the subject based on a self-(mis)understanding 
which leads us to a global cultural nihilism.)  
 
In the second part of the chapter, I shall argue that Luce Irigaray’s 
fundamental concern is also nihilism; a position I was able to understand owing 
to my parallel reading of the her alongside Nishitani Keiji. By examining Luce 
Irigaray’s writings on Freud and Antigone, I shall demonstrate that for her the 
subject falls into nihilism because of a fundamental domination caused by the 







In this chapter, I shall argue that Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji are 
fundamentally in agreement; nihilism is the most important problem for us 
today,46 and an isolated self-centred subject inevitably falls into nihilism. It will 
also be shown that there is an important difference between Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji when it comes to the ultimate cause of nihilism. For Luce 
Irigaray, it is a masculine (neutral) subject who falls into nihilism, whereas a 
female subject has not yet been able to establish herself in her own right as a 
subject, owing to her position as an object for men. Nishitani Keiji’s 
understanding of nihilism is potentially one appropriate for men therefore, but 
perhaps questionable for women, if we take into consideration Luce Irigaray’s 
perspective. 
 
My aim then is to avoid the danger of falling into a nihilism of the same 
by positing a standpoint for man and woman on the field of śūnyatā. This I call 
the non-he and non-she. In this chapter we shall see that men and women are 
both objectified, that men and women must both be established as subjects on 
the field of consciousness as the I-he and I-she, but that we must do this without 
falling into an essentialism, and the way to do this is by breaking through the 
                                                             
46 Here we see the influence of both Niezsche and Heidegger. This history of Western culture 
and philosophy as inherently nihilistic or driven by the motor of nihilism is an assumption 
that both Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray make. It is questionable as to whether this is in fact 
the case. For a discussion of Luce Irigaray's nihilism in relation to Heidegger and Nietzsche, 
See Mortensen (1994). Much of the scholarship on Nishitani Keiji focuses on his relation to 






field of self-consciousness of I-he and I-she, on to the field of śūnyatā as non-
he and non-she. In this chapter, I focus on the problem, and in the next three 
chapters I focus is on overcoming this problem.  
 
3.2. Nishitani Keiji and the problem of Nihilism  
So far in Nishitani Keiji’s thought, we have seen an optimistic view of 
the development of the East-West discourse into a global dialogue, which 
attempts to check the Euro-centric prejudice of the philosophical tradition and 
tackle the emerging global problems which are rooted in their European origins. 
Most of this was drawn from writings before 1966. Here we shall examine how 
Nishitani Keiji proceeds more pessimistically and negatively through the East-
West dialogue, and into the discussion of no religion in the contemporary age. 
Let me give a short description of Nishitani Keiji's position on East and West in 
one of his writings some twenty years later: 
 
‘People from foreign countries who were traditionally 
considered belonging to the “outside”, strangers of a different cultural 
background, are no longer considered “other”. Very gradually they have 
become part of the “inside”, and are not foreign or strange any longer. 
This, I think, is a very important characteristic of the contemporary 
world. The stage of the contemporary world is different from all the 
earlier stages of human history, East and West are no longer facing each 





“inside” unity. Gradually the consciousness that the world is one whole 
has come to develop’ (TW, 119)  
 
In Japanese these two ideas of ‘West’ and ‘East’ are literally identical 
with the word ‘Atlantic Ocean’ (西洋) and ‘Pacific Ocean’ (東洋) respectively 
(TW, 119). They had the connotation of being vast open spaces, Europe 
belonging to one, and China, Korea, Japan to the other (TW, 119). These vast 
spacious image-words represent to consciousness a difference which for 
Nishitani Keiji has now merged into one vast ocean (TW, 120). What is coming 
into existence now is a single world with a shared understanding that this world 
is one or becoming one.  
 
The problem for him is not the global consciousness per se, but the 
style of this global consciousness: Western style. He quips that Japanese people 
all dress in the Western style, which was unthinkable only a few decades ago. In 
fact, he is suggesting that what is occurring is a “totalizing of the Western style”: 
 
‘One may even say that the purely “Eastern” does not exist 
anymore. From beginning to end he is embedded in Western style. Take 
me as an example. I am a Japanese as a person, and yet the things I wear, 
the things I eat, the things I drink, etc. they are all Western in style’     






The East (Japan/Far East) is being subsumed under the West – subtly 
stated here as ‘style’. The two oceans which are becoming one do so as a Western 
Ocean and this is unprecedented, ‘it is only in the contemporary world that the 
world is for the first time truly becoming one. This means a great change’ (TW, 
120). This great change for Nishitani Keiji – as he states almost directly after 
this – is ‘essentially related to the problem of nihilism’ (TW, 120).47  Nishitani 
Keiji characterises this age as an age of no religion, but we should be clear that 
this is not to say an age of atheism (See ENR). Atheism is bound up with theism 
and is therefore, still within the field of religious thinking (ENR; RN xlviii). “No 
religion” for Nishitani Keiji is a world without existential inquiry and the 
liberation of subjectivity that comes with it, and a world without values, and the 
ethical pathways that religions often safeguarded:  
 
‘Until now the standard of values, the ultimate foundation of all 
principles has rested in God – or Buddha, maybe. Nowadays, the 
ultimate foundation of all value standards has become fragile, a situation 
which we describe as nihilism and which is really the most fundamental 
problem of our age’ (TW, 121) 
 
It is the world where there is no religious existential quest that he is 
                                                             
47   A large proportion of the small amount of scholarly literature on Nishitani Keiji is focused 
on either nihilism and/or science and technology. Hase Shoto (1997; 1999) suggests that later 
Nishitani Keiji is no longer focused on nihilism but rather science and technology. The focus 
on nihilism is explicit in the middle period of Nishitani Keiji’s work (see above), but it is still 
very much implicit in later works which are more focused on science and technology. The end 
of On Buddhism [1970’s] for example returns to the problem of nihilism, as do essays such as 





speaking of here. Religion had previously in all periods of human history been 
fundamental to the integration of individuals and the ordering of human 
relations with nature, each other and the divine. It was crucial for the self to 
come to know itself not theoretically (philosophy) but, actually (existential 
religious quest). For Nishitani Keiji, religion preserved the path for existential 
inquiry and ethical values (Davis, 2017, SEP). Our current age is instead an 
epoch dominated by science and technology, two entwined discourses that do 
not include an overarching ethical world view according to which relations are 
ordered:  
 
‘The whole world is rapidly becoming one world. Today in 
almost all fields of human life, in industrial, economical and political 
activities, and in the arts, morality and philosophy, the one world is more 
and more emerging as the stage of their plays. There is no need to speak 
in this regard of science and technology. Their new inventions are 
making communication easier and speedier between distant parts of the 
globe. They are bringing at the same time, by their essential character of 
“objectivity,” the minds of all peoples on to a common plane of thought 
and intention. They are the main actors in the drama of the emergence 
of the one world, necessitating the encounter of various cultures and 
religions’ (RTA, 147) 
 
Nishitani Keiji sees that the whole world is becoming one world unified 





to a single form of self (the Cartesian self) which is fundamental to the 
“objectivity” of science and technology (RN; SZ; OB; Hase, 1997). Science and 
technology, for him, are complicit in the furthering of the nihilistic attitude; our 
bodies, ourselves, are all becoming the same, we are being ordered and reduced 
into an objectified existence (ENR; RR). As Waldenfels (1980, 2) writes, ‘a one 
dimensional view of man presents a distortion of humanity.’48 For Nishitani 
Keiji, mankind and the ‘fragile’ fabric of human relations are being mechanized 
(RR, 61). It is this distorted view of humanity that is Nishitani Keiji’s own 
struggle, ‘minds are being mechanized like never before, everything has become 
solely mechanical’ (ENR, 143) or as he states elsewhere:  
 
‘The situation in question may be called a tendency toward the 
total mechanization of human life. What I mean by this is, first of all, that 
the world comes to be understood mechanically, and secondly, that 
human social relations, namely person-to-person relationships, and 
even the way of thinking, or the human mind and spirit, come gradually 
to be mechanized’ (PM, 51) 
 
The greatest danger here is that a mind mechanized and reduced to the 
same as every other mind cannot even see its own mechanization. We are 
accustomed to interpreting our world in a mechanized manner, to think in a 
mechanized way, and to see only the same thing all around us. We are unaware 
                                                             
48    Here of course he is using the term taken from another student of Martin Heidegger: 





of our own alienation from ourselves as we accept ourselves as subjects set 
against and separate from a world of objects. We come to see ourselves, things 
and others as objects too. We are reduced to the field of objectivity, but as we 
saw earlier, for him an existential subjectivity, that is we ourselves, cannot be 
reduced to mere objects. The emergence of a single world which is mechanized 
and objectified, furthers the history of a nihilistic Western thought with its 
unconscious trajectory set to global nihilism. It is the ultimate cause of the 
problem of nihilism for Nishitani Keiji, and its root lies in alienation caused by 
a mistaken self-understanding which we must address next. 
 
3.3. Nishitani Keiji and the alienation of self  
Nishitani Keiji gives a diagnosis of our times as nihilistic. He 
approaches the problem of nihilism from a number of different angles and offers 
several different definitions and analyses. Nihilism here is broadly understood 
as one or more of the following: a philosophical position which is ultimately 
based on relative nothingness (nihility), a loss of shared values, or an excessive 
ego-centredness which leads to our self-isolation. Here we will examine in detail 
Nishitani Keiji’s claim that it is owing to the inherent self-centredness of self-
consciousness that we fall into a nihility of self and things which leads ultimately 
to an all pervasive nihilism because we fail to pass through that field of nihility 
onto the non-dual field of śūnyatā. 
 





from upon the field of consciousness, and the standpoint is a void when seen 
from upon the field of nihility. Only on the field of śūnyatā can either of these 
perspectives (dualism or relative nothingness) be overcome, and along with it 
the alienation of the subject who stands on either of these fields. I shall focus on 
this analysis, because this form of misunderstanding of the self, according to 
Nishitani Keiji, takes place because of a prejudice inherent to the mode of self-
consciousness; we fall into a nihilistic understanding of ourselves because self-
consciousness falls into an excessive self-centredness, what we might call an 
ego-centred view of the world i.e. a dualistic interpretation of life. This is in fact, 
what Luce Irigaray calls egological (BEW, 21). For Nishitani Keiji, excessive self-
centredness is the root cause of all other forms of nihilism: a loss of shared 
values, a failure to deal with our own little death, a philosophical position based 
on the ego or the relative nothingness of existence.  
 
We must begin then with his understanding of the self and its relations. 
For him the self in relation to things has three possible modes, which we can 
preview here before going into more detail.49 The first mode of self is self-
consciousness. It is in brief, that we know ourselves and things on a field which 
is fundamentally divided in two as internal and external, subject and objects, 
i.e., it is a dualist view of the world. The second “is” nihility; a relative 
nothingness of which all phenomena, including self-consciousness, are subject 
to, and which therefore undermines this internal and external division with a 
despairing nothingness or abyss. The third “is” śūnyatā, a non-dual and 
                                                             
49   I am indebted to Graham Parkes for this threefold understanding of Nishitani Keiji and 





unifying simultaneous experience of self and all things; a self-negation that 
includes and preserves the other two limited modes of self-consciousness and 
nihility through a double exposure of them (Parkes, 2014). These three modes 
are not in any way hierarchical, they are the essential fields on which we might 
find ourselves; as fields on which we stand, they frame the world on which we 
know ourselves and the world around us. In other words, they provide the limits 
of our hermeneutic horizon. 
 
Nishitani Keiji states in the opening chapter of Religion and 
Nothingness (1983) that:  
 
‘when we think of “reality” from an everyday standpoint, we 
think first of all of the things and events without us: the mountains and 
streams, the flowers and forests, and the entire visible universe all about 
us … Next, we think of reality as the world within us: our thoughts, our 
feelings, and our desires’ (RN, 6) 
 
 For him, we naturally see our world as divided between external and 
internal, as that which is without us and that which is within us. Our everyday 
experience of being a self in the world is demarcated into two: one concerning 
external phenomena, and one concerning internal phenomena. We are 
constituted by our separation from the world around us. The objects around us 





consciousness then is our most ordinary mode of the self, it is not a special 
phenomenon, but rather goes hand-in-hand with that every day, unexamined 
or ordinary way of viewing the world around us as a division between me and 
the world of things outside. A human being, on the level of self-consciousness, 
sees the world naturally according to an internal/external division:  
 
‘to look at things from the standpoint of the self [on the level of 
self-consciousness] is always to see things merely as objects, that is, to 
look at things without from a field [of consciousness] within the self’   
(RN, 9).  
 
The human being on the level of self-consciousness is for Nishitani 
Keiji our usual way of self-understanding. He writes, ‘when we speak of the self, 
usually we mean the self which is conscious of or has come to reflect on itself. 
This self has “self-consciousness” as its essence, and never parts from it’ (STZ, 
1). This very ordinary way of seeing the world then, is due to the fact that we are 
self-conscious beings with a mind composed of sensations and intellect; who 
discriminate between internal and external, subject and object, and ultimately, 
self and other(s). In short, “Man”50 is self-conscious because he/she ‘knows 
himself [or herself] at the same time as he [or she] knows things’ (STZ, 16). This, 
for Nishitani Keiji, is a self which sees itself and the world around it on the field 
                                                             





of consciousness.51  
 
The separation between internal and external is necessary therefore, if 
we are seeing and thinking from the field of consciousness, as he states: ‘[The] 
standpoint of separation of subject and object, of opposition between within and 
without, is what we call the field of consciousness’ (RN, 9). Field (J. ba) we can 
recall here is a spatial-concept on which we stand or take a standpoint (J. 
tachiba). ‘Field of consciousness’, therefore, gives a spatial and not only 
temporal sense to consciousness, as well as giving the term a sharable sense, 
i.e., we all as human beings see things from the standpoint of a self-conscious 
self, which is due to that fact that we all stand on a field of consciousness. Self-
consciousness then, is our ordinary place from where human beings share in 
seeing the world. We are all bound up together by the same way of seeing on the 
field of consciousness. This is the horizon or the frame from which we look. The 
problem is ‘the unquestioned assumption … that this is the only proper mode of 
thinking that there is no other’ (Unno, 1989, 308). As we shall see, it is feasible 
that we could conceptualise ourselves in other ways. 
 
There is then within the structure of the field of consciousness, and our 
self-consciousness which is constituted simultaneously with it, a basic problem 
which leads to a Cartesian like position (RN; STZ). This position is one where 
the self is taken as self-evident, as an ego who is certain, and from which the 
                                                             





world of objects or things can then be verified as extended in space outside of 
the self as ego. This is essentially a misunderstanding, or a limitation to 
ourselves and things as only understandable on the dualistic field of 
consciousness. Nishitani Keiji calls this the ordinary way of seeing the world 
and it has a major problem: the self as self-consciousness can only see the world 
from its own self-centred position. For Nishitani Keiji:  
 
‘the self becomes that which possesses these faculties. And since 
all things in the world, including human beings, are known only via the 
self's sensations and intellect, the self [as a self-consciousness] is the 
vantage point from which all things come to be seen. In this sense, the 
self takes on the appearance of always being located at the center of 
everything’ (STZ 13) 
 
This means that ‘it is not possible really to get in touch with things as 
they are’ because that ‘self [as self-consciousness] always occupies centre stage’ 
(RN, 9). With these roots in an ordinary way of seeing, a self as self-
consciousness: 
 
‘clearly discriminates one thing from another, and his self from 
all other living things. Self and external world, subject and object, are 
divided, and man views the world of objects from the self-centred 






The self on the level of self-consciousness is the vantage point from 
which all things are seen:  
 
‘the self [as self-consciousness] sees and grasps the self [from 
its three possibilities] placing itself at the centre, opposite all other 
things. This is the self's self-centred mode of being and way of seeing’ 
(STZ, 13) 
 
This is what Nishitani Keiji calls the self-centredness of self-
consciousness, and it means that as human beings who are self-conscious we 
have fallen into a self-centred mode of seeing ourselves and the world of things 
about us. A human being as self-consciousness therefore, separates itself from 
all things, this is our inherent prejudice on the field of consciousness. This self-
consciousness, at the centre of a world of objects discriminated from it, places 
itself in ‘a position vis-a-vis things from which self and things remain 
fundamentally separated from one another’ (RN, 9). This self-consciousness 
comes to be completely separated from the world around it and sees itself as the 
centre of the world. Man now ‘exists as if he had no essential connection with 
other things in the world, as if he were removed from the sphere of the world, 






‘The self that is self-centred in relation to the without is a self 
that is separated from things and closed up within itself alone. It is a self 
that continually faces itself in the same way. That is, the self is set ever 
against itself as some thing called “self” and separated from other things. 
This is the self of self-consciousness’ (RN, 10) 
 
What has occurred here then is a shift from the world understood as 
internal and external, and from which we can understand ourselves in relation 
to the world of things and objects, to a world of self-isolation of the ego, owing 
to an inherent prejudice in seeing ourselves as self-evident and separate from 
the things of the world outside us. However, it: 
 
‘is by no means self-evident. Indeed it stems from a bias rooted 
deep within the self-consciousness of man. More fundamentally, the ego-
centred grasp and interpretation of ego which we find in modern man is 
no less of a bias and hardly as self-evident as it is assumed to be. These 
biases signal a confinement of self-being to the perspective of self-
immanence from which man prehends his own egoity and personality, a 
confinement that inevitably ushers in a narcissistic mode of grasping the 
self wherein the self gets caught up in itself’ (RN, 69)  
 
In this section I have tried to avoid analysing the historical trajectory 





distinction of subject and object, or a more and more dualistic enframing of the 
world, but this is clearly what Nishitani Keiji has in mind when he gives his 
diagnosis of our contemporary situation which progresses from a modern 
Cartesian philosophical understanding of statements, but for him there has 
been a general trend towards a greater and greater individualism, and a more 
and more self-centred attitude to life – caused by a prejudice inherent to self-
consciousness, and a refining of the distinction between a subject and an object 
in Modern man. He gives the examples of modern science and modern 
philosophy, (See RN essay I and STZ) as well as psychology and literature, (See 
STZ part I) as proof of both the reification of self-consciousness, and its inherent 
self-centredness, which becomes more and more profound in Modern man. We 
only need to note that his standpoint is persuasive and based on his own 
experience. 
 
In brief, what we have been speaking about is the inevitable existential 
alienation of the self, owing to the fact that human beings are defined in a 
limited way by their self-consciousness which takes place on a field of 
consciousness which sees the world as inherently dualistic (meaning that of 
course they see themselves in this way because there is no other way if we 
remain on this field.) This results in two nihilistic tendencies: a prejudice 
towards the subject or the ego in isolation, and/or the objectification and 
mechanization of the living world outside and the subject or ego himself. For 
Nishitani Keiji, however, the self is not limited to the field of consciousness but 
has two further possibilities founded on the field of nihility and the field of 





to the self, and its self-misunderstanding on the field of self-consciousness, and 
the resulting cultural nihilism which such a shared limited understanding of 
self-centredness perpetuates. 
 
Folded beneath this facade of self-consciousness is its double, the field 
of nihility: a relative nothingness which negates all phenomena posited in a 
dualistic manner which is as we have seen constitutive of the field of 
consciousness. If the mode of self-consciousness is the making of distinctions 
based on divisions such as subject and object, internal and external, within and 
without, which lead to a reified and alienated view of the self on a dualistic field; 
then the mode of nihility is the inevitable annihilation of those distinctions, a 
reduction of everything to the same, a slipping into blind nothingness or non-
differentiation. In short, a de-reification of self and all things into non-
substantiality, by removing the dualistic framework through a glimpse of its 
underbelly of relative nothingness. What we have seen in the previous section 
is in fact already a slipping into nihility of modern man. Nishitani Keiji claims 
that the diremption of self and things takes place because of an excessive sense 
of self-consciousness on the field of consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes 
separate from the world around it and is presumed to be self-evident or self-
subsistent, and ultimately each self on the mode of self-consciousness is 
radically separated from the world of things and an ‘other’.52 This radical 
separation by an abyss is a defining factor of nihility and a primary cause of 
nihilism.  
                                                             






Nishitani Keiji defines nihility as that which, ‘renders meaningless the 
meaning of life’ (RN, 4), while Parkes and Aihara define it as, ‘one of the various 
“grades” or aspects of “nothing” … It means literally “hollow [kyo] nothingness 
[mu],” generally with a negative connotation’ (Parkes, 1990, 199). We must 
remember, that it is fundamentally a negating of all phenomena, hence, the 
difficulty in saying exactly what it “is”. We must see it as a dynamic negating 
quality. Death for example is the negation of life, and this juxtaposition is one 
which is useful to keep in mind. Nishitani Keiji introduces the idea that nihility 
lies beneath the field of consciousness:   
 
‘Normally we proceed through life, on and on with our eye fixed 
on something or other, always caught up with something within or 
without ourselves. It is these engagements that prevent the deepening of 
awareness. They block off the way to an opening up of that horizon on 
which nihility appears and self-being becomes a question’ (RN, 4) 
 
Our existence on the mode of self-consciousness, our everyday life, 
going here and there, doing this and that, is “always caught up with something 
within or without ourselves”. In other words, our everyday activities splits us 
between the internal and the external in a very ordinary way, which all takes 
place on the field of consciousness. It blocks our way to a greater awareness of 





self-consciousness with all its every day concerns. But when the horizon of 
nihility: 
 
‘does open up at the bottom of those engagements that keep life 
moving continually on and on, something seems to halt and linger before 
us. This something is the meaninglessness that lies in wait at the bottom 
of those very engagements that bring meaning to life. This is the point at 
which that sense of nihility, that sense that “everything is the same” … 
brings the restless, forward-advancing pace of life to a halt and makes it 
take a step back’ (RN, 4) 
 
In our daily lives we go about our everyday engagements giving little 
attention to the fundamental questions of life, however, nihility ‘shatters the 
clinging to conventional thinking on the field of consciousness’ (Unno, 1989, 
309). Nihility is therefore, is an 'antidote' to an unexamined self, because it is 
the occurrence of something which breaks the sense of self as a nice self-
contained separate existence which will go on unchanging on the field of self-
consciousness, and which is supported by the everyday activities which provide 
us all with meaning (or keep us too busy to reflect on their meaning). Nihility 
makes us stop and question ourselves: who am I? Why am I here? What is the 
purpose of existence? What is the meaning of it all? These questions, for 
Nishitani Keiji, are absolutely fundamental to our authentic existence, and they 
mark the opening up of the religious quest which includes, or is even necessary 





fundamental understanding of ourselves and reality, we must become a 
question to ourselves: 
 
‘when we become a question to ourselves and when the problem 
of why we exist arises, this means that nihility has emerged from the 
ground of our existence and that our very existence has turned into a 
question mark. The appearance of nihility signals nothing less than that 
one's awareness of self-existence has penetrated to an extraordinary 
depth’ (RN, 4)  
 
Nihility is therefore not in fact a negative occurrence; rather, it is a 
necessary one, if we are to break through the sense of self-consciousness as a 
separate self, and the misunderstanding that this is our only mode of 
existence.53 This “deepening of awareness” which effects all aspects of our daily 
life and our everyday activities, is an essential and defining aspect of Nishitani 
Keiji’s philosophical hermeneutics. The inquiry into a new sense of self, a new 
self-understanding, becomes the great question of life, which gives life authentic 
meaning through a deepening of awareness.  
 
We must also remember that nihility and self-consciousness are always 
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co-present in our existence as a self, they are not separable. Just as self-
consciousness is a defining factor of our human existence, we also cannot escape 
from nihility: 
 
‘Even those who claim that things like nihility are not a problem 
for them will sooner or later be swallowed up by nihility itself. It is 
already very much there, right under their feet, and by refusing to make 
it a problem for themselves they only slip deeper into its clutches’         
(RN, 47) 
 
We can even say that nihility is as much a defining factor of our 
existence as self-consciousness is; but we cannot say that one is good, while the 
other is bad. We must say that each has a necessary function in our existence: 
one positive and one negative. We can see how closely related they are by 
juxtaposing the two. The field of consciousness is: 
 
‘The field that lies at the ground of our everyday lives [and it] is 
the field of an essential separation between self and things, … Within it, 
reality appears only in the shape of shattered fragments, only in the 
shape of ineluctable self-contradictions’ (RN, 10) 
 






‘the unique existence of all things and multiplicity and 
differentiation in the world appear on the field of nihility, all things 
appear isolated from one another by an abyss. Each thing has its being 
as a one-and-only, a solitariness absolutely shut up within itself’            
(RN, 145)  
 
An excessively self-centred self-consciousness that falls into a nihility 
where the self-enclosure of things is absolute (RN, 249). This excessiveness of a 
self-conscious self which is radically separated from all things, when taken to 
an extreme, tips over into nihility. The two are in fact, therefore, a hair’s breadth 
apart. Ultimately: ‘we call such a state of absolute self-enclosure “nihilistic.” In 
human awareness, this solitariness is expressed as being suspended, all alone, 
over a limitless void’ (RN, 145).   
 
We do well to remember then that nihility is that which ‘renders 
meaningless the meaning of life’ (RN, 4). It is most likely that the event which 
triggers our encounter with nihility will be perceived on the field of 
consciousness as negative, bad or something to be avoided, something to fear, 
a lack or a loss. Everything, both internal and external will be nullified, reduced 
to a void in comparison to how it is for us now on the field of consciousness (RN, 
17). Hence our preoccupation with the busyness of everyday life is an attempt 






In our everyday lives, for Nishitani Keiji, what breaks through our 
isolated self-consciousness tends to be a personal tragedy (RN, 3-4). It could be 
the death of a loved one, or our own encounter with illness, suffering or death, 
which brings us to realize that our existence as a self-conscious being is finite: 
we will die, as must all living beings (SP). And we as human beings defined by 
our self-consciousness are conscious of the fact of death. It is, in a life where 
almost everything is changing and uncertain, our one certainty: we shall die, 
irrespective of our will to live, or our drive for mere survival (Parkes, 2014). 
Lurking under our everyday busyness – our life on the level of self-
consciousness – is this fact of death, and at any moment it may seize us and 
remove us from this self-consciousness, bringing us face to face on a personal 
level with the nihility of our existence. In short, we can summarise by saying: if 
self-consciousness is life, then nihility is death, and these are two sides of the 
coin of our existence as a self. However, it is not all doom and gloom, we should 
recall that there is in fact a third side to this coin śūnyatā, which is an abyss for 
the abyss of nihility (RN, 98). 
 
The main point for us to grasp here is that an excessive self-centredness 
falls into a nihilistic understanding of the world (self and things) as does an 
excessive nihility. It is therefore, that through its misunderstanding of itself on 
the two horizons of self-consciousness and nihility, and a misunderstanding of 
the relation of the fields of self-consciousness and nihility, that the self falls into 





one of ego self-centredness, globalization and mechanization combine, for him, 
in what he calls an age of no-religion, in other words: an age without existential 
inquiry and a shared system of values which guide that inquiry.  
 
It is important to make one final note here, that an excess of thinking 
on the side of nihility necessitates a nihilistic philosophical position. At the time 
in which Nishitani Keiji is writing the contemporary situation of philosophical 
nihilism can be seen in the philosophies of Nietzsche, Sartre and Heidegger. For 
Nishitani Keiji they each take a stand on nothingness, and posit freedom on 
nothingness (SN). With the rise of atheism, he sees nihilism as the limitation of 
man to the human self-centred position, in brief humanism (SN). Connected to 
both of these is the loss of shared values brought about through the demise of 
Christian religion in Europe, or the demise of Buddhism in Japan, what can, in 
short, be called ‘the death of God’, that is, the simultaneous loss of self-
understanding, shared values, and the will to create new values as diagnosed by 
Friedrich Nietzsche.54  
 
Nihilism as we have seen is intimately linked to religion and is the most 
fundamental problem for Nishitani Keiji throughout his life. He also makes 
clear that nihilism is a perennial problem, as it is something which people from 
all ages and times have struggled with (RN, 168). Most of all, as he points out 
on the first page of The Self overcoming of Nihilism fundamentally, ‘if nihilism 
                                                             






is anything, it is first of all a problem of the self’ (SN, 1). Above, I have attempted 
to sketch Nishitani Keiji's existential inquiry into the human condition, and its 
fall into a nihilistic understanding of itself and the world. This understanding is 
what I mean by the alienation of the self. It is not alienation in the Marxist sense, 
but rather alienation in the existential sense. This alienation occurs in two 
different but related ways, one, through a radical separation of our self from all 
other things, owing to the inherent self-centred prejudice of self-consciousness 
we fall into a subjectivism to some degree in all that we do; and two, by the 
objectification and mechanization of all things, others and oneself as objects. 
 
Nishitani Keiji suggests that the Western approach to overcoming the 
threat of nihilism is through a specific mode, the desire and freedom of the 
individual. Although his writings are limited on this, apart from the 
mechanization of the self and institutions (as seen during his lifetime in 
communist states) there is another option of filling the void with pleasures and 
distractions (RN, 87). In its simplest of forms this is a negative nihilism of the 
masses following trends, fashions, sporting events and any other sweeping 
distractions. The positive side of this desire orientated subject is a creative 
existentialism; a positive nihilism that attempts to step away from the 
degradation of man through mechanization and find freedom in a subjectivity 
that takes its stand on that very nihility (RN, 88). This is Sartre’s position for 
Nishitani Keiji: a subject is free to choose because he is a subjectivity constituted 
on nothingness. (We should remember that Sartre was the most popular 
philosopher in Europe at this time and much of Nishitani Keiji’s writings target 





away from mechanization and objectification which places our freedom firmly 
in subjectivity; it still rests on an incomplete self-awareness, it is on a dualistic 
field suspended over a void, and therefore, still partial in its self-understanding, 
as well as risking establishing the subject on an ever-changing field of desires 
which are clearly open to manipulation. This standpoint of the liberal self is one 
where the freedom of individuals ‘is apt to be orientated to the mere freedom of 
the subject in pursuit of desires’ (RN, 87), which risks establishing ourselves on 
something which is for him very superficial such as fleeting desires (PAZ). This 
is a pursuit of happiness based on desiring, accumulating and being attached to 
things and others which for him, is clearly unacceptable and merely perpetuates 
the inherent duality of consciousness and the nihility the underlies it, rather 
than actually overcoming it.  
 
In summary then, self-consciousness covers over the mode of self 
which Nishitani Keiji terms nihility. The field of nihility, lurks within, under, 
alongside, the field of consciousness.55 These fields are completely interrelated 
with our experience and our reality: we experience ourselves as a self-conscious 
self and we believe our reality is this self-consciousness; contrariwise, we 
experience ourselves as a nothingness, and we believe that our reality is based 
on this nothingness giving us a certain freedom based on our subjectivity as 
nothing. Our experience is usually an admixture of these two fields, but 
whatever the case, the relationship between them not appropriate for our actual 
living existence. Put succinctly: the standpoint of self-consciousness has a 
                                                             






prejudice based on substance and life; and the standpoint of nihility has a 
prejudice based on insubstantiality, nothingness and death. Ultimately, both 
standpoints are necessary, but either one taken to its extreme leads to a position 
we call nihilistic; because they both result eventually in the radical separation 
of self from the world of things, and the self-misunderstanding that results is 
either owing to self-enclosure or objectification. However, this does not mean 
we are looking for a version of the golden mean between the two; rather, what 
we are looking for is a realisation of śūnyatā. We shall look at this position of 




3.4. Luce Irigaray and the problem of nihilism 
Luce Irigaray, like Nishitani Keiji, gives the diagnosis that the problem 
of nihilism in Western culture is caused by a misunderstanding of the self. By 
reading Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray alongside each other, and through 
personal discussions with her, I was able to locate this thread of nihilism 
running through her work. Although she agrees with Nishitani Keiji, that man's 
inevitable descent into nothingness and nihilism as a loss of values, and an 
inability to create new values; she locates the cause of man's demise into 
nothingness in a very different dynamic.  
 
Unlike Nishitani Keiji, who considers man's predicament to be one 





of nihility, Luce Irigaray considers the current situation to be one brought about 
by man's domination of the natural world on the one hand, and on the other, 
the confusion of woman with the natural world, especially her capability to 
reproduce or engender. She comes to this analysis through her engagement with 
Freud’s Little Ernst, her reading of Antigone and her linguistic analysis, which 
we shall examine in this section. In this section we shall examine her analysis of 
the problem of man's domination of the world, his relation to objects, and the 
resulting nihilism which ensues from it. In short, the problem of nihilism in 
Western (masculine) culture.  
 
The only previous engagement with nihilism in Luce Irigaray’s work 
work is found in Ellen Mortensen's The Feminine and nihilism (1994). Although 
a useful study this text focuses almost solely on the philosophical heritage of 
Luce Irigaray (Nietzsche and Heidegger) to locate her work in that history of 
European nihilism found in these two very significant philosophers. It is 
necessary to understand these forerunners in the Western tradition who placed 
the problem of nihilism in Western culture at the forefront of our current 
epoch's predicament, and who were so influential on Luce Irigaray and her own 
thought concerning nihilism. But, on the other hand, it is also important for us 
to look at her later work in relation to the problem of nihilism, and, as I do here, 
to discuss her cross-cultural encounters in relation to that same problem – two 







In her most recent works, Luce Irigaray has shown a great concern for 
the problem of nihilism as understood in the Western philosophical tradition. 
For example, in In the beginning she was (2012) she highlights three nihilistic 
tendencies. First, she locates the origin of nihilism with the pre-socratic 
philosophers and a process of neutralization, ‘with the neutralization of his own 
being and the whole of the universe, the Presocratic philosopher somehow 
prepares our tradition for nihilism’ (IBSW, 4). Second, she proposes that the 
reduction of everything to the same, that is, the eradication of difference: 
 
‘There must no longer be master or slave, rich or poor, white or 
black, and finally no longer man or woman. This reduction of differences 
is planned by Western culture, especially through putting into the neuter 
the ecstasy which took the place of her – nature, woman, Goddess – or 
of the relation with her. This reduction of differences leads to a cultural 
deluge, to a nihilism without any possible overcoming, or to an 
authoritarianism or totalitarianism worse than those already known, 
notably because they reach the core of thinking itself and claim to be 
universal’ (IBSW, 10) 
 
And finally, in this same text she speaks about nihilism as the 
fragmentation of ourselves: 
 





humanity or instead contributes to its destruction through a 
fragmentation of us into parts which are still smaller, more partial, more 
dead. Such a culture, then, sometimes appeals to our eyes, sometimes to 
our ears, sometimes speaks through words and sometimes through 
images, but never gathers us with all our perceptions, and never allows 
us to really approach one another, notably with the whole of ourselves. 
Which ends in a sort of neutralization, a kind of nihilism, even if it results 
in beautiful forms, appearances and discourses’ (IBSW, 20) 
 
We can see then that in her latest work she has a clear understanding 
of nihilism at the root of the Western philosophical tradition, as a neutralisation 
of our “being”, as the reduction of everything to the same (Mortensen, 1994, 10; 
Zakin, 2011), and as the fragmentation of ourselves which results in 
neutralisation (Whitford, 1991, 133). 
 
Most recently, in her questions to Michael Marder, which occupy the 
prologue to her dialogue with him in Through Vegetal Being (2016), we hear 
again this concern for the problem of nihilism:  
 
‘I am extremely vigilant on the passage from a culture that was 
nihilistic, through its subjection of our global being to supra-sensitive 
values, to an epoch presumed to be postmetaphysical. I am afraid that 





(TVB, 4)  
 
Ten years earlier in Sharing the world (2008), she raises this same 
concern for the danger of critique and the overcoming of the tradition being a 
nihilistic tendency:  
 
‘discovering the limited and sometimes erroneous character of 
our cultural construction can lead us to a destructive nihilism with 
respect to all our values, including that partial individualization which 
man has, with difficulty, gained. No doubt, to pass from one epoch to 
another requires am interpretive and critical attitude towards the past, 
but not necessarily a total destruction of our tradition’ (SW, 132)  
 
But even before this, in her text between east and west (2002) where, 
as we have seen, there is the focus on her passage between traditions, nihilism 
was discussed as that threat of nothingness in her opening essay, where she 
states: ‘Has he not dominated all, or almost all, by his cleverness, only to arrive 
at nothing? And, surveying from on high the world, his world, does he not find 
himself finally excluded from it?’ (BEW, 2). Failing to begin from himself, ‘the 
reality he himself is’, she asks, ‘has he not proceeded from illusion to illusion?’ 
(BEW, 2). In short, he dominates the world from upon high (abstractions, 
consciousness, and the speculative) ignorant of his objective reality as a 





should recall, that her own existential quest is one of the main reasons why Luce 
Irigaray embarks on her difficult passage between East and West, and we can 
add that this is clearly also as personal means to facilitate the overcoming of 
nihilism.  
 
The overcoming of nihilism for her is through sexuate difference, and 
our relation to an “other” who is different to us. This “other” offers us a ‘means 
of overcoming nihilism without forgetting its teaching’ (SW, 132) and who we 
reach from a corporeal sensibility: 
 
‘Cultivating our sensibility, including our corporeal sensibility, 
in order to enter into relation with a different other is also a way to escape 
the nihilism threatening our tradition as well as its critique. To decide in 
favour of the human truth that we can and want to be in relation to and 
with the other amounts to being faithful to a different truth from the one, 
dependent on a supra-sensible absolute, that has both exiled us from 
ourselves and separated us from one another’ (SW, 135) 
 
And further to this, in Through Vegetal Being (2016), and in relation 
to Nietzsche’s teaching of nihilism, she states quite clearly, ‘I, for one, think that 
the cultural elaboration and the ethical practice of the relations between 
differently sexuated subjects, beginning with two, can act as both a passage and 






Luce Irigaray’s great concern over the nihilism of Western culture is 
not a recent development, and I suggest it originates in her middle period with 
the classic text An Ethics of Sexual difference (1993). In fact, I consider nihilism 
to be the main problem that Luce Irigaray is dealing with, since her middle 
phase of work onwards, which as we have seen, she claims sexuate difference, 
cultivated as a corporeal sensibility, can overcome (Cheah and Grosz, 1998, 14). 
In An Ethics of Sexual difference (1993) she famously states that sexuate 
difference is ‘one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age … 
[It] is probably the issue in our time which could be our 'salvation’ if we thought 
it through’ (ED, 5). Her entire oeuvre is undeniably an attempt to 
philosophically critique from, and then later philosophically (and often 
poetically) positively elaborate a position which recognises sexuate difference 
as the primary and fundamental difference. But if we read on from this oft 
quoted statement to hear what we are trying to save ourselves from, we see that 
the fundamental problem is nihilism:  
 
‘Think of it as an approach that would allow us to check the 
many forms that destruction takes in our world, to counteract a nihilism 
that merely affirms the reversal or the repetitive proliferation of the 
status quo values – whether you call them the consumer society, the 
circularity of discourse, the more or less cancerous diseases of our age, 
the unreliability of words, the end of philosophy, religious despair or 





to consider the living subject’ (ED, 5)  
 
For Luce Irigaray, nihilism rears its head in many forms, and through 
the universal difference of sexuate difference we are looking to 'check’ or 
undercut these many forms. The lack of an acknowledgement of sexuate 
difference for her, results in a single world (his History) constituted by a 
masculine subject and his philosophical discourse. Without sexuate difference 
we are left with only the possibility of the affirmation of a reversal, or the 
proliferation of the status quo of (masculine) values, which results in nihilism. 
The masculine singular subject – along with the feminist discourses from within 
that same paradigm – simply perpetuates the same masculine values or an 
inversion of the same (masculine) values, and this results in nihilism. Moreover, 
critique alone is not enough. In short, a woman cannot assume that she is the 
same as man, this would result in a perpetuation of the same masculine values 
by leaving us within a discourse bounded by a single subject: the masculine 
neutral subject such as the unsexed “I” of self-consciousness.  
 
 
3.5. Luce Irigaray and the fabrication of the world 
‘Everywhere journeying, inexperienced and without issue, he comes to 
nothingness’ (Sophocles, Cited in TBT, 68). There is much that is strange in the 
world, but Man is the strangest of all. He is uncanny, he is terrible, so begins the 





first line of her own analysis of it.56 Man moves outside of himself in order to 
master the world. He fears the world around him beginning with the sea, and so 
he makes boats and sets sail on the seas. The sea is an abyss for him, she thinks, 
and instead of facing the abyss within, he faces the abyss without, later 
projecting it onto the world at the cosmic level. In a similar sense the earth too 
must be mastered; it is dug up, plowed, and constructed upon. He commits a 
violence to the sea and to the earth. For Luce Irigaray:  
 
‘Man upsets the rhythm of natural growth. He plows the earth 
and obliges it to produce by force what it does not yield on its own … Man 
imposes a yoke upon the life that unfolds itself but whose foundation he 
does not inhabit’ (TBT, 69) 
 
The world must be mastered but he can no longer live in it. She asks 
us:  
‘Is this not because he feels foreign to this life which lives 
without him, this life which reproduces itself, which orders itself without 
his governance? Is this not a possible reason for the beginning of 
History? Is History not simply the other name for man's intolerance 
towards nature? From then on, does History not move in an opposite 
                                                             
56 All the following section is paraphrased from the essay 'Between us a fabricated world' 






direction: towards the oblivion of man's to be’ (TBT, 69) 
 
In order to differentiate himself from the world around him Man 
fabricates a world. This fabrication is the historical world as opposed to nature. 
To overcome the world of nature he substitutes its power for his own, he tames 
nature, and he does so through his fabrications: tools, vehicles, language. In 
short, logos and techne. The world of nature (the sea, the earth, plants, animals, 
and ultimately woman too) is tamed and controlled by his constructed world of 
History. It is this initial domination of the world around him and not the world 
within him which leads man to be the most uncanny, the most strange and the 
most terrible of all. It is through myth, not archaeology or anthropology, that 
we can interpret this first gesture of domination: 
  
‘the beginning is revealed in the interpretation of a mythology 
in which man imposes himself as the master of nature, after having been 
its slave … His gesture of dominion and the instruments which serve this 
domination: tools, language, intellect, the passions themselves, create, 
little by little, another world which dominates him – in the form of 
History, for example – and which exiles him from himself, even if he may 
feel closer to it because it is made by him’ (TBT, 70)  
 
Man was the slave to nature but he overcomes “her” by reversing the 





his fear of the sea (or his mother?) From his self-imposed position of a slave, 
however, he becomes the exiled master. His fabrication of History inverts the 
domination without him knowing it, and the violence he did to his natural home 
is returned to him by his History. He does not escape the uncanny, he simply 
loses himself within his own uncanniness projected outwards as History 
because of its familiarity, as opposed to that (nature) which was (perhaps) other 
to him in the first place:      
 
‘Man thus appears surrounded by a double power: the power of 
the universe around him and that of the world created by him which he 
does not recognize as his work, in particular as the work of his violence 
which is concealed in the everyday … Man lives in the uncanny, believing 
that he has tamed it. For him, the familiar is his violence become History. 
But in such a place, generated by his dominion, he is an exile … Man has 
become estranged from his to be and thinks in an improper fashion. He 
considers himself to be the master of the very thing which dominates 
him’ (TBT, 70) 
 
As we saw above Nishitani Keiji makes a very similar move: through a 
mistake in man's consciousness, a false consciousness, albeit of a different kind; 
man mistakenly divides the world and then comes to dominate it, but it too 
dominates him as he becomes more and more mechanized. For Luce Irigaray, 
this domination leads to his own domination in turn by the constructed world 





perspective, is that it is not merely a mistake in the neutral formation of 
consciousness that causes man to dominate the natural world around him; in 
fact, this domination of the natural world (and also his break with his mother, 
as we saw above in the Freudian analysis) is all in order to establish himself as 
“himself” and as separate to the natural and the reproductive which are out of 
his control. For Luce Irigaray, man or Man's prejudice of himself as the only 
subject, as a self-conscious self, outside of the natural world, is constituted by 
the domination of the external world – it is not a simple mistake. In short, the 
inner is constituted through the domination of the outer which establishes a 
self-consciousness as separate from one's mother and the natural world. It is 
not a simple mistake which leads to domination, rather, domination of the 
projected external world leads to self-conscious isolation. But, this domination 
has deeper roots in fear. In Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji we see two very 
different interpretations of a certain dynamic which they both agree is taking 
place. 
 
To return to Luce Irigaray, it is not that man is inherently violent. It is 
simply that his original gesture was brought about by a fear of nature: the sea, 
the earth, the animals, woman (as his mother?). His original slavery to nature 
is illusory. There are things, beings or forces which are beyond his power and so 
he makes a world within his power which protects him from this natural world 
without. He convinces himself he is master of his world. His first gesture of 
domination is due to fear; but this original world which he is afraid of was his 
home, and so he becomes estranged from it and from himself throught his same 





he comes to be dominated for a second time by his own constructions; both 
without realising it, and without recognising it as his own making. Man is 
doubly uncanny because of his fear and then because he projects slavery on to 
himself. In essence, he makes a world of a masculine history which enslaves him 
for a second time. What we must ask then is, are the projection of the abyss 
outside of himself, and this obliteration of being, the same as Nishitani Keiji’s 
nihility?  
 
Why does Man, or a man, go outside of himself? And why has his 
History, his science, and his technology been one concerned with seeing 
everything as outside of himself? Why does he only know, construct, dominate, 
and commit violence against that which is outside of him? Why does he never 
turn to himself, inward, to the abyss of himself? As we will see, for Nishitani 
Keiji this turning or inquiring inwards is the solution. Luce Irigaray asks, why 
does man oppose himself to all that is terrible in nature as opposed to its calm? 
Why does he remember it is frightening and not its sweet side? He yokes 
everything domesticating it for his own purposes. He makes it safe and then he 
goes on to name it. Techne as tools, science and knowledge make everything 
tame and familiar so that he can master the world around him. But it is always 
a world outside of himself. It is in the opposing of generation to fabrication that 
we see a clue to the answer to these questions from Luce Irigaray's perspective. 
His relationship to his mother and his birth is problematic for his subjective 
development. What Luce Irigaray wants to elaborate is that a man will never be 
able to generate like his mother, so ‘he must fabricate things from outside of 





externally, while she generates internally’ TBT, 76). 
 
Here we have seen one of the classic insights of psychoanalysis being 
elaborated through the myth of Antigone. For Luce Irigaray, man, like all his 
interpretations of the world, has come to nothing. And ‘death, of each and all, 
seems the only thing that resists man's destructive power’ (BEW, 1-2). His 
failure to allow for a world based on two subjects (owing to his own need for 
overcoming the mother-son relation via objects and fabrications) means he is 
isolated and unable to relate to an other as an other. It is perhaps this inability 
or lack of desire to relate to an other, which is another possible cause of this 
domination of nature and woman (TBT, 69). He can only relate to an other as 
an object, and so he is all alone in his domination of the world around him from 
his position as the only subject over and against nature (which includes 
woman.) It is for this reason that Luce Irigaray attempts to establish a second 
subject who speaks differently from a different body and in a different relational 
position to the world and an other. We shall discuss this formation of the sexed 
subject in the following chapter. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion: Men and Women, united in nihility/nothingness  
By examing the problem of nihilism in this chapter, I have shown 
several points of convergence between Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray. 





of the external world leads to an isolated ego and the domination of nature, as 
well as ultimately the objectification or mechanisation of ourselves. Luce 
Irigaray refers to this as nothingness, and Nishitani Keiji nihility. I consider 
nothingness to be one half of the dynamic of nihility as found in Nishitani Keiji.  
 
Through this juxtaposition I have have shown that for both philosophers 
the role of domination in this dynamic is important, but clearly the cause of this 
domination differs for each. For Luce Irigaray, it is the misunderstanding of 
man’s relationship to his mother by which he falls into fear of the external world, 
isolating himself and learning to dominate it. For Nishitani Keiji, it is a mistake 
inherent to the relational dynamic of self-consciousness which causes a self 
prejudice or ego-centred action, whereby he isolates himself and comes to 
dominate the world through mechanization. In Luce Irigaray the focus is on 
fear; in Nishitani Keiji, it is ignorance.  
 
For Luce Irigaray this domination is found in man's privileging of his 
relation to objects, or his manipulation and fabrication of objects, in order to 
overcome the natural world through dominating it. Whereas for Nishitani Keiji, 
it is a self-misunderstanding owing to the dynamic of self-consciousness which 
causes the need to dominate the external world. On the most general level, I 
have shown that Nishitani Keiji begins from his relation to things. He does not 
define himself relationally with others, and especially not to his mother, or 
between human beings who are potentially different according to sex/gender; 





himself in relation to the external world of trees and rivers etc.; but for Luce 
Irigaray, it is important for a man to think through his relation to his mother as 
the first other.  For her, a man, without defining himself in relation to an other 
who is different to him such as a woman, a man will always fall into a nihilistic 
position by attempting to define himself, all by himself, in relation to the objects 
of the world. The maternal relationship is central to her thinking and for her it 
has not been thought at all within the history of Western philosophy. This is a 
major reason why man has come to nothing, as she states:  
 
‘it is the mother who first brings us into the world. The world 
she gives to us, and to which she gives us, is necessarily present in our 
way of experiencing the world and of living in the world. But the 
philosopher has not yet considered this’ (SW, 123) 
 
This blind spot in Western philosophy is therefore, carried over into a 
blind spot of Nishitani Keiji’s global philosophy, if we do not think through this 
relation to our birth. Luce Irigaray's critique of Western culture and philosophy 
is levelled at this ‘forgetting of her’ (KW viii) and ‘a subjectivity in the feminine’ 
(KW vii). This forgetting has caused a huge imbalance in man's relation to 
woman and to nature, leading to the development of a phallocratic and 







‘sexuate difference is precisely what Western culture has 
abolished. Western man has constructed his subjectivity against his 
natural origin. He did not work out his maternal beginning but put it into 
the unthought background of his story and history. To escape a return to 
such a substratum, he has elaborated a culture of the same as he is: 
father, brother, son, who share the same necessities, the same values, the 
same world’ (KW, ix) 
 
Therefore, in defining his relationship to all things as a self-
consciousness Nishitani Keiji falls into this category of man as understood by 
Luce Irigaray. On the other hand, Nishitani Keiji does not begin his 
philosophizing from his relation to manufactured objects, he starts from the 
natural world around him in order to elucidate the structure of the field of 
consciousness (recall it was trees and mountains which represented the external 
world. He too has serious issues with the mechanized and objectified world we 
live in.) Moreover, it is not a philosophizing based on domination of that natural 
world; rather, it is a simple mistake in how we see ourselves in relation to it. 
Therefore, his thought does not arise from a position of manipulating and 
constructing objects owing to his fear of the natural world or his inherent 
violence; rather, this domination arises from a misunderstanding of himself in 
the mode of self-consciousness. It is precisely this return to nature that Luce 
Irigaray suggests in the following chapter, as well as a pathway for men in her 
image of the Buddha looking at a flower, as we shall see in chapter five. Nishitani 
Keiji too, advocates a re-interpretation of our relationship to nature, to 





the following chapter. Although I can say here, that sexuate difference is still 
absent from this understanding.  
 
Follwing on from this critique is that, self-consciousness, like most of 
Nishitani Keiji's language, is sex/gender neutral, and in light of Luce Irigaray’s 
thought we have to say that this is unacceptable. For her we can recall, ‘that any 
theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the “masculine”’ (SP, 
133). Any neutral or abstract subject is always a (masculine) subject because it 
comes from within a masculine horizon, or a male subject's constructed world, 
a male History. According to the philosophy of sexuate difference there is no 
possibility of an abstract “I” or a transcendent subject such as a subject defined 
as “consciousness” or a “thinking thing”. Neither is it possible to have neutral 
and disembodied speech devoid of its gendered objectivity. There is no subject, 
even if he or she is constituted on a self-consciousness and a nihility which is 
gender neutral. Our self as relational, for Luce Irigaray, is an (inter)subjectivity, 
always grounded in the objectivity of our birth, our necessary primary 
relationship to our mother, our body, our breath and our speech (language). 
These factors make up our gender or genre, as she states: ‘I am not the whole: I 
am man or woman. And I am not simply a subject, I belong to a gender’ (ILTY, 
106). We are never neutral, we are always bound in a relational matrix of 
sexuate difference, so to speak of self-consciousness in the neutral erases this 
fact.  
 





framing of the problem of nihilism is gender neutral, and it does not incorporate 
what for her is the fact of sexuate difference. Erin McCarthy’s (2010) use of 
ningen, and her attempt to include the dynamic of sexuate difference within it, 
would be an attempt to address this lack in the Japanese concept for human 
being; which is, in essence a (masculine) neutrality, if we take seriously Luce 
Irigaray’s claim that all theories of the subject irrespective of cultural difference 
have been appropriated by the masculine. Nishitani Keiji’s elaboration of the 
problem of Western philosophy and culture as driven by a nihilistic motor, is 
therefore, another attempt to eradicate sexuate difference, this time, from 
another perspective outside of the Western philosophical tradition, but 
nevertheless, one which maintains the same patriarchal masculine bias of a 
false neutrality; even if, this dynamic is one which is unconscious or which he is 
ignorant of.  
 
The critique of Nishitani Keiji's sex/gender neutral language is an 
obvious one, but at the same time we can perhaps read more deeply into his 
thought in his defence. For Luce Irigaray, nothingness is what Nishitani Keiji 
would call nihility. I think it is very difficult to ignore the profound analysis of 
nihility and the human condition which Nishitani Keiji makes, irrespective of 
whether we are men or women (or anyone with sex/gender ambiguity for that 
matter). We exist together on a profound level on a field of consciousness which 
is fundamentally a field of internal/external mediation. How we might be 
sexuately formed and how we might mediate this difference is to be taken into 
consideration (which we shall discuss in the following chapters.) However, even 





there would still be a fundamental similarity for all human beings, and perhaps 
even for many other sentient beings, at the most subtle level on the field of 
consciousness. It is a similarity then which would underlie the possibility of any 
difference (sexuate or otherwise) in our self-consciousness, with which we each 
find ourselves on that field of consciousness as a man or a woman. In many 
ways, this does return us to the concept of human being as ningen.  
 
Erin McCarthy (2010) has rightly pointed out, that what is required is 
an understanding of the dynamic of sexuate difference which takes place within 
this concept of the human being as ningen. Therefore, an increase in awareness 
of the differences in self-understanding, and how the subject is constituted in 
the relationship to the world outside of us, is what is required for such a 
modification in self-understanding between men and women to take place on 
the field of consciousness.  
 
We are all as subjects constituted on the field of self-consciousness, but 
that self-consciousness manifests in different ways, which may in fact differ 
most fundamentally according to sexuate difference. But we must remember 
that this elucidation of self-consciousness by Nishitani Keiji is in fact a critique 
by him. The field of self-consciousness is not the answer, it is part of the 
necessary make up of the self (as is nihility), but it is not where we shall see or 
overcome our domination and violence of the world around us. For Nishitani 
Keiji, domination and violence are inevitable on the field of consciousness 





prejudice and ego-centred perspective that arises on it. For him, we must pass 
through nihility to overcome this. I would say then that this is still a problem 
for Luce Irigaray and her thought of sexuate difference, because she does not go 
deeply enough into what she calls nothingness.  
 
To summarise, a strong differentiation between men and women on 
the field of consciousness – as two different self-consciousnesses – in fact 
maintains and increases conflict and violence, while at the same time it will 
inevitably fall into a nihilistic position due to the reification of two different self-
consciousnesses, which are not fully aware of their underlying nihility, and 
therefore, either exist in a superficial way or run the risk becoming a sort of 
essential self – a self-understanding with some illusory sense of permanency or 
transcendence, such as the soul for example.     
 
It is nihility which safeguards against such a mis-understanding of the 
self, and I think I can safely claim that nihility is something that all people (men, 
women and all possible sexual ambiguities) must share as a perennial problem. 
Nihilism is a problem for men and women alike. The fact that our existence is 
finite and that existence in general is transient is unescapable. Nihility is 
“always underfoot” no matter whether we are men or women. That a man has 
come to nothing, and that a woman has been subordinated to a nothingness or 
an absence, shows the two sides of self-consciousness and nihility. The one 
which dominates comes to nothing, the one who is dominated also comes to 





is not allowed to come from nothingness in the first place. A subjectivity which 
ends in nothingness and a subjectivity which never had a chance to be anything 
else but nothingness, are fundamentally united in their alienation on the field 
of nihility, albeit for very different reasons.  
 
By bringing together Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji, I have shown 
that nihility is a problem which is also effected by our understanding or position 
on the field of sexuate difference. Men and women will experience nihility in 
fundamentally different and sexuate specific ways, but we are all, each one of 
us, still cast over a nihility, and there may be collective or cultural trends which 
bring about a culture of nihilism with an accompanying dynamic of sexuate 
difference at its root. The danger is, that this is becoming a singular global 
dynamic which does not recognise sexuate difference, and which perpetuates 
the same dynamic of domination which has prevailed up until now.  
 
Ultimately then, both Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray use concepts 
such as nothingness and nihility to explain the basic problem and the cause of 
the nihilistic Western cultural tradition, but in how it is caused and how we 
overcome it they have different standpoints. For now, it is enough to note the 
absence of any sex/gender sensitivity in Nishitani Keiji’s thought as he 
articulates the problem of nihilism, making it apparent that his thought is not 
sensitive to the ethical issues of sex/gender. From Luce Irigaray's perspective, 
it could be claimed that he works towards the further eradication of sexuate 





nihilism, even if this is because he simply gets the diagnosis wrong. However, I 
have claimed that Luce Irigaray too has a limited view of nothingness/nihility, 
and that nihility itself can be taken into consideration along with sexuate 
difference as a fundamental problem of human beings (ningen), both I-he and 
I-she. In the following chapters, we shall look at how Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji both seek to overcome nihilism as we have seen here. We shall 
look more closely at the role the sexuate body plays in the establishment of the 
positions of I-he and I-she, and I will now begin to include Nishitani Keiji’s own 
positive and creative use of śūnyatā and the non-self, to create two positions of 











































In this chapter I want to juxtapose Nishitani Keiji’s thinking on nature, 
body and cultivating ourselves through the breath with Luce Irigaray’s thought 
on the vegetal, the body and self-cultivation through the breath. The aim is to 
begin to show how these can come together to overcome the problem of 
nihilism, which I have established as something they both share.  
 
The main point I want to make here is the need for a sexuate 
understanding of the body for sexuate difference to be possible, while at the 
same time, this bodily difference must be re-integrated with nature in a non-
essential way. This re-integration with, and re-interpretation of, nature for both 
Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji, is discovered through Eastern practices of 
bodily realisation. On the one hand, Nishitani Keiji’s blind spot of sexuate 
difference becomes increasingly apparent here, while on the other hand, Luce 





if we are to maintain sexuate difference non-essentially. My aim, therefore, is to 
hold both sexuate difference of the body and the no-self simultaneously on the 
field of śūnyatā. To understand this, we need to examine the re-interpretation 
of nature and its relation to culture, before we return to the question of the self, 
the body and self-cultivation through Eastern practices.  
 
 
4.2. Nature, body and culture in Luce Irigaray 
Much has been written on the sexed duality of nature which Luce 
Irigaray attempts to elaborate (Stone 2003, 2006).57 In her work Luce Irigaray 
and the Philosophy of Sexual difference (2006) Alison Stone offers a clear 
overview of Luce Irigaray’s philosophy of nature in her middle to later phases. 
Much of what I write here is reliant on this work.  
 
The focus of Alison Stone’s analysis is that the duality of sexuate 
difference is grounded in a nature which is rhythmical and fluid, and how this 
relates to a realist essentialist interpretation of her thought. As she rightly 
points out, nowhere does Luce Irigaray systematically set out her thoughts on 
nature (Stone 2006, 89). However, her thought is often implicitly engaging with 
the history of philosophy, especially, as we have seen earlier, philosophers such 
                                                             






as Hegel (Stone, 2006, 10-11). How we handle sexuate difference in relation to 
nature and culture is paramount for Luce Irigaray’s project. This is because, as 
we have seen, the history of philosophy, deeply reinforces the split between 
nature and consciousness, with woman being associated with nature, while man 
is associated with consciousness (See Genevieve Lloyd’s classic study The man 
of Reason, 1993). We see this, in relation to Hegel, in her Democracy Begins 
Between Two (2000) Luce Irigaray clearly states her aim is, ‘To pass from the 
state of nature to civil life without abandoning the relationship with nature – 
that nature which surrounds us as bodies, sexed bodies, as woman and man’ 
(DBT, 47). The main point is that she is speaking of human beings as being 
constituted as sexed, through our bodies, and as part of nature, and that this is 
not to be overcome by consciousness (associated with man) in the realm of 
history, by cutting ourselves off from, or transcending nature (associated with 
woman).58  
 
My focus here, is on the Eastern influences of her re-interpretation of 
nature as a sexed interpretation based on masculine and feminine cultures and 
two different subjects with two different relational differences, so that I might 
juxtapose these to Nishitani Keiji’s own thought. Sokhtan Yeng (2014, 66) 
points out the importance of Luce Irigaray’s Eastern ideas in relation to Hegel’s 
thought, ‘Irigaray shows herself to be an astute reader of Hegel by integrating 
an interpretation of Buddhism into her challenge to Hegelian philosophy’. In 
many ways I follow this, albeit with an understanding that Tantra and Yoga are 
                                                             





her main supports, not Buddhism. The attempt to tie human beings to nature, 
through the body and breath, and the relationship between nature and culture 
that emerges from this reworked relationship, is very interesting for my 
juxtaposition with Nishitani Keiji. What we need to be aware of, is that 
traditionally it has been a masculine culture’s perspective which reduced 
woman to nature, and which has been the prevailing interpretation (Jones, 
2011, 200-210). Man is a subject; woman is an object bound up with nature. We 
might be cautious then when approaching the Japanese concepts of self-
understanding as ningen and no-self therefore if we cannot reconcile them with 
sexuate difference.  
 
In the essay ‘Human nature is two’ Luce Irigaray, states, ‘the natural is 
at least two: male and female’ (ILTY, 34). Likewise, in Sexes and Genealogies 
she clearly states, ‘Nature has a sex, always and everywhere’ (108). At first 
glance, and taken out of context, it sounds as though she has a naïve perspective 
on nature as sexed; she appears to claim that all nature is two, male and 
female.59 A brief examination of this as a hermeneutical claim leads us to a view 
that nature is somehow sexed all the way down. It is sexuate from the human 
perspective, which is for her always two male and female, and where men and 
women each have a clear rhythmical difference and culture from where they will 
interpret nature. It is her East-West encounter which in fact taught her this: 
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‘[I] learnt another way from my own experience and from the 
traditions of the Far East, in particular from the most primitive Indian 
cultures … These primitive cultures practise the differences in the 
relationship between man and woman, including in physical love.  But, 
for them, it is not a question of a dual polarity within one, as things still 
are in the West where, from Aristotle onwards, it is said that man is hot, 
dry, active and woman, in contrast damp, cold and passive. They talk 
instead of drawing out the qualities of the one (female) and the other 
(male) (DBT, 113)  
 
Here she is speaking of the intertwined polarities in nature and in men 
and women. How each has different qualities and arrangements of these 
qualities and how they complement, draw out, return to and create desire 
between two who are different. This way of understanding the manifest world 
(usually understood as nature) as sexuately differentiated poles with mixtures 
of different qualities pervades many of the Asian traditions from South Asia to 
the Far East. The understanding of the manifest world as essentially two forces 
which are masculine and feminine in nature can be found in classical Chinese 
thought (Yin-Yang) and in Indian thought as well as many of the Tantric 
traditions (Loma-Viloma) including Esoteric Buddhism from Tibet to Japan. 
While it may be considered a primitive way of understanding the world, these 





human cultivation, especially of the psyche. This re-integration of men and 
women as a part of nature, therefore, requires sexuate difference.  
 
Yin and Yang or Loma-Viloma meet and merge, they interchange, they 
are both always present between an appearing and withdrawing. It is not a 
dialectic between two points which never meet. It is rather, a dialectic between 
two forces which actually flow into or back upon each other. These ‘sexual’ terms 
are always in alternation and not contradiction. They are not logical, but rather 
based on interchange and fluidity: 
 
‘this is not the opposition that we know from logic in which the 
one is opposed to or contradicts the other, where the one is superior to 
the other and must put the inferior down. There is a rhythm and growth 
in which both poles are necessary, or so it seems’ (SG, 108) 
 
It is this dynamic interchange and constant balancing of forces which 
gives rise to all manifestation. Often, as Luce Irigaray comments, the sexual 
interaction of male and female human beings is symbolic of this interchange. 
Sometimes, it is even considered to be a sacred act of enacting this very flow of 
forces as a means of uniting between two and with the whole. But we should 
remember that sexuate identity is not the same as sexuality. A more common 
approach than sexual congress in order to develop and play with these two 





Such a practice is in fact Hatha Yoga – Hatha being the joining of solar and lunar 
energies, another way of understanding the two forces at play in manifestation 
(Feuerstein, 2008, 352). 
 
 These worldviews include the awareness of life or vitality as a specific 
kind of energy (Chi, Ki or Prana) which we are somehow cultivating, to create 
balance, harmony or union with ourselves, each other and the cosmos. The two 
forces then are a useful way to understand nature and our place in the world, 
because they include the cultivation of the human psyche. Traditionally, it is 
understood that a human being can become aware of these two forces and 
engage in physical practices to balance and enhance them within themselves, 
with others and with the natural world – practices such as Yoga, Tai chi, Zen 
meditation, walking in nature, to name just a few. For Luce Irigaray, such 
practices would have to be engaged in, with sexuate difference in mind.  
 
Luce Irigaray follows Hegel in many respects concerning the relation 
between nature and culture. She goes her own way however, when it comes to 
culture as self-cultivation, where the Eastern influences are more apparent. In 
my reading of Luce Irigaray, I understand her to mean that nature is a play of 
forces which function between two poles approximating to, or often interpreted 
as, the masculine and the feminine. Nature’s forces are interpreted in sexuate 
terms by a tradition which is itself also always sexuate. These forces therefore, 
are not necessarily sexed but can be read as so, and this is common across 





faithful to the cosmic have a sex and take account of natural powers 
(puissances) in sexual terms’ (SG, 108). For Luce Irigaray, human beings are 
intimately bound up with nature, and are seen as one part of its many rhythms: 
 
‘There is a rhythmic pulse which beats between going out 
towards the other and returning to the self, between extending oneself as 
far as the other and returning to dwell within the self, between coming 
out into the light and going back into the darkness, into the invisibility of 
interiority, into the mystery of alterity … This movement resembles that 
of the heart, of the circulation of blood, but also that of the cosmos itself 
which exists between expansion and contraction. It is true of the entire 
universe, but can already be seen in the sap of the plant world, in the 
behaviour of animals, just as in the movement of the sea, in the 
alternating of the seasons, in the repetitive intensities of the light and of 
the heat of the sun, in the cycles of humidity and dryness, of the winds 
and the cyclones’ (DBT, 111-112) 
 
Here we find again the microcosm-macrocosm understanding of our 
relationship to nature. Human beings are unique within the flux and flow of 
nature because they can cultivate themselves in multiple senses. In fact, culture 
is the unique activity of human beings as they cultivate their natural rhythms in 
relation to the flux and flow of nature (Stone, 2006, 91). Usually, culture is 
understood as a collective enterprise, wherever human beings live together. We 





rhythms as a part of nature. Culture and nature are therefore, always entwined 
in Luce Irigaray’s thought. However, the creation of shared cultural forms, come 
out of natural rhythms, which differ according to our sexuate bodily relational 
existence as male or female. As she said, she wants civil life without abandoning 
or transcending nature.  
 
For Luce Irigaray, masculine culture has attuned to a male rhythm 
which is more linear and based on a tension-release model (Stone, 2006, 102). 
Feminine culture, on the other hand, is based on a female  cyclical rhythm which 
has the quality of irreversibility (Stone, 2006, 102).60 This leads to the 
development of masculine and feminine specific cultures, and feminine culture, 
for her, has been supressed within this masculine culture. This is one of the 
reasons why she has engaged with Eastern culture: to re-invigorate feminine 
culture (Joy, 2006; Deutscher, 2002). Furthermore, for Luce Irigaray, 
masculine and feminine cultures are also bound up with concepts of the divine, 
such as the divine couple as found in South India and especially Tantra yoga. 
Since between east and west (2002) the divine couple has played an important 
role for her in redefining ourselves and our relation to nature, i.e., the micro-
macro relationship: 
 
‘In India men and women are gods together, and together they 
create the world, including its cosmic dimension. The divine couples, 
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whether it is Vishnu or Śiva, along with their lovers, are microcosms in 
constant economic relations with the macrocosm; the same goes for 
Tantrism’ (BEW, 29) 
 
What is important for us to focus on here is the understanding of 
natural and cultural rhythms. We can imagine that cultural forms may or may 
not actually be in-tune with the rhythms of our nature. Sexuate difference is 
clearly linked to the cultivation of our selves in-tune with nature, and therefore, 
any interpretation of nature must include the primordial difference of 
sexuation, if it is to preserve and promote the establishment of two sexuately 
different subjects. This cultivation of nature to culture to the divine is sexuate 
through and through, and any practices to cultivate ourselves must adhere to 
this sexuate nature, or there is the danger of once again falling into a nihilism 
of abandonment or transcendence.  
 
 
4.3. Nature, body and culture in Nishitani Keiji 
For Nishitani Keiji, on the first level, nature is the wholistic origin of life 
and being. It is the living-whole from which we emerge and return, along with 
all other living things: being emerges from becoming and is sustained on a self-
understanding of śūnyatā. It is an ever-ongoing process best captured by the 
Buddhist teaching of interdependent origination, re-interpreted in light of 






‘all things come to be, and perish, and thus are set in a 
“becoming and flow.” It is not that all things merely “are,” but that they 
become; they undergo transformation and thus are set in “motion and 
flow.” Judging from this, we can say that for a thing to “be” means that it 
nevertheless springs out of the world of nature, undergoes 
transformations, and finally returns to it again. In this case, nature is 
regarded as a living whole’ (OB, 101)  
 
At the first level then, nature is a flux and a flow, an interdependent net 
of becoming and being. This is reminiscent of the Buddhist doctrine of 
Pratītyasamutpāda as discussed earlier, and we must always bear this in mind 
when approaching Nishitani Keiji’s thought (Van Bragt, 1982, xxv; See also 
Davis, 2013). Nature includes the plant and animal worlds as living-things. We 
breathe, and in many respects, share the elements essential to living, especially 
water, and this is fundamental to realising the interconnectedness of our self-
nature or jisei: 
 
‘we are connected to the environment through our bodies. And 
it goes without saying that we cannot maintain our lives without air, 
water, and so forth. This can be said not only of human beings but of 
animals and plants as well. Air circulates in such a way that the air I 





is in turn breathed by me. And water also goes around the sky, falls to the 
earth, and then is available to animals and plants living on the earth. We 
can say that water and air are essential means of our life’ (OB, 98) 
 
Here we see the focus on the interchange of the simple elements such 
as water and air, and the focus on the process and relationship of ourselves and 
plant life, especially in our breathing. This description by Nishitani Keiji is a 
living interchange reminiscent of Luce Irigaray’s own poetic evocations of the 
vegetal. Her Eastern influenced interpretation of nature juxtaposed to Nishitani 
Keiji’s interpretation of nature shows the fruitful possibilities of dialogue 
between East and West. 
 
In his article ‘On Nature’ (1979),61 Nishitani Keiji goes on to juxtapose 
several interpretations of nature from various Western and Eastern 
philosophical perspectives. Much of the article ‘On Nature’ (1979) is concerned 
with the English, German, Greek and Latin etymology of terms used to define 
nature in the history of Western philosophy. Through his comparative 
etymological inquiry of these Western languages Nishitani Keiji arrives at the 
Latin term “Nasco” as closest to his own understanding of nature.62 This is a 
Japanese understanding, which is clearly influenced by his own cultural 
prejudice. However, this understanding is more nuanced than simply claiming 
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nature is a flux and a flow. It includes a subtler analysis of the interplay of being 
and becoming as understood in the Japanese language.   
 
Nature, according to Nishitani Keiji, is best captured in the Japanese 
language by terms such as shizen or jinen. Shizen is a common term for nature, 
natural and spontaneous, while Jinen is an older word which includes ‘changing 
and not-changing in one’ (ON, 67) meaning ‘on the one hand the principle of 
change or continuous movement … [becoming] and at the same time there is 
the principle of Sein [being]’ (ON, 67). I want to emphasise here that the 
meaning of shizen or jinen should not be confused by our own prejudice of 
seeing essence or innate quality in a definition. They are not fixed definitions of 
separate unchanging entities which he is attempting to express in words; rather, 
they are terms which for him encapsulate both the sense of becoming and being 
in one, which is more familiar in the Japanese language. It includes the 
“becoming and flow” which was spoken of above, but more than this, it is a term 
used in Japanese which contains two meanings, one such as nature, and another 
such as natural or spontaneous. For him the term “ji” best captures the nature 
of a thing and the self: 
  
‘Jinen includes the idea that a thing naturally becomes this way; 
in other words it includes the “self” [E] when we talk of the thing “itself” 
[E]. It is thought that all things are in each case themselves, and jinen is 
thought from the relations among those things, the relation between 





and ji works is quite different from the way the world is structured in 
western thought. It is not clear where something like jinen becomes a 
problem in the West. In the case of the natural sciences such an issue is 
entirely absent’ (ON, 70-71) 
 
For him, living-things are shizen or jinen, translated as nature, natural 
or spontaneous, as Graham Parkes (1990, xxvii) notes, ‘things in nature are 
what they are, and do what they do “without why.”’ This includes rocks and 
trees, birds and animals, and the self-nature (jisei) of each individual human 
being. From this perspective all things are entwined and hence, there is no 
single cause or quality to any of them – each thing mutually constitutes all other 
things. It is a broad perspective from where we can perceive the deep 
interconnection of all things. It is from this perspective which Nishitani Keiji re-
envisions nature, as a co-constitutive becoming and flow from which human 
beings emerge, but which we also always remain a part of, even if as a self-
consciousness we think we are somehow separate. This is the cause of alienation 
and nihilism. It is our cultivation in-tune with nature that Nishitani Keiji, like 
Luce Irigaray, is also pointing to. For Nishitani Keiji, the human body is co-
constitutive of nature as a becoming and flow, it is the place where individual 
self-consciousness arises, and it is the place where human relationship occurs. 
For him the human body emerges from the web of nature: 
 
 ‘the human body is, from the outset, unified with the world of 





of what comprises the natural world’ (OB, 98) 
 
At the same time, as self-conscious human beings we feel ourselves to be 
individual: 
  
‘Human existence can be characterised as being absolutely 
alone – that is to say, as not being substitutable by any another. This is 
precisely what is meant by an individual, in the genuine sense of the 
word’ (OB, 89) 
  
For Nishitani Keiji then, there are two poles entangled in the human 
body: 
  
‘one of them is that the human body is an element constituting 
the world of nature; the other, is that it is the “I” that sets in motion the 
world of nature by standing aloof from it, and by manipulating 
knowledge and techniques’ (OB, 103) 
 
Here we can understand the “I” as self-consciousness and note that it 
is sex neutral. For him, the human body lives between two poles, or, as he says, 





constituting nature as a living whole, while at the same time being aloof from 
this wholistic nature.  
 
Our shared sense of existence in the world, also manifests through the 
human body, ‘human beings appear to each other in the form of a human body’ 
(OB, 81) and ‘because of this, the character of “I” and “thou” is revealed in the 
way of being as a body’ (OB, 81). Our own existence, and the existence of 
another, includes both the body and the sense of self as an individual “I” and is 
revealed to us in this betweenness of our shared existence: ‘the issue of being 
concerning an individual human being cannot be accounted for apart from the 
betweenness, or the relation, that he or she bears to other human beings’ (OB, 
83). For Nishitani Keiji, there is a “togetherness” which fundamentally 
structures our existence as human beings, and the body is fundamental to this 
structure of human existence (OB, 83).  
 
Furthermore, much like we saw in Luce Irigaray’s thought in the 
previous chapter, for Nishitani Keiji our shared social being takes place within 
a constructed world:  
 
‘This “I” is an acting agent with self-conscious knowledge in 
view. Here is a full-fledged practical standpoint in contradistinction to 
“becoming and flow.” By taking advantage of the knowledge that includes 





of nature), subjectivity tries to establish its own world (that is, the 
sociohistorical world). This world is no longer the world of nature, but 
the world that human beings have constructed with clear-cut 
consciousness out of the world of nature. Therefore, it is called history, 
culture or human society’ (OB, 102-103) 
 
As human beings with a body, we are inescapably rooted in nature. At 
the same time, as individuals with self-consciousness who are bound up with 
the collective world of human beings, we cut ourselves off from nature (and 
presumably our bodies) in a shared and constructed world on the field of 
consciousness. From this perspective, the body is left behind in nature, and our 
relational existence between self and other, between nature and culture, is lost. 
Each unique human individual has this paradoxical existence between or in 
relation to their body, self-consciousness, nature, and the soci0-cultural 
constructed world, if we cut ourselves away from a part of it, we fall into 
nihilism. We can see then a clear similarity in the thought of Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji when it comes to understanding ourselves as a part of nature and 
a misunderstanding which leads us to a nihilistic position.   
 
One way to make sure this doesn’t happen, is by cultivating our 
relationship to the body. The sense of self-existence emerges out of the body and 
is always tied to the body (OB, 81) even if the ‘I’ thinks itself separate, body and 
self-consciousness are bound together (OB, 81). At one level, as we saw, this 





even though we feel ourselves to stand outside of nature, and reflect on it as 
separate to ourselves, this is in fact owing to the field of consciousness. Finally, 
it is through bodily knowing that we return to nature. As McCarthy points out 
in, ‘the Japanese philosophical tradition, the body is not considered inimical to 
knowledge but, rather, necessary for its attainment’ (2014, 206). We go down 
through the body as we re-integrate ourselves with nature:  
 
‘the human body develops a variety of characteristics that can 
be described through such phrases as “to acquire knowledge in such a 
way that it becomes a real bodily appropriation,” “to come home to one’s 
body,” or “to take a bodily interest in something.” The phrase “to take a 
bodily interest in something” means to absorb oneself wholeheartedly in 
it. I think that taking a bodily interest in things provides us with a clue as 
to how to think about the world of religion … Above I referred to the 
distinction between the world of nature and that of history. My point was 
to render it possible for human beings to come back to nature once again 
through their various activities. Human activity arises out of nature 
understood in the broadest sense, and even though human beings have 
produced the various sciences and technology as a means of struggling 
against nature, their ability to do these things was granted by nature, 
rather than arising from their own abilities alone. Human beings are 





this ability is given a further impetus to produce culture’ (OB, 105)63 
 
To summarise, the main point I wish to make here concerns the 
relation of the body to nature, to self-consciousness, and to culture. I think that 
this is where we begin to see the innovativeness of Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy 
in one of its most concrete senses. The human body is really a place between 
living-nature as the Buddhist interpretation of becoming and flow, and the 
individual ego as “I”, and the shared world of human beings or culture. For the 
former pole it is constitutive, and for the latter two, it is often negated, or 
objectified; to constitute the separate sense of self as self-consciousness, and the 
collective ordering of that self-consciousness in society. What is required is a 
return to nature through the body, and a bodily knowledge of one’s self and 
one’s relationships (OB, 136-137). The body, for Nishitani Keiji, is a place which 
bridges our understanding of nature and culture. 
 
 
4.4. A body between nature and culture 
In the first place, Nishitani Keiji’s interpretation is, like Luce Irigaray’s, 
opposed to the reduction of nature to an objective scientific view. Human 
beings, in modern culture, stand out from nature, by setting themselves against 
                                                             
63 Nishitani Keiji’s analysis here includes an understanding of the country or the land which a 
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it, or as Nishitani Keiji will say, by understanding themselves as aloof from it. 
Nishitani Keiji, like Luce Irigaray, considers human beings to be a part of 
nature, and culture emerges out of its flux and flow through this standing aloof. 
In the most general sense I firmly agree with them both, that we need to re-
interpret ourselves as a part of nature, and that culture, is the cultivation of our 
natural spontaneous tendency (jinen), which is best cultivated, as we shall see 
below, through practices of breathing. 
 
However, according to Luce Irigaray, a tradition has a sex or includes 
sexuate differentiation within it, and its interpretation of the world is therefore 
sexuate. This interpretation by primitive traditions may have in fact have been 
prejudiced towards the dominant masculine culture, so a return to such 
understandings is not ideal (Joy, 2006, 130-131). The important point is, that 
these prejudices exist in the Western tradition, which masquerades as neutral. 
This apparently neutral tradition interprets nature, and it does so in a way that 
denies sexuate difference, and therefore, represses it. Nishitani Keiji’s lack of 
reference to the sexuate quality of nature, culture and the body which bridges 
them is clearly a problem because it might mask sexuate difference.  
 
For Nishitani Keiji, it is not sexuate difference that provides an 
alternative interpretive lens to see nature through, it is his formulation of the 
Buddhist understanding of interdependent origination and the idea of jisei or 
self-nature. This is a formulation we can best describe as asexual, because it 





consideration sexuate difference as Luce Irigaray understands it. The Japanese 
philosophical tradition as exemplified by Nishitani Keiji here relates human 
existence to nature, it also does so from a neutrality which covers over or does 
not acknowledge the sexuate quality of our body, our culture and our 
interpretation, and therefore, our re-integration with nature. If we are to 
include a sexuate understanding of nature and culture, then Luce Irigaray’s 
thought of sexuate difference must be reconciled with Nishitani Keiji’s. 
 
Human beings as men and women interpret the world from two 
different perspectives, as a part of nature, but also through the lens of sexuate 
difference. For Luce Irigaray, nature is two, because there are at least two 
possible interpretations of it, from two different sexuate bodies, with their own 
rhythms, and cultural modes of interpretation. To use Nishitani Keiji’s terms, 
we can say that men and women have two different standpoints on the field of 
nature, an interdependent flux and flow of which they are an integral part. A 
culture of sexuate difference, which is in-tune with nature, is one which includes 
the specific rhythms of each part of nature, while seeing them as a part of a 
greater whole. I want to suggest that in human beings sexuate difference is the 
most fundamental relational quality which emerges from our natural way of 
being (jinen). Sexuate difference, therefore, is a human specific rhythm which 
underlies our togetherness as sexuate bodily beings, who are between the two 
poles of nature and culture. At the same time, these sexuate human specific 
rhythms are held on a greater field śūnyatā, which when combined safeguard 





need to look more closely at Luce Irigaray’s understanding of birth and the 
body, in order to think this through more comprehensively.  
 
 
4.5. Thinking through birth with Luce Irigaray 
In her early work, Luce Irigaray followed a more or less Freudian 
approach to the body, seeing the ego as a bodily ego (Whitford, 1991, 63). 
Making explicit the difference between male and female bodies, tied to the 
masculine and feminine perspectives, gave her a tangible point from which to 
critique the tradition of psychoanalysis and the tradition of philosophy in her 
early works (Zakin, 2011). For example, the analysis of little Ernst, Freud's 
grandson, playing with a thimble, which is utilized by Freud to develop his 
thought on mother-son relations.64 It is the juxtaposition of two sounds 
(Fort/Da) along with a gesture of throwing away and retrieving a thimble on a 
thread. In German Fort means “gone” and Da means “there”. Freud is reluctant 
to interpret a theory as such from these observations, however, he does see these 
two sounds of an eighteen-month-old boy as his effort to manipulate the world 
(through the combination of a hand gesture, a sound and an object) as a 
repetitive act of play to compensate for his painful feelings, due to the absence 
of his mother. His little grandson, according to Freud, is therefore, not simply 
playing with an object but is in fact substituting this gesture and sound for the 
absence/presence of his mother and the pain and pleasure this reproduces. 
                                                             





Fort, the thimble as his mother, is gone; Da, the thimble as his mother, is here. 
The boy has now established a symbolic means to deal with the of his mother 
and the pain it causes, through the manipulation of an object. And, for Freud, 
this is an achievement of culture, in other words, the overcoming of nature. 
 
Luce Irigaray takes up Freud's analysis and problematizes it in a 
number of ways. Freud placed more emphasis on the act of repetition and 
mastery which gives Ernst pleasure and offsets the pain he feels at the loss of 
his mother. While Luce Irigaray here draws out the analysis from a perspective 
of sexuate difference. In short, a perspective from two different positions and 
not from only the masculine subject's interpretation. In her interrogation of 
Freud's interpretation, she wants to take further her analyses of the boy’s 
relationship to (and privileging of) objects by looking at early child development 
from a psychoanalytic perspective.65 In order to highlight this privileging of 
subject-object relations in boys she asks, what if the the little boy (Ernst) was a 
little girl?  
 
‘In Freud's text, then, the child is a boy. And Freud never wrote 
that it might have been a girl. Why? A girl does not do the same things 
when her mother goes away. She does not play with a string and a reel 
that symbolize her mother, because her mother is of the same sex as she 
is and cannot have the object status of a reel. The mother is of the same 
                                                             





subjective identity as she is’ (SG, 97) 
 
It is important to remember that for Luce Irigaray a subject’s primary 
relationship is to one's mother. It is this relational difference which initiates 
sexuate difference: a difference which begins before we are born, in a 
(pre)subjective space within our mother. This continues to develop as we 
develop as children, in relation to the world around us, both subjects and 
objects. However, the little boy will privilege the subject-object relation; while 
the little girl the subject-subject relation, owing to this primary subject-subject 
relation with one's mother before we are even born. As she states:  
 
‘The relation of the little boy to his mother is different from the 
little girl's relation. The little boy, in order to situate himself vis-a-vis the 
mother, must have a strategy, perhaps a strategy of mastery, because he 
finds himself in an extremely difficult situation. He's a little boy. He has 
come out of a woman who's different from him. He himself will never be 
able to engender, to give birth. He is therefore in a space of unfathomable 
mystery. He must invent a strategy to keep himself from being 
submerged, engulfed … For the little boy, it's necessary to construct a 
world in order to construct himself’ (JLI, 108) 
 
Returning to Luce Irigaray's analysis of the Freud case study, she 






1) When she misses her mother, she throws herself down on the 
ground in distress, she is lost, she loses the power and the will 
to live, she neither speaks nor eats, totally anorexic. 
2) She plays with a doll, lavishing maternal affection on a quasi 
subject, and thus manages to organize a kind of symobolic 
space; playing with dolls is not simply a game girls are forced to 
play, it also signifies a difference in subjective status in the 
separation from the mother. For mother and daughter, the 
mother is a subject that cannot easily be reduced to an object, 
and a doll is not an object the way that a reel, a toy car, a gun, 
etc., are objects and tools used for symbolization. 
3) She dances and this forms a vital subjective space open to the 
cosmic maternal world, to the gods, to the present other. This 
dance is also a way for the girl to create a territory of her own in 
relation to the mother (SG 97-98)66 
 
It is the second of these three which is most revealing for our purposes 
here. While a little boy will play with an object (a toy car for example) the little 
girl will play with a doll; a quasi-subject, which signifies a different way of 
relating to the world around her in her mother's absence. Because her mother 
is a subject like she is (remembering the importance of their sameness in 
engendering, body, and speech) the little girl likes to play with a toy which 
                                                             





resembles this subject to subject relationship. It is this factor of engendering 
which is so important for Luce Irigaray:  
 
‘Among women, the relationship to sameness and to the mother 
is not mastered by the fort-da. The mother always remains too familiar 
and too close. In a way, the daughter has her mother under her skin, 
secreted in the deep, damp intimacy of the body, in the mystery of her 
relationship to gestation, to birth, and to her sexual identity’ (SG 98) 
 
Instead of an object, a little girl requires a quasi-subject to establish 
herself in relation to her mother, as another subject similar to her, due to their 
shared ability to engender another boy or girl. It means that boys and girls have 
different ways of relating to the world around them, and due to this difference 
they also speak differently, as she stresses here, ‘woman always speaks with the 
mother, man speaks in her absence’ (SG, 99). What is important here is to focus 
on her analysis that a boy becomes an autonomous (male) subject and enters a 
masculine culture by breaking with his mother through the manipulation of an 
object. As she states elsewhere, ‘a boy will have to interpose objects and the 
construction of an own homocultural and homosocial world, in order to protect 
himself from the mystery, indeed the abyss, that his origin, his mother, 
represents for him’ (KW, 90). This is how he differentiates himself from his 
mother and from the natural world around him. Further, the little boy plays 






‘the problematic of the object has nothing to do with that of the 
other … the object is necessary for masculine subjectivity to resolve the 
difficulty of relating with the mother. Confusing object with the other 
amounts to including the other in the necessities of one's own subjective 
construction; it is not yet a question about the other as such’ (CN, 47)  
 
Luce Irigaray’s return to Freud further clarifies her thought on sexuate 
difference, and further clarifies her position regarding the formation and 
preservation of a masculine culture. We can see that she is presenting to us the 
idea that the boy requires an object in order to understand his difference to his 
mother; she is not present, he must be different to her, and the object serves the 
function of establishing this difference and his own subjectivity (Whitford, 1991, 
44). It also means that he is likely to confuse an other with an object; as he does 
so with his first relationship to another, his mother. It also means that he is 
going to have difficulty in establishing a subject to subject relationship 
especially if that subject is different to him. And collectively, it means that if 
nature is a collection of objects for him, then women (as mothers) are easily lost 
in this natural world, leaving him to be the only subject, and all by himself, i.e., 
alienated. 
 
Luce Irigaray also presents linguistic research to support her 





difference, she is not simply relying on Freud and his case studies. She makes 
an extensive linguistic analysis of children and adults in multiple languages to 
demonstrate the difference in how little boys and how little girls speak; and how 
language functions for adult men and women. By setting simple exercises based 
on sentence construction with an emphasis on 'the subject speaking, the subject 
spoken to, the subject spoken about’ (KW, 79) she demonstrates some 
fundamental differences in the language used by children especially. Here I will 
not go into the research itself, I simply reference Luce Irigaray's research on 
linguistics as it supports her re-interpretation of Freud and the myth of 
Antigone which follows.  
 
Luce Irigaray in her essay ‘Towards a sharing of speech’ shows that 
boys prefer: 
• subject-object relationships, 
• relationships with the same as them, 
• the one-many configuration, 
• hierarchical or family relationships; 
And girls prefer: 
• relationships between subjects, 
• relationships in difference, 
• relationships between two persons, 







She summarizes, ‘boys and girls thus belong to very different relational 
worlds, and communication between the sexes will be impossible, unless 
awareness of this difference and respect for it come into the exchange’ (KW, 85). 
Although this research was done with Italian school children, she has, along 
with co-researchers, done many such linguistic analyses in different countries 
and languages, with children of different ages.67 For our purposes here, it would 
be interesting to consider any similar research with Japanese children, so we 
might ascertain the sexuate difference noticeable in Japanese language. To my 
knowledge, no such research exists in translation.68  
 
The privileging of objects within a (mono)subject-object relationship is 
a prejudice according to the masculine subject's needs. The masculine subject 
privileges the object relation (over the intersubjective) because he requires it to 
establish himself as separate from his mother and to become an autonomous 
subject. On the other hand, a woman’s relationship to her mother is different to 
that of a man’s; she does not require an object to establish herself as an 
autonomous subject. She is a subject like her mother: they are the same gender 
                                                             
67  See for example ‘She forgotten between use and exchange’ and ‘Two of us, outside, 
tomorrow?’ in Luce Irigaray’s i love to you (1996)  
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using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships... The failure 
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and they privilege intersubjective relations. For this same reason her 
relationship to objects (and to others) is different to that of a man’s. Luce 
Irigaray holds that this difference is primordial and does go all the way down to 
the depths of the constitution of ourselves as subjects.  
 
What we do see from Luce Irigaray’s research are two different forms 
of development for male and female self-consciousnesses (to use Nishitani 
Keiji’s terms). In short, based on her psychoanalytic and linguistic studies, Luce 
Irigaray wants to establish woman as a positive other to man (Cheah and Grosz, 
1998; Jones, 2011; Whitford, 1991). A sexuate specific self-consciousness (again 
to use Nishitani Keiji’s terms) which she terms an I-he and an I-she. If we fail 
to realise this, the danger of a repetition of alienation and a further fall into 
nihilism appears inevitable. This means that Nishitani Keiji’s analysis of the 
problem of nihilism is lacking the sexuate dimension of the formation of the I-
he and the I-she as two different forms of self-consciousness. 
 
 
4.6. Thinking through birth with Nishitani Keiji 
We can recall above, Nishitani Keiji said we are explicitly born as a 
human body. We also saw that his choice of term for nature is Nasci, to be born. 
Nishitani Keiji makes some passing comments to birth in relation to nature, our 
development and our self-consciousness. It is worth asking here then, what role 





even if it is conceived as a becoming and flow which our body is constitutive of.) 
The role a female or a woman play in this birthing must be recognised, or else 
women could easily be lost in this becoming and flow and find themselves as 
vehicles for the emergence of men as self-conscious gatekeepers in a shared 
patriarchal world of their own making. In other words, if we follow Nishitani 
Keiji, women could be confused with nature, precisely as Luce Irigaray has 
analysed.  
 
Above, Nishitani Keiji spoke of the self ‘emerging from nature’. 
Elsewhere and in relation to Spinoza and Goethe and education, he states, ‘[I] 
believe that individuals emerge from nature, which is regarded as the creative 
power’ (RE, 72). He goes on:  
 
‘Nature produces things in an orderly fashion, forming the 
foundation for education. A baby sucks his mother’s breast in harmony 
with the order of nature. Out of the interrelation of a baby with its 
mother, infantile emotions develop, which gradually evolve into feelings, 
affection and gratitude towards parents. The order of nature that 
presides over the foundation of the relations between individuals forms 






Putting aside for a moment the issues around the language used here,69 
we can see that the relation to one’s mother is in fact fundamental for Nishitani 
Keiji. Not enough is said for us to make too much of his comments, but clearly 
for him, the individual is born into the world through their mother, and is 
nurtured by them, which structures our development, and along with our 
education, forms the basis of interhuman relations; and we might add, perhaps, 
our later cultivation. He doesn’t think this through fully, but it appears that we 
can easily supplement his thought with Luce Irigaray’s. 
 
In his essay ‘A departure from the “individual”’ (On Buddhism, 2006), 
Nishitani Keiji speaks of the Buddhist teaching of dependent origination and 
how it relates to our birth. For him: 
 
‘the reason why I exist lies in my having parents, who were in 
turn dependent on their parents, and so forth. And to speak of the matter 
differently, a child becomes a parent, who in turn gives birth to a child, 
and so forth’ (OB, 101) 
  
What is interesting here, is that Nishitani Keiji deflects the issue of the 
couple into a series of couples.70 Instead of focusing on the couple in isolation, 
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sexuation in the terms “parents” and “child” as Nishitani Keiji is using neutral terms. The 





he creates an interdependent chain of birth which in many respects is infinite, 
as it extends into past and future, and beyond our historical or objective 
knowledge. This broadness of vision means that to speak of a couple and birth, 
is to speak of a great chain of human life, which is tied up with the becoming 
and flow of nature itself, as well as the sense of self which emerges as self-
consciousness and as an “I am”. This means that we have an understanding of 
nature and birth, which if nuanced further by the sexuate difference of Luce 
Irigaray, offers us a greater insight into the most important of transformations 
in life, that is birth-sexuation. 
 
Nishitani Keiji also has an interesting point for us concerning self-
consciousness or the “I am”, the sense of self as a separate individual, for him: 
  
‘there is behind the phenomena of being another aspect, in 
accordance with which it can certainly be said that I come out of my 
parents, but at the same time this is also not the case. For we did not 
come out of our parents insofar as our being is concerned. For instance, 
keeping an eye on the fact that “I am,” I cannot say even that my parents 
could possibly have produced this fact, as it really is’ (OB, 101) 
 
                                                             






Our sense of self as an “I am” does not result from our original birth. 
In a way we could speak of becoming self-conscious as a second birth and 
realizing ourselves as “I am” as a third birth. We are not born from our mother 
as such when we mature to a self-conscious self, an ego who can stand aloof 
from the world of nature as an individual. Nor, are we born from our mother 
when realise ourselves as “I am”, a transformation which transcends our first, 
and our second birth. This is similar in a sense to Luce Irigaray’s understanding 
of the ‘socio-placenta’. This “I am” is our being and he goes so far as to say that 
it has a shared origin to our parents own sense of “I am”. We are all born again 
from a shared origin of being. This for him, is perhaps the source of the idea of 
God or the Buddha. It is a reason for religious thinking on the origin of life, but 
it is certainly speculative, and it is not well explained.  
 
In my reading of Nishitani Keiji, we are born again when we mature 
from a baby to a self-conscious self who is aloof from nature. We also undergo 
a third birth as an “I am”, a mature self-realised human being, who is not only 
limited to self-consciousness, but realises themselves as a self-awareness, 
interdependent with all of existence. He or she is a co-constitutive part of all 
that has ever existed and all that will ever exist. This is the understanding of 
birth according to śūnyatā as an existential relational self-understanding. 
 
In his few comments on birth, Nishitani Keiji ties it to an emergence 
from nature. The lack of sexuate specificity here is quite clear. Again, without 





birth, there is a risk of women being obfuscated with nature, and/or nature 
remaining neutral. By drawing on the insights of Luce Irigaray, we can fill this 
lack and make birth a very human affair which considers the sexed specificity of 
our bodies, our roles in birth, and our relations to others, especially our mother.  
 
On the other hand, Nishitani Keiji’s broader horizon is also quite useful 
when we think of birth. It opens out the timeframe from an event of one 
individual, to the great flow of human beings as parents and children in a never-
ending chain. This cycle of birth is quite helpful to make sure we think in the 
broadest of terms when we introduce Luce Irigaray’s thought. Ningen might be 
a useful concept for understanding our human betweenness, but birth is the 
most important relational nexus which structures our sense of self as this 
betweenness.  
 
I would state that we are all born into a great chain of birth and 
therefore, we can see how the individual is always related to and bound up with 
the collective, which is between bodies, and masculine and feminine culture in 
nature. Sexuate difference and ningen are therefore, best brought together 
through our understanding of birth within a re-interpretation of nature as a flux 
and flow, of which we as sexuate human beings are an important self-aware 
part. But practically speaking, how are we to become a part of that flux and flow 







4.7. Self-Cultivation as transdescendence through Zazen 
We realise śūnyatā as a bodily-knowing. The body is the place of 
cultivation of a re-envisioned nature and self-consciousness as an “I am”: a self 
that is no-self, enlightened in the sense of Zen. As Yuasa (1987, 25) states, ‘to 
put it simply, true knowledge cannot be obtained simply by means of theoretical 
thinking, but only through “bodily recognition or realisation.”’ This bodily 
knowing has been recognised as a shared quality of Japanese and feminist 
philosophers (McCarthy, 2010; 2014). One such philosopher is Luce Irigaray, 
for whom, the realisation of bodily-between takes place not through philosophy 
and words, but by sitting and breathing – in effect, in silence, even if this is then 
expressed in philosophy (McCarthy, 2010). Through practices of bodily 
cultivation such as Japanese artistic pursuits or Zen meditation, we come to 
realise the body as a between place (Yuasa, 1987). For Nishitani Keiji, as we shall 
see, this is a place or locus that overcomes the nihilism of objectification and 
mechanisation, by placing itself with one foot in nature and one foot in culture, 
and then transcending such distinctions.  
 
In the Japanese Zen tradition, as understood by Nishitani Keiji, to 
come to a true self-understanding (a self which is no longer separate from 
another, the things of the world and the world as a whole) one must cultivate 
the relationship of the body and nature through breath meditation or 
concentration (Yuasa, 1987; Sekida, 1985; Ueda, 1983). As we saw in the 





he mentions it only occasionally in his writings. However, its importance cannot 
be underestimated, as he clearly states that it is difficult to understand such 
Buddhist concepts as śūnyatā or Buddhist wisdom in general, unless we 
practice silent meditation: ‘Since the practice of silent meditation is neglected 
today, it will be difficult to gain such wisdom’ (RJ, 40).   
 
Although there are many both gross and subtle variations in its precise 
method, sitting meditation is considered essential to the Buddhist path. Zazen 
(Japanese for sitting Zen) is the base practice of Zen (Sekida, 1985, 29). Zazen 
is made up of two characters in Japanese, the first, za is literally ‘to set oneself 
down’ or ‘to sit’, and zen (in this case) takes the meaning of centring or 
recollecting one’s self moment by moment (Ueda, 1994). This recollection, is 
most often facilitated by anchoring our attention on the in and out breath 
(Sekida, 1985, 53-65; Ueda, 1994).  
 
Nishitani Keiji's references to zazen are few and far between. He 
explicitly but briefly mentions zazen in ‘Cut flowers in Emptiness’ (1995 
[1975])). His most complete discussion of zazen is found in his later work, ‘The 
significance of Zen in modern society’ (1975). Here Nishitani Keiji takes up the 
last two lines of the Bodhidharma's mythical teaching: ‘Pointing directly at 
man's mind, seeing one's nature and become a Buddha’ (SZM, 20)71 and goes 
on to give an exposition of the Bodhidharma's mythical slogan in order to offer 
                                                             





a solution to one of the main problems of contemporary society which we have 
already come across, alienation (SZM 19-20). It is fascinating that in this article, 
written when Nishitani Keiji was seventy-five, that he gives his fullest account 
of zazen, and its goal of a non-dual realization in immediate experience.  
 
Nishitani Keiji’s Zen philosophy offers us a solution to the modern 
predicament of alienation through the practice of zazen. There are four levels 
working simultaneously: a) doubting oneself, b) investigating oneself, c) giving 
up oneself, d) returning to oneself. Descartes is the starting point for Nishitani 
Keiji's philosophical musings. Perhaps the greatest impact which Descartes had 
on modern philosophy is captured in his method of doubt. Nishitani Keiji here 
brings the teaching of the Bodhidharma into dialogue with Descartes' on this 
fundamental philosophical method of doubt. According to Nishitani Keiji, ‘a 
man must turn to himself. Not by force, but by his own initiative and will, he 
must confront himself for the purpose of self-investigation or search for the self’ 
(SZM, 19). This turning to one's self comes about through a confrontation with 
the world around us which leads to a doubting of ‘things that are given’. He 
states that one comes to doubt the ‘basic elements of our daily experiences, and 
things traditionally accepted as truths and values’ (SZM, 20). For him, we must 
experience a basic alienation from ourselves (in short, as we have seen nihility) 
in order to turn outward, when we realize that there is nothing outside us which 
can satisfy us we are turned back upon ourselves; but, here we are faced once 






Doubting, for him, goes further than Descartes' philosophical doubt, 
because the self itself ‘should be taken up and doubted’ (SZM, 19). Doubt, 
therefore, unites the self and the world “below” any sense of a separate self-
consciousness. The world around us, the objective world, along with all its 
values and truths (here we hear the Nietzschean influence in Nishitani Keiji) 
along with the self, the ‘inside’ and our ‘given’ understanding of ourselves, must 
be doubted:  
 
‘abandoning them one goes beyond what is usually accepted as 
the unquestionable framework of our evaluations and thoughts, what, in 
the Buddhist tradition, is called discrimination or the discriminative 
mind’ (SZM, 20) 
 
This doubting of both self and world, values and truth, takes us beyond 
the intellect or reason. It leads us beyond Descartes' doubt to where we have no 
possibility of a return to the self through God, nor any possible return to the self 
through reason, what we might loosely accept in Buddhist terms as the Buddhist 
tradition’s discursive or discriminating mind. We are left in a place of doubt of 
both the world at large and ourselves, the inner and the outer combine in a great 
ball of doubt (SZM). Put succinctly, we fall into nihility. This self which is now 
in a sea of doubt must therefore be investigated from a different angle than 
reason or rationality. It is here where the significance of zazen comes into play. 
Zazen is the means for the investigation of the self which is in doubt; a self that 





integration of the self is the breath and its ordering. Sekida (1985, 53-65) agrees 
with Nishitani Keiji wholeheartedly in his own philosophical inquiry into Zen 
practice. In Nishitani Keiji we see a joining of philosophical inquiry and Zazen 
meditation.  
 
For Nishitani Keiji, breathing is the ‘most important part’ and is not a 
mere technique but the practice/performance of the non-duality to which zazen 
aims. In the article ‘Cut flowers in Emptiness’ (1995) he states ‘breathing 
naturally during zazen … the inhalation and exhalation become as one’ and that 
during zazen ‘the person thoroughly identifies with his existence in time’ (CF, 
24). That is, in this very breath, in this very moment, the person becomes 
unified with themselves in the dimensions of body (inhalation and exhalation) 
and self-consciousness.  
 
In brief, the person comes to realise birth and death in each moment; 
through observing each breath they know birth and death, death and birth, in 
other words: life (RN, 75). This is the non-dual realization to which zazen 
practice aims. In this first instance it is a non-dual experience of self through 
the breath and the awareness of time merging into one, one's body and one's 
self-consciousness dissolve in a single awareness: śūnyatā or “I am”. It is a 
momentary glimpse into the nature of reality, through a re-ordering of the 
relationship between body-mind (Yuasa, 1987, 118-123.) Nishitani Keiji’s zazen 






‘zazen or sitting meditation is not a mere technique or a means, 
but a process of abandoning or cutting off that duality which is 
preventing one's true self from manifesting itself. This process of sitting 
and confronting one's self spontaneously by one's own initiative is not 
something that can be generally described as a psychological state of 
mind. It is rather the way of self-investigation or self-exploration of man 
as a total being, or of the total existence of man. The physical and the 
psychical, body and mind, are gathered in oneness in the posture of 
sitting in zazen’ (SZM, 20) 
 
The method then is performative and in a sense negative: it is a ‘cutting 
off’ of a duality which has been “given” to us as our basic existence, i.e., the 
collective prejudice of a self-consciousness that stands aloof from nature, others 
and the world. Essentially, the (male?) ego is always setting itself up against the 
world as a subject opposed to objects, and without the breaking down of this 
illusory barrier there can be no liberation from ourselves. We have come to 
doubt the existence of our self and taken up zazen to pass through it. In this 
practice the duality of inner and outer, self and world, subject and object, is 
negated (Ueda, 1983). Through a basic sitting posture with an ordered 
breathing, the false self is dropped, and the true self manifests spontaneously, 






In short, Zazen practice is transcendence for Nishitani Keiji; we 
transcend the ignorance of our ego-self and its separation from the world about 
it: ‘one transcends the subject-object duality; one's will, desire and 
discriminative thinking, on the one hand, and the “realities” of the outer world 
on the other’ (SZM, 20). This is the aspect of “giving up one's self”, which we 
can recall is not a nihilation of the self, rather it is a dropping of the separate, 
and therefore dual, self through an investigation into the whole or total 
existence of the human being (See Davis, 2013, 190). This results in a non-
duality of our self and the world, as Nishitani Keiji states: ‘to transcend one's 
duality of existence … means to abandon one's self-being and to give up one's 
ego. As long as there is an ego, there is also something other than ego which 
means duality’ (SZM, 20). The dropping of the ego refers to a non-dual 
realization of our self on another level, one which Nishitani Keiji terms our 
whole being or total existence, or our true self, or no-self or the “I am”.72  
 
Interestingly, even though this non-dual overcoming is now complete, 
in Nishitani Keiji we find another stage, the final stage of “returning to oneself”. 
This occurs simultaneously with the doubting of our self and world, the 
investigation of our self through zazen and the dropping of the ego. We must 
remember that these “stages” cannot really be seen only causally they must also 
be seen simultaneously. A transformation takes place: ‘returning to oneself is 
not to be understood as a procedure on the ego-level, as an egoistic, self-centred 
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the spontaneity of that exploration and avoid the fixation of the self in a particular name with 
a corresponding conceptual understanding. It is problematic philosophically, but in terms of 





movement’ (SZM, 20). For Nishitani Keiji the returning to one’s true self is 
captured by the second part of the Bodhidharma's phrase “seeing one's nature 
and become a Buddha”. It means ‘to ask the basic question of who and what am 
I, and realize one's own Buddha nature … to see one's original face’ (SZM, 23). 
This is not an abstract or theoretical questioning, it is one which takes place 
through ‘daily active life, moving, sitting, looking at flowers, and it returns after 
all this to the same daily life’ (SZM, 23).  
 
The transcendence of duality that Nishitani Keiji is speaking of is a 
transcendence that never departs from this very immediate existence of our 
everyday lives and that which we are. In translation it is rendered as 
‘transdescendence’.73 Transdescendence returns us most fully to an integrated 
and whole self, deeply connected to the world around us, or more precisely, 
interpenetrating the world and all about us as we ourselves are too 
interpenetrated in a simultaneous reciprocal constitution of a body and nature, 
self and other, self and world. Transdescendence then, is another word for the 
realisation of śūnyatā in the body.  
 
Transdescendence is the seeing of one's self with a greater self-
awareness which is being spoken of here but a self-awareness which comes to 
the point of ‘seeing oneself in the self-awareness of Buddha’ (SZM, 23). It is to 
literally drop one's own ego centred self and to be reborn in a sense through the 
                                                             






same insight of the Buddha so that one realizes the truth of the Buddha's path 
in one's own non-dual body-mind-world. As he states elsewhere, ‘In Zen 
Buddhism there is a belief that the Buddha’s enlightenment can be directly 
attained with a person’s living body … the Buddha dharma is immediately 
realised in the sensory realm’ (RJ, 41). The body itself is radically transfigured 
by practice and insight, which then informs the presentation of a philosophical 
exposition.  
 
If we think of terms such as body and mind, when we use these terms 
we compartmentalise ourselves and our world into two, we identify with one 
more than the other. We have a prejudice to one or the other or make some 
trade-off between them (Yuasa, 1987, 118-123). However, in Nishitani Keiji’s 
thought, they are both one and the same. Using Dōgen's: ‘Zazen signifies that 
body and mind drop out’ (SZM, 21) Nishitani Keiji makes clear that this is not a 
realization through what we may call our ordinary body and mind which then 
simply returns to this same ordinary body and mind after our navel gazing 
enlightenment moment. It is rather that through forgetting one's self, one 
returns to one's self, or put another way ‘the movement of letting them drop out 
simultaneously means to regain them’ (SZM, 21). This realization of body-
dropping off, of the ego-self falling away, is immediate, without time, wholly 







‘The whole process begins with one's own reality as a living self. 
After “forgetting” oneself and transcending everything, one returns once 
more to the reality of that self. The important point is that at no point is 
one detached [i.e., creating a further dualism] from that basic reality, 
from the immediacy of that reality. At no point do one's feet leave the 
ground, so to speak’ (SZM, 23)74 
 
This moment of realization is one thoroughly grounded in the everyday 
world, which at the same time transcends this ordinary world as dualistic, the 
self returns in a new transformed way but at no point did we leave this world to 
another transcendent realm; there is no deus ex machina to resolve our 
existential alienation; there is no need for an absolute transcendent other who 
comes to us gracing us with salvation; we made our own error and we can realise 
it for ourselves through our own self-understanding. We go down through the 
body. What is in effect, a ‘transdescendence’; rather than a transcendence. This 
realization takes place as a simultaneous realization of one's self and reality; 
reality and one's self (RN, 5).75 It is a radical re-appreciation of our existence, 
which is the purpose of religion and the necessity of our times in the face of 
nihilism.  
 
However, if transdescendence takes us down through the body, then 
surely the sexed nature of that body is relevant? I would consider it necessary 
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for any immanent transcendence to take into consideration the sexuate 
difference of nature, body, and self-consciousness, as Luce Irigaray’s thought 
forces us to do this. It cannot be simply bypassed. It is for this reason that Luce 
Irigaray’s thought is so important for us here.  The question is, can we reconcile 
transdescendence with Luce Irigaray’s own understanding of immanent 
transcendent also realised through bodily practices?  
 
 
4.8. Self-cultivation of the sexuate body-breath 
The education of our body and the breath are fundamental to the 
cultivation of ourselves as sexuate human beings for Luce Irigaray. Practices 
from Yoga and Tantra are dimensions which she finds lacking on our own 
culture, and they show a different attitude towards self-cultivation (DBT 113; 
BEW; TVB 25; TBB 14). In her discussion of a child’s growth, she comments on 
the complex process of moving from crawling to standing: 
 
‘This really complex endeavour seems to go without saying for 
us Westerners, and if certain cultures, notably Eastern ones amongst 
which those of the yoga tradition, help us to cultivate the passage of the 
body from one position to another in relation to gravity, its situation in 
space, its sensory perceptions, especially the visual ones, instead our 
tradition does not care much about these sorts of questions, which are 





individual and allows it to reach a suitable constitution and autonomy … 
this centring has not been considered seriously enough by our culture as 
an element crucial in structuring subjectivity’ (TBB, 14-15)  
 
This is one of the few places where Luce Irigaray relates Yogic practice 
to her own views of childhood development and human cultivation. It is clear 
this is about practices concerning the body and not the intellect. In fact, it has 
been noted that Luce Irigaray is looking for a return to the body through these 
practices, and that she is not necessarily looking for the same results as the 
traditions themselves (Sokhtan Yeng, 2013, 211). The importance of self-
cultivation through the body, as a part of a child’s growth, and our own adult 
maturation is clearly paramount for her, as it is “crucial in structuring our 
subjectivity.” Likewise, the breath is vitally important. 
 
Our first breath, taken at birth, is the link from our origin, to life, to our 
body, and to the cultivation of ourselves as autonomous human beings: 
‘Breathing corresponds to the first autonomous gesture of the living human 
body’ (BEW, 73) and, ‘it is our first and last gesture of life’ (BEW, 73). In her 
essay The way of breath (2002) Luce Irigaray draws on Yogic wisdom to 
elucidate this link of breath and life.76 It is because we do not understand the 
breath that we cannot understand life: 
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‘breathing is what permits us not only to live by ourselves but 
also to transcend a mere survival, to overcome the stage of a mere vitality 
so that we become able to achieve a human existence’ (TBB, viii)  
 
Sexuate difference along with the breath, is the focus of her thought for our 
cultivation in-tune with our natural belonging. This the path of self-cultivation 
woven between East and West as found in Luce Irigaray’s thought (TBB, viii). 
Even the breath is sexuated:  
 
‘faithfulness requires each individual to correspond with a 
concrete finiteness through its sexuate belonging. The specificity of its 
sexuation is what acts as a finiteness inherent or immanent in nature 
which provides each with its limits, measure and economy, including 
breathing – thus a life of its own’ (TBB, 3)  
 
The cultivation of the breath in Yogic and Tantric practice is called 
pranayama (Feuerstein, 2013, 121). Etymologically, this word is made up of two 
words, prana and ayaama (Feuerstein, 2011, 74). Prana is usually translated 
as vital force, or energy (Feuerstein 2013, 121; 2011, 74). Prana is, in effect, a 
similar understanding to Chi or Ki as found in Chinese or Japanese thought 





Yasua (1993) has noted the importance of this concept for understanding 
Japanese philosophy and non-dual subjectivity. Luce Irigaray is often using the 
term energy alongside her discussions of the breath and its cultivation. We find 
this more and more in her later works and especially her most recent 
publications.77 
 
Furthermore, in his The Psychology of Yoga Georg Feuerstein (2013, 
127) relates this term prana or energy to Freud’s libido, or bioenergy, in the 
psychoanalytic tradition. We can highlight specifically Wilhelm Reich’s orgone 
theory as one of the principle offshoots of Freudian thought which is very 
similar to this understanding of life-energy as all pervasive (Feuerstein, 2013, 
127; Feuerstein, 2010, 249). Reich referred to it under many names, and at one 
time, he used the vegetative. However, I read this term energy in accordance 
with Asian understandings of prana or chi. When Luce Irigaray speaks of 
energy in her writings therefore, I consider it is this prana as understood in the 
Yogic and Tantric traditions which she is speaking of.  I think she has carefully 
played on this term and its meanings within her poetic evocation of breath as a 
universal path of cultivating the vegetal, energy, the divine or mother energy.  
 
The vegetal, a term she shares with Michael Marder, and with whom 
she co-authors one of her most recent works Through Vegetal Being (2016) is 
an understanding of nature as living, which she finds in this plant-thinking or 
                                                             





vegetal being, and which appears in many ways to be a re-interpretation of 
energy and self-generation. We might say, Jinen. For her, ‘nature, contrary to a 
fabricated object, moves by itself towards its blossoming’ (TVB, 13). It is self-
generative or has its own potentialities which can be fostered and cultivated in 
our own case as human beings. For her, the vegetal is a place she has lived with 
for a long time as she states: 
 
 ‘the vegetal world is, from my infancy, what allowed me to 
survive, but also to find the roots of life again after the expulsion from 
my social environment that followed the publication of Speculum’     
(TVB, 5)  
 
For her, the vegetal is a place where one is intimate with plant life, trees 
and the green world that surrounds us and holds us in what was traditionally 
objectified and conceptualised as nature, and as separate to us. The key 
difference in conceptualising nature according to scientific understanding or 
idealism, is seen here as intimacy and living with the vegetal, which is for her 
essential to survival and becoming (TVB, 7). Going even further, we could say 
that as human beings, in order to cultivate ourselves, we must grow alongside 
and with our counterparts in the vegetal world. It is a return to nature in the 
sense of a meditation in and with nature understood as the self-generating 






Intimacy then is not to be understood as an intellectual position, but 
rather a living experiential position which Luce Irigaray is trying to speak from. 
Our cultivation is one of flourishing in its classical sense as growth, fulfilling our 
potential, or even better: blossoming, and where we do not split ourselves off 
from nature (TVB, 26). It is for this reason that her use of the image of the 
Buddha contemplating a flower, as we shall see later, is suitable to bring across 
her message of the vegetal, hidden in words – as a man sits in silence, intimate 
with the living-world around him (ILTY; BEW).  
  
This practice of contemplating a living-plant or tree is one of the 
specific practices she mentions in her texts, and it was something which she 
connected to masters of the East such as the Buddha, and Krishnamurti, who 
sat under trees or spoke of flowers and flowering as literal examples of the 
flowering of our own self-unfolding (BEW; TVB, 26). We see in this process of 
cultivation, a clear parallel between her thought and Nishitani Keiji’s. It is our 
natural spontaneous unfolding which is hindered by the mechanised and 
objectified form of development found in contemporary cultivation. 
 
For Luce Irigaray, our natural rhythms of growth are mechanised. This 
is for her the case with modern culture, where we she expresses the difference 







‘Instead of being really concerned with integrating the different 
stages of our becoming human, subjectivity has been constituted only 
from certain aspects: those capable of dominating natural growth 
through categories and principles which are imposed on it from the 
outside or from on high as modalities presumed suitable for human 
development … [the little human] will be asked to submit its natural 
growth to meta-physical requirements already defined, the origin of 
which are not in its body: a thing that will paralyze its growth and tear it 
between a motion of which it is the source as living being and other 
movements to which it is subjected and which transform it into a sort of 
fabricated product, the mechanical functioning of which is dependent on 
an energy external to it, at least in part’ (TVB, 15) 
 
The child growing up in a culture of mechanization based on a meta-
physics which is contrary to his or her origin and self-generation, i.e., his or her 
natural rhythm creates a fabricated object, not a living human being. Similarly, 
a culture which is predominantly masculine, or neutral, will impinge on the self-
generation of female subjectivity by distorting her rhythm or by not facilitating 
her growth according to her own rhythm. Male and female are relationally 
different, they grow differently according to their rhythm and relation to nature 
and culture, and they become human depending on the processes of cultivation 






Importantly, this relates to the practices of self-cultivation which we 
find in Luce Irigaray’s thought. The practice of self-cultivation would also play 
out differently through our different bodies, which are also parts of nature as a 
whole. She even goes so far as to say that men and women may breathe 
differently, and she is cautious about adopting some of the tantric and yogic 
practices which may be more appropriate for men than for women (BEW; 
CON). Nature and culture are bridged by a re-interpretation of nature as a fluid 
whole, and a living body that never departs from that whole, while it engages in 
shared cultural activities, which are based on the differences between male and 
female bodies in relation to the flux and flow of nature and the net of a shared 
culture. Self-cultivation then, must also be in-tune with the sexed difference of 
male and female bodies, or, it may fall into a mechanical form of alienation. 
 
Prana is sometimes called the divine energy, or mother energy, and is 
represented by the goddess Shakti, (Feuerstein, 2013, 124-127; Swami 
Gitananda, 2008, 2-3). This energy, this material which is also infused by 
something pre-material, a life power, is the divine as feminine power in action. 
The divine feminine power is called Shakti and is also coupled with the god Śiva. 
This coupling, especially in the divine coupling of Śiva and Shakti, is understood 
to be the highest model of the Tantric tradition (Feuerstein, 1998, 77-84). As we 
saw above, this divine coupling is important to our understanding of the body, 
breath, nature and culture in the micro-macrocosm model that Luce Irigaray 






Pranayama specifically can be understood as the extension, or 
sometimes science of control of prana through breathing practices (Feuerstein, 
2011, 74). It refers to understanding and/or altering the breath through 
techniques or methods of cultivation (Feuerstein, 2011, 69-73). In between east 
and west (2002) Luce Irigaray states that, ‘The practice of respiration, the 
practice of diverse kinds of breathing certainly reduces the darkness or the 
shadows of Western consciousness’ (2002, 7). Her appeal to Eastern practices 
to supplement her own philosophical and psychoanalytic studies and practices 
is crucial for us to understand her philosophical project. Clearly, the cultivation 
of the breath is taken from Yogic and Tantric practice. This is a process of 
divinisation of the body, ‘for the masters of the East, the body itself can become 
spirit through the cultivation of breathing’ (BEW, 7) and this divinisation of the 
flesh is one of the main lessons she learned from Yoga and Tantra. This allowed 
her to re-read or understand or relate her intuitions of the philosophical and 
Christian tradition and its relation to the body and the breath. For Luce Irigaray, 
one of the fundamental lessons learned from Yoga is a different mode of 
approaching ‘life, others and teaching’ which ‘supposes and accompanies a 
singular experience of the body’ (BEW, 60). She states clearly: 
 
‘The tradition of Yoga, the Tantric tradition and certain 
meetings with spiritual women and men have taught me … that the body 
is itself a divine place – the place or temple of the divine in harmony with 
universe – or rather they have taught me how to cultivate my body, and 






She had already intuited this from her understanding of the Christian 
tradition, but it was through Yoga that she learnt how to cultivate this intuition: 
 
‘Through practicing breathing, through educating my 
perceptions, through concerning myself continually with cultivating the 
life of my body, through reading current and ancient texts of the yoga 
tradition and Tantric texts, I learned what I knew: the body is the site of 
the incarnation of the divine and I have to treat it as such’ (BEW, 62) 
 
For her, ‘without doubt, at the origin of our tradition – for Aristotle, for 
example, and still more for Empedocles – the soul still seems related to the 
breath, to air. But the link between the two was then forgotten, particularly in 
philosophy.’ (BEW, 7) This link, between the body, the breath and the soul, is 
the pathway towards the divinisation of the body. It was lost in philosophy, 
through conceptualisations and representations. But, for her, it is the missing 
link for us in order to understand and restore the bridges between traditions, 
East and West.  
 
Luce Irigaray’s philosophy between East and West, and her orientation 
towards practice and process of cultivation is best captured by the term ‘way’ 





(2002), where she also interprets philosophy to mean the wisdom of love (2002, 
1). And, which is concerned with ‘the whole of the human and not only that 
mental part of ourselves’ (2002, viii). There is a clear link to the Asian 
understanding of cultivation as a way, that is Marga in yogic thought, or Tao or 
Do in Chinese or Japanese thought respectively. As we have seen already, with 
Zen meditation, these traditions often have a detailed understanding of the 
breath, its rhythms, its effects on the body, the emotions, the thinking process 
and our awareness. This has been cultivated over many thousands of years and 
is still a living tradition in several areas of the world. These paths of cultivation 
are often referred to as ways of life, and in fact, we can take this in its most literal 
sense here: for Luce Irigaray, breathing is the way of life. 
 
Once again, even the practice of the breath points towards this being 
between traditions as a place for cultivation of ourselves as human beings. It is 
not that we must overcome the body, or that the body is fallen, or mere matter 
to be transcended, or that is just chemical reactions and neural impulses, the 
body itself is a temple for the divine which is brought out through the breath, it: 
 
‘blossoms, becomes more subtle and totally sensible. This 
transformation, transubstantiation of elementary corporeal matter into 
spiritual flesh, is achieved particularly through the passage of energy 
from certain chakras – or psycho-physiological centres – to others: thus 
from chakras of sexual energy or of elementary vitality to those of the 





all the way down to the feet. All this alchemy of the becoming of the subtle 
body is described in certain texts such as the Upanishads of yoga and also 
in certain Tantric manuals as well as in the teaching of Patanjali on 
concentration and perception. Everything is not said there, everything is 
not yet said there as I have sometimes believed. But instructions about 
the transformations of the body in union with the totality of the universe 
and its possible incarnations are given’ (BEW, 62-63) 
 
In this passage, there is no doubt as Joy (2006), Sokhtan Yeng (2014) 
and Deutscher (2002) have recognised: that the influence of Tantra pervades 
her thought. Finally, Luce Irigaray expresses her desire to see these teachings 
on the breath and the body, in the cultivation of love between two freedoms, 
something which is lacking in the Westernised take on them. For her, ‘often, 
love is presented there as a union, regressive in a way but ecstatically spiritual, 
of man with the universal womb that woman would incarnate, chosen as shakti.’ 
(BEW, 63) For her, this is better than bestial love, but it is not without the need 
for re-interpretation. For her: 
 
‘the union of two lovers, woman or man, can contribute to the 
rebirth of the other as both human and divine incarnation. In this case, 
the carnal union becomes a privileged place of individuation and not only 
of fusion, of regression, or of the abolition of polarities and differences. 
In love, women and men give back to one another their identity and the 





them makes possible. This doubly identity allows them to remain two in 
love, and in adult relations of reciprocity’ (BEW, 64) 
 
The carnal dimension of her thought is outside the scope of this thesis, 
but she has been criticised for her selective use of Tantra (Sokhtan Yeng, 2013; 
Joy, 2006). For Luce Irigaray, the way of breath is the way of life. For her, just 
as we are all born, we also all breathe, it is the first gesture we share, and it is 
the fundamental path for the cultivation of our life. It is, therefore, the universal 
path for the cultivation of our selves, as a living-being and as a spiritual being, 
beyond mere nature as an objective and mechanical thing, towards a living-
nature of the vegetative. To summarise, I quote a very autobiographical 
statement at length:  
 
‘breathing is what allows for a passage from the vegetative life 
to the spiritual life. Thanks to the vegetal world, I could not only begin 
living again but also continue thinking. “There is air” was sufficient; I did 
not need another “there is.” A new start and a new world were possible 
without any other than breathing, and so, little by little, opening in 
myself a clearing made of a reserve of free breath, in which I was capable 
of perceiving and shaping that which I perceived. At first, I could, above 
all, affirm “It is not that” and put in question the truth that my tradition 
taught me. I crossed a sort of negative ontology. It is not that which has 





essential function of air and of breath has been forgotten as the 
mediation for both living and transcending a mere natural life’ (TVB, 22) 
 
As sexuate human beings we live between the vegetal and the divine 
(TBB, vi). The relational complexity of human development is found in its many 
relations and as a difference:  
 
‘A human being must give itself a being with faithfulness to the 
living that it is. In a way it must create its human being through relating 
to the world and the other(s) – be they plants, animals or humans – thus 
a being in relation which requires us not to be what they are while being 
able to be in relation to and with what they are, that is, capable of taking 
on the negative that the difference represents’ (TBB, vi)  
 
For her, a human being: 
‘does not at once live in the space and the time which suit it; it 
comes into the world separating off from its first vital roots, and it is little 
by little that it will have to find, to elaborate and to construct a place 
which takes into account its natural potentialities and permits it to 







This practical and poetic new way of philosophising based on the 
breath as our fundamental existence and air as that natural support that 
grounds our being provides a free place within ourselves from where we can 
negate that which is not our self, that which is not true, that on which we do not 
need to depend. It is, as we saw above, a negative ontology grounded in 
breathing air, which provides an energetic space within from which to think in 
a new way. Clearly, as Sokthan Yeng points out, Luce Irigaray is greatly 
influenced by practices of cultivating the breath and meditation as found in the 
Yogic traditions (2014, 66, 70-71). However, she doesn’t teach any actual 
techniques for cultivating the breath and prana in her texts. There is no 
technical understanding put forward; but, when we read her essays on the 
breath, there is a sense of pointing us towards listening to the breath as we listen 
to words, the sound of the birds, or silence. They do therefore, raise our 
awareness. One of Krishnamurti’s “techniques” was to point us towards the 
space between the words in his speech, the silence between. The text itself does 
act as a kind of meditation therefore, and she does perhaps inspire us to take up 
Yoga or to walk in the open air enjoying nature, through her words and her 
poetic weavings.  
 
 
4.9. Re-integrating nature, body and practice 
In this chapter I have shown that there are three clear points of 
convergence in the philosophies of Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray. The first, 





our natural belonging. The second, is the need for Eastern practices to fulfil a 
perceived lack in the Western philosophical tradition, and to facilitate that 
integration. The third, is the body as the place of self-cultivation which brings 
about a re-integration with nature, and it’s re-interpretation. Of course, the 
fundamental difference here is the sexed specificity of the body, nature and 
culture, as seen in Luce Irigaray’s thought.  
 
We have seen that a re-integration with nature, through the body, is 
crucial for us to reach a relational self-understanding, and overcome our 
nihilistic cultural trend. Historically, in European culture, the masculine 
perspective has prevailed which was established by cutting off from nature (and 
the body) and manipulating it. In this respect, Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji 
are in a basic agreement, but in respect to why this has happened we can see a 
clear difference between them. For Luce Irigaray, conceptualising nature as a 
whole is potentially nihilistic (TVB, 6), hence her thought on the vegetal as a re-
interpretation of a certain way that ‘nature’ grows and blossoms is more 
favourable. By taking refuge (a very Buddhist term) in the vegetal world, Luce 
Irigaray is able to ground her thought of sexuate difference in living-nature, for 
her, life itself is ‘necessarily sexuate’ (TVB, 5). Human beings are sexed through 
their bodies where they are entwined with nature. In other words, nature has 
this potential for sexuation, which human beings fulfil. When Luce Irigaray says 
nature is two, what she means really is that human beings are sexed, male and 
female and this relies on the sexuation inherent to them as a part of nature 






Eastern practices can help us to reach our natural and spontaneous 
self-nature (jinen). However, any such down going or transdescendence must 
be inclusive of the insight of sexuate difference. This is because 
transdescendence never leaves the body, it is a down going, and therefore, must 
pass though sexuate difference. Moreover, sexuate difference can help us to 
establish ourselves and our natural belonging in the process of growth towards 
a maturity that is capable of transdescendence. This natural belonging can be 
phrased in terms of an I-he and an I-she, if the dominant culture of 
mechanisation and objectification is carefully and cautiously moved beyond. 
 
Furthermore, even these techniques of self-cultivation are influenced 
by the masculine or feminine interpretation of them, and breath itself may be 
different for male and female bodies (understood as relational). We must 
therefore, be cautious about appropriating these practices because of their effect 
on our self-cultivation, and whether this will facilitate our natural becoming 
further, or hinder it. A practice of self-cultivation must also be inclusive of 
sexuate difference, or at least be aware of the effect this practice might have on 
our sexuate understanding of ourselves as relational bodies. The danger once 
more is again that sexuate difference may be neutralised by bodily practices 
which do not take it fully into consideration. One of the main dangers here is 
the non-dualism inherent to Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy of Śūnyatā, which will 






According to Luce Irigaray, each and everything has a rhythm and flow 
which approximates to the two primary forces of male and female, in the eyes 
of some traditions of human beings, who themselves differentiate implicitly or 
explicitly because of sexuate difference. Sexuate difference, of which humans 
are the most complex manifestation, guarantees the dualistic perspective on 
nature, and a holistic way of understanding the interplay of forces in the vegetal, 
the animal and the human worlds. The focus on interchange of rhythms 
guarantees this difference within nature and suggests we cannot conceptualise 
it as a whole; at best we can interpret it as two, and this will support a reality of 
a web of differences. Without this differentiation, for Luce Irigaray, there is a 
danger that we once more fall into a nihilistic understanding based on 
everything being the same.  
 
Although I think in many ways Nishitani Keiji would appreciate the 
detailed exposition of rhythms between the different entities in the natural 
world, he himself does not go into such specificity. Śūnyatā is once more the 
broadest possible understanding of the interchange and flux and flow of all 
things. It does not explicitly include sexuate difference, and it may, therefore, 
neutralise it and potentially reduce it to the same. However, with a heightened 
awareness of sexuate difference, there is no reason why it cannot be included in 
this understanding of reality as Śūnyatā. In fact, I think it needs to be included, 
if we are to make ningen harmonious with sexuate difference, from nature and 






Human beings are a part of nature, they are a self-aware part which 
brings about culture. Our realisation of this is the self-awareness of reality as 
‘our becoming aware of reality and, at the same time, the reality realising itself 
in our awareness’ (RN, 5). We can recall James Heisig’s point here that: 
 
‘the standpoint of emptiness, then, is not so much a 
philosophical “position” as it is the achievement of an original self-
awareness (our self-nature), compared to which all other consciousness 
is caught in the fictional darkness of ignorance, or what the Buddhists 
call avidya’ (2001, 223)  
 
And as we saw, for Nishitani Keiji: 
 
‘śūnyatā is the point at which we become manifest in our own 
suchness as concrete human beings, as individuals with both body and 
personality. And at the same time, it is the point at which everything 
around us becomes manifest in its own suchness’ (RN, 90) 
 
Śūnyatā is therefore, at once reality (including the human social world 
and nature) and the horizon of interpretation. Sexuate difference must be held 
within this broad open horizon of self-awareness. It is what ties us to our natural 





broader understanding, there is a danger that sexuate difference will slip into a 
nihilism of essentialism, where self-consciousness becomes reified as 
something, instead of being a point of awareness, or a standpoint from where 
we interpret the world of which we are an integral part. In short, an I-he and/or 
an I-she, must become a non-he and/or a non-she. That is, by going down 
















































In this chapter, I shall expand on the practice of self-cultivation by 
looking at how Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji attempt to overcome nihilism 
through a new perceptual model. This model is based around a subject looking 
at flowers. The example of looking at flowers is found in several of Luce 
Irigaray's writings where she uses the Buddha for her model of seeing the 
vegetal, nature and life itself. In Nishitani Keiji, it is the Japanese art of Ikebana 
which is an example of a different way of seeing and experiencing ourselves in 
relation to the natural. These two examples of looking at flowers serve as a case 
study on how each philosopher tries to re-interpret the world and to re-







The crux of the problem shall arise here when we compare these two 
examples. The non-self, as understood by Nishitani Keiji, is a self which is 
situated on a field of śūnyatā, which is, as we have seen in the introduction, a 
field of non-dualism, where the subject and object, or the internal and external, 
are united in a double exposure – what we might call layers or levels of 
existence. Luce Irigaray has expressed concerns with non-dualism as found in 
Yoga and Patañjali (CN, 38). Her concern is that any form of oneness is a 
neutralisation of everything to the same and will result in the eradication of 
sexuate difference and therefore, nihilism (CN, 39-41). We might expect then 
that this non-dual experience of śūnyatā is one which Luce Irigaray would be 
uncomfortable with.  
 
On the one hand, we shall see that Nishitani Keiji’s example of looking 
at a flower might offer an avenue for a new model for man to emulate, which 
gives space for the emergence of a female subject and a feminine culture to 
emerge (because man will release his possessiveness of woman as an object, if 
he realises himself as a no-self.) On the other hand, we shall see that, Nishitani 
Keiji’s Zen standpoint might go too far by ignoring the role of sexuate difference, 
thereby defeating the very purpose of Luce Irigaray’s passage between 
traditions.  
 
What I want to propose here in this chapter is a model inclusive of 
sexuate difference, but grounded on śūnyatā; understood not as a dissolution 





as a possibility for two different kinds of sexuate subject (I-he/I-she) who are 
fundamentally non-attached (or what I call the non-he/non-she) i.e., to begin 
to flesh out an understanding of the non-self (in Nishitani Keiji’s terms) or pure 
subjects (in Luce Irigaray’s terms) to exist together on the field of śūnyatā while 
being sexuately differentiated.  
 
 
5.2. Luce Irigaray’s Buddha looking at a flower 
Luce Irigaray’s image of the Buddha looking at a flower is I think a 
significant turning point in her thought, where we see an explicit Eastern 
influence in her texts. Consider her statement that, ‘Buddha's contemplation of 
the flower suggests that we learn to perceive the world around us, that we learn 
to perceive each other between us: as life, as freedom, as difference’ (TBT, 23). 
This change in our perception, through such a contemplation, allows the 
perception of life, freedom and difference (dare we say even sexuate difference?) 
The example of the “Buddha looking at a flower” occurs in three of Luce 
Irigaray's most significant works: i love to you (1996), to be two (2000) and 
between east and west (2002).78 As we can see they correspond to the middle-
later period of her work. In these works, Luce Irigaray brings the image of the 
Buddha looking, contemplating and gazing at a flower into conversation with 
the thought of Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-ponty, Levinas and Simone de 
Beauvoir, and, at the same time, she engages with several problems and 
                                                             





questions from the Western philosophical tradition. She usually does not make 
this explicit for the reader, and she tends to homogenise the Western 
philosophical tradition, just as much as she might homogenise the “East” 
(Deutscher, 2002, 149).79 My work here is not in locating the invisible 
interlocutors, or examining the philosophical problems she is engaging with; 
unless it relates directly to the Buddha imagery, and my juxtaposition of her 
work with Nishitani Keiji’s.  
 
It is not a traditional or scholarly interpretation of the Buddha which 
Luce Irigaray makes and brings into dialogue with the Western philosophical 
tradition; rather, it is a novel interpretation that, for her, attempts to remain 
true to the Buddha's gestures, invigorating the Buddha's teaching appropriately 
for our own time and its problems, such as an inability to perceive the vegetal, 
life and sexuate difference. In short, it is a model for a man to find a new way of 
seeing living-things in the world, thereby simultaneously changing his relation 
to objects, and therefore, necessarily his sense of self as a subject. It is a new 
way of perceiving in relation which overcomes the isolation of objectification 
and nihilism.   
 
For Luce Irigaray the Buddha can serve as a model for our self-
cultivation because he did not reject life, nor his body. What she draws out from 
his life of renunciation is that he rejected his social world of constructed objects. 
                                                             






For her, we see this through his gesture of living in the forest (BEW, 35-36). He 
renounced the social world in order to return to the natural world (BEW, 35-
36). He intended to live in the forest, so he could be silent and breathe according 
to his own rhythm and in tune with the cosmic rhythm (BEW, 35-36). As Luce 
Irigaray states:  
 
‘The quest of the Buddha seems to me to correspond to the 
search for a continuous communion with the respiration of the 
macrocosm. In order to attain such fluidity, the Buddha renounces the 
punctuality, the discontinuity, of objects and, moreover, of discourses. 
He tries to become pure subject but on a model forgotten by us: pure 
subject means here breathing in tune with the breathing of the entire 
living universe’ (BEW, 35-36) 
 
As we saw in the introduction, for Luce Irigaray our subjectivity is our 
transcendence: that which can never be seen or known by our self or by another. 
I think we can say that it is cultivating this which Luce Irigaray is suggesting 
when she speaks of becoming a pure subject. The Buddha as a pure subject is 
one who is in fluid relation with the living world around him. It is once again, a 
micro-macro model, through which cultivating our breath in relation to the 
natural world we can re-integrate ourselves into the macrocosm. To be close to 
that which he really is, the Buddha must come closer to the living world, the 
natural world, where he can find his own rhythm of breath alongside and with 





in chapter four, because we each have our own rhythm, and this is a natural 
dimension of our existence.  
 
For Luce Irigaray, objects and words take us away from our own 
rhythm; punctuating it, making it discontinuous, and therefore, disharmonious. 
The Buddha's renunciation, according to her, is one of renouncing constructed 
objects because they take us away from our own rhythmic breath, and the 
rhythm of the living world, or we might say the vegetal:   
 
‘Renunciation, for the Buddha, represents the way of access to 
continuity and to harmony. To practice renunciation does not signify, for 
him, sacrificing oneself for a hypothetical immortality or eternity but 
bringing them here and now. Such work cannot be carried out in a purely 
speculative manner, which is another Western error in the interpretation 
of the Buddha's teaching. He never separated himself from the economy 
of the living universe, notably the vegetal’ (BEW, 35-36) 
 
The return to the living-world, which means the renunciation of 
discourse and objects, and the return to the forest where he can breathe 
according to his own rhythm, is for Luce Irigaray the most important gesture of 
the Buddha (BEW, 35-36). The Buddha does not go outside of himself to find 
immortality or eternity, he returns to himself through breathing with the living-





that all objects make us partial: 
 
‘If he renounces – at least according to our perspective – it is 
because the objects of desire, the objective correlates of my subjective 
desires, oppose harmony with the universal breath. They tear me to 
pieces’ (BEW, 35)  
 
The desire for a constructed thing outside of myself; through a 
partiality such as the perception of vision, and the organ of vision, as Luce 
Irigaray says, tears me to pieces: the object partializes me, through my visual 
perception and desire, it removes me from my wholeness, and my own rhythm. 
It makes my cultivation as a living subject impossible. It is for this reason that 
Luce Irigaray thinks that ‘the Buddha renounces every object, the object always 
being partial, nonabsolute, a cause of conflicts, sorrows’ (BEW, 36).  
 
For Luce Irigaray, the major difference is found between an object and 
a living-thing. The Buddha looking at a flower is completely different to 
someone walking down the street and seeing a car. A flower is a living-thing, 
which does not partialize him, allowing him to remain in himself, while 
breathing, or coming closer to the natural-living world on a greater scale (CN, 
43). By returning to the forest, the Buddha comes back to himself as a living-
being among living-beings. He can therefore cultivate himself, eventually to a 





pure subject, therefore, is not attached to manufactured objects, and in himself 
as a living-being he is whole – beyond desire and joined with the universal 
breath. Her interpretation of the Buddha is essentially a model for man to 
overcome his attachment to, and domination of objects, so that he might 
become that which he really is – a living pure subject.  
 
The Buddha renounces the constructed world and returns to the 
vegetal (living world). In doing so, he renounces all objects (constructed things), 
and instead he attempts to cultivate himself as a pure subject: through his 
breath and his relation to the vegetal. Luce Irigaray does not explain the concept 
of a “pure subject” clearly. Here I attempt to elucidate it from the little she does 
say. A pure subject is not the same as becoming an abstract subject. The Buddha 
is not becoming a disembodied neutral subject, an “I” with no body – that is the 
philosophical subject of the Western world – the thinking thing of Descartes for 
example. Instead, he attempts to become a pure subject, unified with the 
macrocosmic and the microcosmic, while remaining in his body, in tune with 
his breath and in silence – what she calls en-stasis (CN, 41). The critical problem 
from the perspective of sexuate difference lies with gender and objectivity. As 
we saw earlier, our subjectivity is our transcendence, and it is always coupled to 
our primary objectivity which is our gender, as a bodily and spoken relational 
difference to our mother. To become a pure subject, according to Luce Irigaray, 
we must breathe in harmony with our own rhythm and the cosmos. In the 
Buddha's case this means he must breathe according to his own rhythm: the 
Buddha, is still a man. According to her own thought, a subject is always male 





a male. This is what she calls the cultivation of our sexuate belonging or 
sexuation (TBB, viii). Her question therefore is, can we remain as two human 
beings, sexuate difference being the paradirm, while entering this state of 
contemplation? (CN, 41). In-line with her thought of sexuate difference, we can 
say that as a male subject the Buddha attempts to become a pure male subject; 
but if he attempts to become a pure subject breathing to some non-gendered 
rhythm, then he shall inevitably fail. He must breathe according to his own 
rhythm to become a (non-attached/partialized) pure (male) subject. And from 
this we must assume that a woman has her own path to any such enstasis. We 
shall return to this later.  
 
 
5.3. The flower as a model 
For Luce Irigaray, it is not only the Buddha who offers us a model, we 
can also learn from the flower itself. She wants to distinguish between observing 
or contemplating a living thing or a manufactured object. It is important to 
recall that what the Buddha ‘is gazing at is not just anything – it is a flower’ 
(LTY, 24-25), which according to her, ‘perhaps offers us the best object for 
meditation upon the appropriateness of form to matter’ (LTY, 24-25). The 
flower is a form which is appropriate to contemplate because it is one of the 
simplest, which is a living-thing (and we might add, because it is overtly sexual). 
According to Luce Irigaray, the flower also resembles our own being: our gaze 
is the flowering of our own body (they are the windows to our soul? Or we might 





(male or female) being. We cultivate our senses as our opening to the world; the 
flower too is a cultivated nature which opens to the world. The gaze of the flower 
and the gaze of the Buddha meet in an openness of nature-spirit. It is for this 
reason that not only the Buddha's gaze on the flower offers us a new model 
through which we can see the living-world but the flower too:   
 
‘Between us we can train ourselves to be both contemplative 
regard and the beauty appropriate to our matter, the spiritual and carnal 
fulfilment of the forms of our body. Pursuing this simultaneously natural 
and spiritual meditation of a great Eastern sage, I'd say that a flower 
usually has a pleasant scent. It sways with the wind, without rigidity. It 
also evolves within itself; it grows, blossoms, grows back. Some of them, 
those I find most engaging, open with the rising sun and close up with 
the evening. There are flowers for every season. The most hardy of them, 
those least cultivated by man, come forth while preserving their roots; 
they are constantly moving between the appearance of their forms and 
the earth's resources. They survive bad weathers and winters. There are 
the ones, perhaps, that might best serve us as a spiritual model’ (ILTY, 
25)   
 
In short, we can cultivate ourselves, remaining in the body, and 
learning from the simple living-world around us by looking in a different way 
and appreciating the aliveness of a thing. The flower as a living-thing offers us 





does not mean he renounced life (BEW, 36). In fact, he returned to it. We can 
see then that it is not only the Buddha who serves as a guide for our spiritual 
cultivation but the flower too. The Buddha gazing at the flower (can we also say 
the flower gazing at the Buddha?) offers us a unified but still differentiated 
living model which guides us towards our own cultivation. As she says: 'the 
Buddha's gazing at a flower might provide us with a model. So might the flower’ 
(LTY, 25).  
 
Contemplation, such as the gazing upon a flower, offers us a model 
which cultivates our nature-spirit alongside and with a living-thing, which we 
might even say is cultivating its own nature-spirit. If we look at a flower in this 
way, then both ourselves and the living-thing are preserved as a living-subject 
and a living-thing: I-he (or I-she) and the living-thing are and remain 
transcendent to each other. Neither the flower, for example, nor ourselves, are 
reduced to an object for the other. For Luce Irigaray, to contemplate a living 
thing is to contemplate life. Life, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the 
invisible energy which pervades the vegetal, animal and (male or female) 
human realms.  
 
The perception and cultivation of the invisible is very important for 
Luce Irigaray’s thought.80 Here my reading focuses on the East-West dimension 
of invisible “energy”. In order to respect sexuate difference it is important to 
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understand that it does not ‘correspond to the respect of something visible, but 
of something invisible which results from a relation with oneself, with the other, 
with the world peculiar to each gender’ (BT, 147). Here we see again this 
threefold relationality of self, other and gender, and we see again a movement 
away from the realm of vision as a predominant mode of perception. Luce 
Irigaray draws our attention to the fact that ‘in Western philosophy the thought 
of the world as a living world no longer exists,’ nor she states, ‘does the thought 
of sexuate difference’ (BEW, 45). ‘Life is above all always individual, personal,’ 
but it is also 'always sexed’ it is two (LTY, 54). For her, a culture which fails or 
refuses to see the reality of a sexuately different other, also fails to perceive life 
as the invisible energy which permeates living-subjects and living-things. This 
cultivation of a living relationship generates this invisible living energy between 
us. By looking at a flower, our relation to the vegetal is cultivated, and we are 
brought to our own natural or living rhythm as a human being (Marder, 2014, 
227). Through this perception, we differentiate between living and non-living 
things; and, being able to perceive another thing as living (such as a plant, a 
tree, an animal) further opens up the possibility to see ourselves (male or 
female) also as a living-subject. This in turn means we are able to see another 
human being (male or female) as a living-subject, and it ensures we do not fall 
into the mistake of seeing them as mere objects. Finally, we might come to see 
the other as sexuately differentiated to us, by a living-difference.  
 
 





When Luce Irigaray discusses the Buddha looking at the flower she is, 
as already mendtioned, engaging with the thought of Hegel. For her, looking at 
a living thing such as a flower is a natural-spiritual method which transcends 
the distinction between nature and spirit set up by Hegel (Marder, 2014, 214). 
The need to overcome the split of spirit and nature found in Hegel's philosophy 
is paramount for her because a woman is condemned to nature and 
reproduction, while only a man becomes free in the realms of history, culture 
and politics, i.e., the higher realms of spirit which transcend nature and the 
family in the individual subject. According to her interpretation of Hegel, to 
achieve individuation as a subject is to transcend the family life and enter the 
public realm (ILTY; BSW; EIC). To remain in the family realm is to fail to attain 
to being an autonomous subject, and most importantly, this is only open to the 
father of the household. A woman is not capable of becoming a subject because 
she finds her place in the family as a mother; she is in fact limited to 
reproduction, and therefore, caught up in the objective world of nature, unable 
to ascend to the higher levels of spirit such as politics and culture (religion, art 
and philosophy.) Hegel is not the only philosopher guilty of setting up this 
division between nature and spirit. It is a common trend within the history of 
Western philosophy and Christian thought (Lloyd, 1993). Hegel is often seen as 
the apex of the Western tradition which unites Christianity and philosophy, so 
it could be for this reason that Luce Irigaray often focuses on Hegel. However, 
we cannot equate overcoming Hegel with overcoming the fundamental 
problems of Western philosophy. For her, Hegel appears to represent Western 






What is most interesting for us here is that Luce Irigaray is unique in 
her claim that the image of the Buddha looking at a flower is an exemplary 
model of a perceptual-spritual method which can overcome the dichotomies of 
Western thought. For her: 
 
‘What is remarkable in these traditions is the fact that thought 
is ready to listen to nature, to the sensible. The famous example of this is 
the Buddha contemplating a flower. For him, this gesture probably 
represents the perfect act since it respects nature while becoming 
spiritual. The overcoming of matter by spirit – the privileging of the 
speculative over the sensible is, therefore, no more. Buddha becomes 
spirit while remaining sensible, awakened flesh. Surely this is a fine 
lesson in love?’ (ILTY, 139-140) 
 
In fact, her interpretation of the Buddha, brings this way of thinking in 
to relation with Western philosophy in a very similar way to Nishitani Keiji, with 
the aim of overcoming the dichotomies of Western thought. For Luce Irigaray, 
through the cultivation of our perception of the vegetal, we become capable of 
overcoming the generally accepted division set up between the spiritual and the 
natural in Western philosophy (Marder, 2014, 214). This division plays out most 
prominently in the split between consciousness and matter, or mind and body, 
which is essentially a dualistic model of understanding ourselves. We saw this 
also in Nishitani Keiji’s thought – the split between self-consciousness and the 






By cultivating our perception of a living thing, as opposed to perceiving 
all things as mere objects (confusing living, non-living and/or constructed 
things) we simultaneously transform the thing we are looking at and ourselves. 
It is the Buddha that provides this model for a natural-spiritual practice:  
 
‘perception can be trained as a spiritual method. As such it 
becomes a means for respecting what exists, for contemplating it and 
achieving an ecstasy/in-stasy in relationship with the perceived. This can 
take place in the contemplation of nature: I am thinking about the gaze 
of Buddha towards the flower’ (TBT, 50)   
 
According to her what we can learn most from the Buddha is to remain 
sensible in our transcendence, and to find spirit-in-nature (or we might just as 
easily say nature-in-spirit). Spirit is no longer transcendent and therefore 
separate to nature as usually found in the Christian and Western philosophical 
tradition from Plato to Hegel. This means that we no longer aim to go outside 
of (or transcend) the world in order to realise the good, divinity, God or 
whatever the transcendent goal might have been. We do not aim to achieve an 
ek-stasis; rather, we aim to achieve an en-stasis: a realization of spirit in, and 
without leaving, the sensible (Lorraine, 1999;ADD REF). As we saw in the 
previous chapter, for her, and we might say for Nishitani Keiji too, Eastern 





us to remain in the body or the sensible corporeal while becoming divine and 
establishing a harmonious relationship to our body and the natural world as a 
living-world of which we are a part. The key point here is that:  
 
‘Buddha, for whom re-awakening takes place beginning from 
the contemplation of the most simple, of the most everyday, of the least 
extraordinary and violent: the contemplation of a flower … The 
perfection of the act is achieved through a cultivation of the senses … 
contemplation occurs in the encounter between two cultivated natures: 
between a flower as a production of the earth's beauty and the gaze of 
Buddha as the place where its body flowers, both of which are open 
thanks to the light of the sun, micro- and macrocosmic’ (TBT, 72-73)  
 
We can see here that for Luce Irigaray the Buddha returns to the 
simplest of everyday activities – the main tenet of Zen Buddhism too. We should 
note a sense of harmony or re-establishing of the relationship between 
macrocosmic and microcosmic which she highlights here. According to Luce 
Irigaray, a spiritual realisation in the sensible is a mediation which does not fit 
with the preference of the masculine subject's need for transcendence (in the 
traditional sense of going out of oneself, or out of the world to another world.) 
It is a new model for seeing things in the world; a sort of transcendence-in-
immanence or vice versa, what she calls a sensible-transcendent, and what I, 
following Nishitani Keiji (in translation) call transdescendence. As Tamsin 






‘The person who can experience life in its “authentic reality” is 
the person who is open to a sensible transcendental. This person is the 
lover of life who refuses to entomb herself in a sterile body and who 
instead encourages ceaseless transmutation of a self and world in living 
contact’ (1999, 70) 
 
In Luce Irigaray’s model, a man does not need to go out of himself to 
enter the spirit, as he did to construct his subjectivity through objects. Instead, 
he remains in touch with his body, his nature and his natural rhythm, which 
brings him to a sensible transcendental experience between the micro and 
macro cosmic. If this perceptual-spiritual practice is successful, then inevitably 
woman will be dislodged from her confusion with the world of 
reproduction/nature as found in Hegel's thought. This is because a man will no 
longer go out of himself into the realm of transcendence or spirit, and he will no 
longer leave behind nature for higher consciousness. He will not need to cut off 
nature, to establish consciousness. He will instead cultivate transcendence 
while remaining linked to life. A woman will not be left behind in the family, in 
the lower level of consciousness, which is still in fact on the level of mere nature 
as an object. A man will also be rooted there in nature as a male living-subject. 
A woman too then is conceivably capable of being a subject while remaining in 
nature; instead of being left behind there and subjugated to her reproductive 
function as a part of objective nature, she becomes capable of subjectivity in the 





in fact, I think, the main thrust behind Luce Irigaray’s Buddhism. 
 
Much like we saw earlier with Nishitani Keiji, for Luce Irigaray, the use 
of the Buddha image is in fact subversive of the Western masculine self-
consciousness. Interestingly, in his history of philosophy, Hegel locates the 
beginning of subjectivity as individuality with Buddhism (Park, 2010). For 
Hegel however, this individuality is not complete, precisely because it does not 
leave the natural realm. If Luce Irigaray is aware of this, then it provides another 
reason for her use of the Buddha image, as a model for overcoming what she 
sees as a misunderstanding made by Hegel. Sokthan Yeng, is to my knowledge 
one of the few scholars who has picked up on this (2014, 65-66). 
 
When asked where she took this image of the Buddha gazing at a flower 
from, Luce Irigaray's response was: ‘probably I read something about that, but 
I cannot give you the exact reference. I can say that I experienced it during a 
summer’ (CON, 43). We see then that it is an appeal to her own contemplative 
experience which she draws on to explain this image of the Buddha and the 
flower, not a traditional textual source. In fact, to my knowledge there is no such 
traditional textual source. There are numerous Buddhist texts where the 
presence of flowers is unmissable. These are found especially the later 
Mahāyāna texts; as examples, we can cite the Lotus sutra (named after a flower), 
the Nirvana sutra and the Vimalakirti sutra. These three texts contain 
references to various types of flowers and are used in abundance; as offerings 





Buddha, a Bodhisattva, a God or Goddess, or one of the Buddha's disciples. But 
within these texts we find no reference to the Buddha gazing or contemplating 
a flower.  
 
There is however, one mythical text which I think corresponds the 
closest to Luce Irigaray's image. This is the flower sermon of the Ch'an/Zen 
Buddhist traditions. The Flower sermon is the only example to my knowledge 
where the Buddha raises a flower.  
 
The Flower Sermon is the legendary/mythical origin of Zen (C. Cha'n) 
Buddhism. It is also case six of the mumonkan (C. wu-men kuan) a thirteenth 
century kōan (C. gōng'àn) collection known as ‘The Buddha holds out a flower’. 
The story goes that when ‘Śākyamuni Buddha was at Mount Grdhrakhuta, he 
held out a flower to his listeners. Everyone was silent. Only Mahākāśyapa broke 
into a broad smile. The Buddha said, “I have the True Dharma Eye, the 
Marvellous Mind of Nirvana, the True Form of the Formless, and the Subtle 
Dharma Gate, independent of words and transmitted beyond doctrine. This I 
have entrusted to Mahakashyapa’ (Sekida, 2005, 41).81 However, the key 
difference here is that the flower appears to be cut from nature, as far as we 
know, and it is for another to observe, and not the Buddha himself who looks at 
it. It is traditionally seen as the passing on of the fundamental non-dual insight 
of Zen. We cannot assume that Luce Irigaray knows of this text or whether this 
                                                             





is the text she read and forgot. If this is where she takes the imagery from, and 
I very much doubt it, she has given it a new non-traditional meaning in her own 
weaving between traditions.  
 
I think it is safe to say that there is no gazing at a flower as a practice 
as such found in Buddhist texts. There are several texts where the presence of 
flowers is unmissable, but there are no texts where the image of the Buddha 
looking at a flower is presented as an actual teaching. And, moreover, that the 
teaching presented is anything like the one Luce Irigaray suggest in her own 
text.82 We must conclude that her Buddha gazing at the flower is an image of 
her own making; an imaginary teaching that serves the purposes for the 
realisation of her own thought, especially in relation to nature and the vegetal. 
It is strange that not a single commentator has picked up on this most 
significant point. I am almost certain that the image Luce Irigaray is using, is 
inspired by Jiddu Krishnamurti and one of his many examples of looking at 
flowers.83 After all, he was, for her, ‘the Buddha of our time’ (BEW, 47). The key 
point for our discussion below is that the flower was clearly cut from nature, 
and not viewed in nature as Luce Irigaray contemplates. This distinction makes 
a clear difference between seeing a flower in nature, and seeing a flower cut from 
nature, and it suggests, that Luce Irigaray is reifying life, in the eyes of Nishitani 
Keiji as we shall see.  
                                                             
82 Michael Marder, following Luce Irigaray, speculates on the kind of flower (water lily) the 
Buddha is looking at in his The philosopher’s plant (2014), but this is a speculation on a 
speculation and has no substance at all. 
83 This is outside the realm of what I am trying to do in this thesis. Nevertheless, please see the 








5.5. Nishitani Keiji’s re-interpretation of Ikebana 
In the previous chapter we saw how Nishitani Keiji’s Zazen practice is 
fundamental to understanding his standpoint of śūnyatā. Here we shall focus 
on the aesthetic, understood as both the classical Greek understanding of 
sensory and perceptual experience, as well as the modern interpretation as 
relating to an art form. We shall do so through Nishitani Keiji’s article on 
Japanese Ikebana – the art of flower arranging.  
 
Nishitani Keiji often uses the example of looking at a flower in his 
writings to demonstrate or clarify his ideas. Unlike Luce Irigaray he does not do 
so with reference to the Buddha. But, we should note that the Buddha raising a 
flower in front of his congregation, and Mahakyshapa, one of his senior disciples 
smiling at this act, is the mythical act which marks the beginning of Zen 
Buddhism. So there is a hidden or deeper cultural reference potentially taking 
place here between Nishitani Keiji's discussion of a flower, the insight through 
seeing this flower, and the broader Zen Buddhist traditions.  
 
In his writings, Nishitani Keiji refers to looking at a flower several 
times, in order to show several different aspects of his thought. For instance, in 





(RN, 101). In his essay Religious-philosophical existence (1990) he makes direct 
reference to seeing the flower in emptiness, and in his The significance of Zen 
in modern society (1975) Nishitani Keiji uses the example of looking at a flower 
and absorption once more: ‘looking at a flower, he throws his whole being into 
that flower’ he risks his whole self in a total absorption resulting in a new being 
or new self-awareness, as non-dual. And finally, in his The Japanese Art of 
Arranged Flowers ([1975] 1995) he discusses the Japanese art of Ikebana, 
where the practitioner of Ikebana creates an “open space” of emptiness 
(śūnyatā) through the arrangement of the flowers. Creating a space where we 
can see the flowers in śūnyatā demonstrating that the practitioner creates the 
space from a place of non-attachment and non-duality, while bringing this 
insight to life for the viewer, so that they too may sense this place or space of 
non-attachment and non-duality through the act of seeing. Creating this space 
through Ikebana makes it possible for another to see in emptiness or recognise 
this emptiness. This is his most comprehensive example of the flower and 
śūnyatā in practice, therefore, we shall focus on it here. It should be noted 
however, that in all these examples we see a perceptual-sensory-bodily 
experience combined with an aesthetic shift in self-understanding. They are 
examples of, or even better evocations of, a person becoming one's true self or 
realizing one's self in an encounter between a subject and a natural thing; where 
in the encounter itself this dichotomy is overcome through a unifying and direct 
realization of one's self, which takes place through the act of presenting and/or 
viewing the flower i.e., a transcendent-sensible or transdecendent experience.  
 





discusses the cutting of flowers and their arrangement in a vase.84 Through his 
poetic analysis of Ikebana, he shows us the double exposure encapsulated in this 
fundamental thought of śūnyatā. Even though it is about a classic art of 
Japanese culture there is no doubt that such an art, for Nishitani Keiji, embodies 
the Zen Buddhist way. And each of his poetic descriptions of the cutting, 
preparing and displaying of the flower in emptiness resonate with the Buddhist 
path in general and his teaching of śūnyatā, as we can see, if we jump a little 
ahead in our own analysis: 
 
 ‘The flowers are simply there, in their correctness. While 
sending forth a faint coolness from within a fathomless composure – like 
a person who has eradicated all attachments to life and abandoned all 
the expectations fundamental to our mundane existence – through 
complete silence they communicate that which is eternal’ (CF, 26)     
 
Firstly, let us consider the double exposure. In a personal anecdote of 
Nishitani Keiji's, he weaves together the poetry of Basho, the gospel of Mark, 
T.S. Eliot and a saying of one of the Zen patriarchs. He is walking along the 
Ginza, and what he calls a double exposure of a life-death/death-life perspective 
emerges as an insight into the human predicament: 
 
                                                             
84 We should note here that this article is a response to an essay written by Jean Paul Sartre on 





‘There is no need for the actual buildings to crumble and go to 
seed. One can see the Ginza, for instance, just as it is, in all its 
magnificence as a field of Pampas grass.85 One can look at it as if it were 
a double exposure – which is, after all, its real portrait. For in truth, 
reality itself is two-layered. A hundred years hence, not one of the people 
now walking on the Ginza will be alive, neither the young nor the old, the 
men nor the women. As the old saying goes, “With a single thought, ten 
thousand years. And with ten thousand years, a single thought.” In a flash 
of lightning before the mind’s eye, what is to be actual a hundred years 
hence, is already an actuality today. We can look at the living as they walk 
full of health down the Ginza and see, in double exposure, a picture of 
the dead. Basho’s lines are about the Ginza’ (RN, 51)    
  
This image is one where nihility (death) and self-consciousness (life) 
are unified and seen as a double exposure – each one being necessary for the 
other, and in no way being hierarchically related, but rather deeply entwined 
together in an inseparable manner; without self-consciousness we cannot know 
time or death, and without nihility, there would be no time or self-conscious life. 
These are two sides of the totality of reality, the third side being the standpoint 
of double exposure: seeing them both simultaneously, i.e., śūnyatā. Let's look 
at this with respect to the flowers in Nishitani Keiji's art of Ikebana. 
                                                             
85 Here he is referring to Basho’s Haiku:“Lightning flashes-Close by my face. The pampas 







Firstly, Nishitani Keiji clearly differentiates between the flower 
growing in the field and the flower which has been cut for the art of Ikebana. 
For him, this difference is one between nature or life and emptiness. It is also 
the difference between two kinds of art:  
 
‘One is an art directly in life, and the other is an art alive in 
death … One kind of art seeks eternity by denying temporality, and the 
other tries to unveil eternity by being thoroughly temporal. The former 
arises out of the natural will or desire of life, and the latter arises out of 
emptiness which has severed that natural will or desire’ (CF, 26)  
 
For him, a flower growing naturally is trying to deny time. All things in 
nature, including people, try to deny time through their growth and their 
striving (and their will in the case of people.) Trees or grass or flowers all resist 
the pull within themselves that is working towards their own cessation. Instead 
they strive upwards to the sunlight, the rain and the wind, to receive the 
nutrients they require to live. They struggle against gravity growing out of the 
earth and continually going beyond themselves, all in an attempt (unconscious 
admittedly) to deny the pull of death. This underlying death, or put another way 
nihility, separates me from the flower. We are all cast over a nihility. To quote 






‘Take the tiny flower blooming away out in my garden. It grew 
from a single seed and will one day return to the earth, never again to 
return so long as this world exists. Yet we do not know where its pretty 
little face appeared from nor where it will disappear to. Behind it lies 
absolute nihility: the same nihility that lies behind us, the same nihility 
that lies in the space between flowers and me. Separated from me by the 
abyss of that nihility, the flower in my garden is an unknown entity’     
(RN, 101) 
   
The essential difference then between a flower in nature and the flower 
in Ikebana is that this striving has been cut off. The cutting of the flower takes 
it out of this life struggle and the cutting itself is the mark of the difference 
between Ikebana and other arts.86 As Nishitani Keiji states Ikebana is different. 
From the position of the practitioner, the art reflects the mind of the artist. 
Therefore, like breathing in Zazen, there is no denial of time; likewise in 
Ikebana, in the midst of time we move along ‘without the slightest gap’ (CF, 24). 
Ikebana, therefore, is the cutting act which demarcates life (with its resistance 
to nihility) and śūnyatā (the transdescendence of this dichotomy): 
 
‘the severing of this very life of nature. Flowers in the field or 
garden pollinate in order to procreate. [They are attempting to deny 
                                                             
86 It should be noted that Kiru “to cut” is an important aesthetic concept in Japanese thought. 
It is found in Ikebana, swordmanship and even film. See, Parkes’ Japanese aesthetics (2017) 






time.] This is part of the natural will or desire of life. The arranged flower 
has had this will or desire cut off. It is rather in the world of death, poised 
in death. It has become severed from the life which denies time, and has 
itself entered time and become momentary’ (CF, 25)  
 
In other words, its nihility has become apparent and yet it is not the 
mere nihility of seeing the flower, against myself over there in the field, nor is it 
seeing a withering flower which is dying a mere natural death. The flower cut in 
the manner of Ikebana is removed from its life struggle, and its nihility is now 
revealed in its emptiness. In his own words Nishitani Keiji sets up the 
juxtaposition for us: 
 
‘While the life of nature has temporality as part of its essence, it 
goes against and conceals that essence. Nature exists as if it were trying 
to slip away from time. On the other hand, the flower with its roots cut 
off has, in one stroke, returned to its original, essential fate in time. This 
is not the life of a flower in nature. The flower cannot do this by itself. It 
is merely man's caprice to force the flower against its natural will or 
desire. The flower is thus made to stand poised in its hidden essence, to 
reveal that essence’ (CF, 25) 
 
We should recognise here that the translation again of Ningen is 





is an art whereby a man or woman take a flower from its natural state and make 
with it something for their own gratification, or, as we see in Nishitani Keiji's 
thought, they demonstrate a way of being such as śūnyatā. The concealed 
essence of temporality is brought out for us to see, and therefore, to see in 
ourselves: our life is revealed to us in seeing the flower. What is required is this 
double exposure which is captured by the cutting off of life and of time. I quote 
at length: 
 
 ‘From the perspective of their fundamental nature, all things in 
the world are rootless blades of grass. Such grass, however, having put 
roots down into the ground, itself hides its fundamental rootlessness. 
[This was also the perspective of ordinary or everyday life that we saw 
in chapter four; that things and people appear to have roots, that we go 
about in an unexamined manner, in short, in the illusion of self-
conscious subsistence.] Through having been cut from their roots, they 
are, for the first time, made to thoroughly manifest their fundamental 
nature – their rootlessness. [In the case of the flower, the cutting; in the 
case of things, their perishing; in the case of man, the doubting of his or 
her self-existent self or to face death.] To be shifted from the world of life 
into the world of death is, for the flower, a kind of transcendence. The 
flower made to stand upon death has been cut off from the constructs of 
time that occur in life, and it is just as though it stands in the timeless 
present; its evanescent existence of several days becomes a momentary 
point in which there is no arising or perishing. The flower is shifted to 





manifestation of eternity that has emerged in time’ (CF, 25)87 
 
Although gradually more abstract, this excerpt clarifies the relation 
between life, death, time and transcendence. The essence of the flower is 
fundamentally altered by it being removed from its natural situation. This 
removal brings its essence onto the field of death, but, for a moment, it is still 
living; albeit cast over this death. It is now shown to be rootless, whereas before 
it hid this rootlessness in its desire and striving for life. In its cut placement, it 
is now transcendent, still of this world, still alive, but with its underlying nihility 
or death now revealed. The flower stands for several days poised in this life-
death position. This is transcendence as the double exposure of life and death, 
death and life. It is the same as the inhalation and exhalation of zazen, and it is 
the demonstration of śūnyatā. Let us see how this manifests within the art itself: 
 
‘Probably the person who arranges the flowers senses these 
things, either consciously or unconsciously – for example, when he or 
she places them in the tokonoma [a built in space such as an alcove or 
recess where art works are usually displayed] and gives them the space 
they are to dominate. Within that space, the flowers exist with solemnity, 
floating in emptiness, just as though they have emerged from 
nothingness. The space about them, the space of the entire room, is 
drawn taut by the existence of the flowers, just as if it had received a 
                                                             





charge of electricity, and the air takes on a tension and gravity. The 
flowers, through the certainty with which they occupy the space, sweep 
clear the atmosphere. The flowers themselves, however, have no 
awareness or intention of doing this. The sweeping clear of the air about 
them is the response of the space of nothingness’ (CF, 25-26)88 
 
And here in the text the earlier quotation is repeated, that the flowers 
are simply there, that they give a coolness, that the artist was unattached, that 
this all sits together in a silent space of emptiness (CF, 26). Nishitani Keiji's 
evocative analysis of Ikebana shows us both his sensibility to life and death, and 
the role that art plays between them. Moreover, it demonstrates for us this 
double exposure in relation to an artist, to zazen, to certainty and doubt, and 
even to time. In fact, the fundamental point in this essay is time, however, our 
focus is not time as such but rather śūnyatā: 
 
 ‘the essence of the plant being turned into art lies in the 
aforementioned activity of cutting the plant. With this activity, the 
emptiness … which lies hidden in the depths of the plant is unveiled’ (CF, 
26)  
 
Śūnyatā (emptiness) takes place owing to the double exposure of both 
                                                             





life and death in the cutting of the flower and its presentation. Poised in the 
tokonoma for several days, the flowers draw tight the atmosphere, and people 
sense śūnyatā. This is made possible through the artist's disposition (i.e., a non-
self or pure subject acting in emptiness) and the flower's presentation of life and 
death unveils śūnyatā. That is, it reveals our inherent nature as non-self.  
 
 
5.6. Concluding remarks on flower viewing 
Juxtaposing this to what we have seen with Nishitani Keiji's version of 
flower viewing, we can see some a significant difference in perspective. For him, 
what is most important to see life and nihility simultaneously, is the cutting of 
the flower and its removal from the natural state in which we find it. This is 
because the flower in its natural state conceals its nihility through its striving 
and growth. We can assume therefore, that viewing a flower in its natural 
environment for him, does not offer us a viable contemplation of life. A cut 
flower, placed in the tokonoma, offers us something which is for him clearly 
more significant but, which does not disregard the dimension of life. On the 
contrary, we are able to see life in its true rootlessness by removing it from its 
position in mere nature and bringing out its hidden nihility or struggle against 
death. The flower, now poised for our viewing, gives us this double exposure of 
life-death, death-life, from which we can “sense” śūnyatā in the atmosphere. It 






Unless we reveal the flower in its essence as śūnyatā by bringing it out 
to be seen in both of its dimensions simultaneously, we fall into an essentialism 
of the life dimension – by establishing a sort of reified thing on the field of 
consciousness. Recall above, the key quote where viewing a flower in nature:  
 
‘we do not know where its pretty little face appeared from nor 
where it will disappear to. Behind it lies absolute nihility: the same 
nihility that lies behind us, the same nihility that lies in the space 
between flowers and me. Separated from me by the abyss of that nihility, 
the flower in my garden is an unknown entity’ (RN, 101) 
 
In short, without a double exposure of life and death we risk falling into 
a false way of viewing anything (whether a flower, a Buddha, or ourselves). If 
we attempt to see these things without the insight of śūnyatā then we remain 
separated over an abyss of nihility, and we fail to see ourselves as we truly are.   
 
However, from Luce Irigaray’s perspective, we cannot see the vegetal 
and life if we do not acknowledge sexuate difference. For example, was it a man 
or a woman who cut and placed the flowers in the tokonoma? Was this person 
a pure male or pure female subject? These questions must be asked if we are to 
take into consideration sexuate difference, and to see life as it is always sexed. 
Therefore, the failure to acknowledge the sexuate nature of the artist, and the 





anyone to see, is to over emphasise death or nihility in Luce Irigaray’s eyes and 
risks the likelihood of furthering a nihilistic self-understanding.   
 
Expanding on this then, and in order to find a balance between 
Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray, my own position, would be that the fact of 
birth must be balanced with the fact of death, and the fact of death must be 
balanced with the fact of birth. Luce Irigaray presents a position strongly based 
on birth, which in many ways is an attempt to balance the prejudice of what she 
considers to be the masculine Western philosophical tradition’s focus on death 
(something we could criticise Nishitani Keiji for too). By recognising the fact of 
birth and thinking it through as Luce Irigaray demands us to, and if we slightly 
modify Nishitani Keiji's position to acknowledge that everyone who is alive is 
suspended between birth and death (rather than life and death) then I think we 
start to see a more balanced position established dynamically between them – 
without birth there is no death, and without seeing both in every living moment, 
we fail to see life at all, and therefore, we fail to see the sexuate nature of life. 
 
Life is always born, sexuately different, and always suspended over 
death which can come at any moment. The flower is overtly sexual, the man or 
woman who looks at the flower and/or cuts the flower is also sexuate. In many 
ways, we must both see the flower in nature and contemplate it, and then cut it  
and place it in a space appropriate to it, so that I and the other can both see the 
flower suspended in its true essence – neither natural or cultural but empty of 





can become visible too; through their relation to birth-death, and life. This is 
śūnyatā which includes the sexuate nature of life, and which is made available 
in this case, through nature brought into conjunction with art.  
 
 
5.7. Luce Irigaray and the problem of non-duality 
The most significant problem I must address in Luce Irigaray’s 
Buddhism, which is perhaps more relevant to her interpretation of Yoga, and 
crucial for my understanding of non-he and non-she, is that of non-duality. The 
problem is that Luce Irigaray has issues with the idea of non-duality as a 
oneness which we are all reduced to.  
 
The issue of non-duality as it pertains to the ethical self has been raised 
by Erin McCarthy (2014), who conceives of Luce Irigaray’s understanding of 
intersubjective relations as a form of non-duality. This is the basis of her 
comparison with the thought of Watsuji Tetsuro, whose understanding of 
intersubjective relations as ningen, is also considered to be based on a non-dual 
conception of self-other relations. This non-duality and its relation to 
Buddhism, Tantra and sexuality has also been looked at by Sokthan Yeng (2013; 
2014). Here Sokhtan Yeng focuses mostly on Buddhism and Buddhist Tantra, 
and not Yoga as such. In this section, the subject as non-dual because it is 
fundamentally intersubjective is not the primary issue. Non-duality here is 





might find in a self-understanding with a subject-object or a mind-body 
dichotomy. The clearest example of such a dichotomy found in the Western 
philosophical tradition is that of Descartes, where the res extensa and the res 
cogitans are two distinct and separate substances which along with God make 
up “reality”. There are other ways of conceptualising the inner and the outer, or 
the mind and the body (as we have already touched upon) but here, in general, 
the issue is the separation that can occur between a subject and the outer world, 
and that this is often conceived of in terms of a subject, over and against a world 
of objects, as we saw in chapter three. As we have seen, a non-dual experience, 
is one where such divisions fall away, usually resulting in, or from, a direct 
experience of some unifying reality or oneness. For Nishitani Keiji, this was best 
captured by reality realising itself (RN, 5) and his breakthrough to nihility, and 
then to the non-self understood on the field of śūnyatā. As far as we can tell, 
this appears to be precisely the kind of non-dual experience Luce Irigaray has 
issues with.  
 
Luce Irigaray’s understanding of Yoga and non-duality, appears to be 
drawn from her reading of Patañjali.89 There are several references to him in 
her texts, here we see one in relation to looking at things:  
 
‘the question of looking at and contemplating is also present in 
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treatise on Yoga, with its famous opening which defines yoga as the stilling of the ‘whirls of 





The Yoga Sutras of Patañjali. But Patañjali often speaks about objects, 
material or mental, and about the necessity of overcoming the subject-
object duality’ (CN, 43) 
 
Luce Irigaray interprets the Buddha and Buddhism as a return to 
nature, by considering the perception of the invisible living energy between us 
and living-things, and this is, for her, more important than overcoming the 
subject-object division (CN, 41). For her, it is enough if we can reach a state 
close to the non-duality of Patañjali while remaining linked with life:  
 
‘The flower as such is not absolutely necessary for me to remain 
in myself. But it can help me because it is autonomous with respect to 
me, and it is also a living being. Thus I can concentrate and contemplate 
looking at a flower. And I can reach in this way a state of energy close to 
that described by Patañjali without for all that having to remove the 
flower as such’ (CN, 43) 
 
Luce Irigaray, as we saw, wants to achieve her sensible-transcendental 
insight into life, through nature, while never leaving it. She does not want to 
enter a non-dual state, but she does want to come close to it. What is clear is 
that Luce Irigaray does want the subject and object relationship to be a fluid 
one, meaning that the two intertwine to varying degrees, and as we saw in the 





with nature as a blend of rhythms to underpin this fluidity. The Buddha, as we 
saw, was also in a fluid relation to the natural world as a pure subject. Therefore, 
she does not want a non-dual (oneness) which is reached outside of one's self or 
one which negates the body and the sensible. She wants to use the example of 
the contemplation of the flower to show the kind of state she prefers us to reach, 
and one which will also preserve sexuate difference thereby establishing 
difference between men and women. In her example of the Buddha, the Buddha 
maintains this macro-micro relationship, whereas, for her, Yoga is spoken of as 
a union.  
 
In short, overcoming the subject-object dichotomy is not acceptable for 
Luce Irigaray, because sexuate difference is an irreducible difference which 
depends on the objectivity of gender. For her, as we saw in the introduction, the 
fluid interplay of subjectivity and objectivity must be maintained for her 
fundamental thought of sexuate difference to remain irreducible. To reduce the 
dimensions of our subjectivity (our horizontal transcendence) and our 
objectivity (gender) to the same, i.e., oneness, is to reduce what she wants to 
posit as a primary and irreducible difference, i.e., sexuate difference, also to a 
oneness. This reduction of everything to the same, is for her, nihilistic. I think 
that in Luce Irigaray’s thought, her fear is that a non-dual experience is 
fundamentally one which negates our body, which she must maintain if we are 
to allow for sexuation, sexuate belonging and sexuate difference, through the 






We cannot go into detail here, but it is important to note that Luce 
Irigaray is once again making sweeping statements concerning Yoga and 
Buddhism. Specifically, to Patañjali as Feuerstein rightly points out, in classical 
yoga is understood to have a very firm duality of consciousness and 
manifestation, ‘classical Yoga avows a strict dualism between Spirit (purusha) 
and cosmos (prakriti)’ (1998, 4). In fact, Patañjali is the right branch of Yoga 
to support Luce Irigaray’s thought, at least in the sense of a clear duality being 
maintained – although this may still cause problems for sexuate difference. 
Also, we can note that there is a lot of cross-over between Patañjali and 
Buddhism (Feuerstein, 2008, 213-214). However, in Luce Irigaray’s 
interpretation they are seemingly different, something which not much of the 
scholarship picks up on and confuses. This is another one of the repercussions 
of her own homogenisation and interpretation of Eastern traditions, which is 
not clearly examined in the scholarship. Her work we must remember is 
inspirational at best, and her use of Eastern practices is the focus, not her 
reading of its philosophy.  
 
We should note that Luce Irigaray does not deny non-duality as a 
possibility. She simply wants to allow for difference to be maintained, so she can 
ground the universality of sexuate difference in fluid relations between living 
subjects and objects. For her the universal is two: male and female; and 
oneness, could erase this. She does not want a transcendence outside of the 
world, she always wants to establish a two-ness, with both man and woman 
having their own appropriate mediations for their own bodies and sense of self 





cultures. For man, as we have seen this takes place through the mediation of an 
object. It is therefore unsurprising that his transcendence is either outside of 
himself (like an object) and the world (beyond all objects), or, as Luce Irigaray 
claims in the case of Patañjali a realization of oneness in non-duality. All of 
which surmount the subject-object division in a manner which suits the 
masculine subject's needs.  
 
Now we get to the crux of Luce Irigaray position, this need to overcome 
duality is a masculine need, ‘from a masculine point of view it is fitting to 
surmount this duality, because it generally corresponds to an inability of the 
subject to stay in the self’ (CN, 43). This refers to the male subject's need to go 
out of himself in order to become that very male subject he is. He does not 
remain in the sensible, in his gendered body, and in relation to his birth; instead 
he seeks outside of himself, to break with his mother in his construction as a 
subject. It seems here that Luce Irigaray suggests that overcoming the subject-
object dichotomy is an appropriate mediation for a man because he already 
prejudices this relationship to objects, and the outside of himself, in the 
constitution of himself as a subject. By overcoming the division between himself 
and objects he returns to himself. According to Luce Irigaray, it may be that 
such a mediation is appropriate from a masculine perspective, but not from the 
perspective of a woman, which privileges the intersubjective dimension in the 
construction of a female subject. Yoga as a union between the inner and the 
outer, or some mode of overcoming the subject/object division, may therefore, 
not be suitable for a woman at all, and nor therefore, would the practices of 






Therefore, Luce Irigaray’s idea of a pure subject (such as we saw with 
the Buddha) must remain dual for her fundamental thought of sexuate 
difference to be maintained as a play between subjective transcendence and 
objective gender. This we must envision as resulting in two possibilities as a 
pure subject, male or female, and their two respective cultural worlds: 
masculine or feminine. A pure subject, whether a man or a woman, must reach 
an ‘en-stasis in oneself while intensely living’ (CN 43). For her, as we shall see 
below, this permits both an easier passage to daily existence and to relations 
with other living beings. As we saw in the previous chapter, in zazen, it is 
precisely such an en-stasis which was also being advocated by Nishitani Keiji in 
his realization of śūnyatā: a realization which never leaves this world and 
returns transfigured but immediately in the everydayness of life. The only 
question would be, how does this work in relation to living things, and to 
another who is different, i.e., a woman? And can we work towards an 
understanding of non-self as non-he and non-she? 
 
 
5.8. Nishitani Keiji, flowers in non-duality  
Nishitani Keiji’s understanding of the self at its most fundamental level 
is what we have called no-self. The no-self, is a self that interpenetrates all things 
and which all things interpenetrate (Unno, 1989, 317). In Religion and 





a term coined by Nishitani Keiji.90 As we shall see, the key to this non-self is 
the same as Luce Irigaray’s pure subject: it is a self which is non-attached, free 
from desire for objects, and it is a self which is deeply related to others and the 
world around him or her. It is not therefore, a transcendent non-self lost in the 
non-differentiation of oneness.  
 
The main point for us to grasp is that the no-self is in a relationship of 
reciprocal penetration with each and everything (Unno, 1989, 317), does not 
lose itself in a mass of non-differentiation or oneness, as Van Bragt (1990, 301) 
explains:  
 
‘Nishitani is careful to avoid associating “oneness” with any of 
the metaphysical overtones or logical obligations that it has in Western 
philosophy when he speaks of something “becoming one” with 
something else … It is the circuminsessional [i.e., interpenetrational] 
oneness that is intended here, a oneness that admits of opposites coming 
together in a [reciprocal] relationship’  
 
                                                             
90 Van Bragt does not consider the term have the same meaning as circuminsession, as found 
in the theological tradition where it stands for the reciprocal existence of the three persons of 
the trinity (1990, 195). Stambaugh however, in her excellent essay The Formless Self (1999) 
says that circum with its sense of moving around might be ‘a bit misleading’ and that ‘in fact, 
circuminsessional and interpenetration almost seem to contradict each other’ (1990, 150). I 





The oneness of Western metaphysics leads is to nihility, not śūnyatā. 
A self which is on the field of consciousness, as we saw earlier, is separated from 
all things on an internal and external divide and comes to see itself as separate. 
A self on the field of nihility has broken free of such a divide but is now 
suspended over an abyss of nothingness. The self that realises itself as 
interpenetrational is a self which is fundamentally returned to itself in a new 
mode of being, as Unno (1989, 317) explains, the self which is in an 
unobstructed interpenetrational relationship with all things:  
 
‘does not mean a simple identification or oneness, the 
elimination of multiplicity. Rather, it affirms the real suchness of each 
independent and autonomous “in-itself” without negating multiple 
realities’  
 
Another term Nishitani Keiji uses for this is ‘the middle’. Each non-self 
and each thing exists most fully as themselves when they are realized as this 
interpenetrational reality: ‘such a mode of being is the mode of being of things 
as they are in themselves, their non-objective, “middle” mode of being as the 
selfness that they are’ (RN 150). Each thing and each non-self exists uniquely as 
itself, while at the same time each thing interpenetrates all other things and vice 
versa. We saw this in the last chapter, when Nishitani Keiji discussed the body 
and nature. The body is co-constitutive with nature and vice versa. This is why 
each and every one of us, is in fact absolute, and hence each one of us is in ‘the 





emptiness, emptiness is form’ a favourite of Nishitani Keiji’s which he often 
resorts to, to express his position. As Unno (1989, 317) again explains for us 
succinctly: 
 
‘It is not the case that the two are simply merged or collapsed 
into one; rather, when emptiness is affirmed, form is negated; and when 
form is affirmed, emptiness is negated. When this simultaneous negation 
and affirmation occurs not only among two things, A and B, but among 
multiple realities, infinitely and boundlessly, we have what is called 
“non-obstructed interrelationship’  
 
This is Nishitani Keiji’s interpenetrational self. It is ‘neither monistic 
or dualistic’ (Taylor, 1993, 66). We are one with all things (absolute) and we are 
uniquely ourselves (absolutely relative). We are absolute (singular/unique) and 
as interpenetrating all things and all things interpenetrating ourselves, we are 
also absolute (whole). We are each one of us held firm in the middle, between 
body-mind, between material-ideal, between self-things, between self-other. In 
a sense, we stand on that very between space that negates both and conjoins 
both simultaneously, especially our dichotomous thinking about these 
oppostites (Heisig,2001, 228).  
 
The overcoming of dialectical thinking and the separation of the world 





thorough realisation of egoteki or muga by each and every one of us, which is 
none other than the realisation of the non-self, which is in effect a realisation 
that takes place on the non-dual field of śūnyatā.91 Śūnyatā, as a field, binds 
each thing to each thing, as they reciprocally interpenetrate each other, 
constituting each other; but śūnyatā “itself” is not a thing, it is a term used to 
describe the true reality of each no-self that comes to realise itself on that same 
field of śūnyatā, i.e., śūnyatā itself is śūnyatā (RN, 106). This 
interpenetrational nature of existence, is one which allows for a maximum of 
fluidity between things (in Luce Irigaray’s terms), while making sure that each 
thing remains absolutely itself. It is hard to see where Luce Irigaray might have 
a problem with non-duality understood in these terms.  
 
For this realisation to occur we must no longer be attached to 
ourselves, or to things, or to concepts – body and mind must drop off. It is a 
separate dualistic self that lacks and requires things in order to fulfil itself. This 
is the desiring self, an ego, who desires things to complete themselves. This lack 
is in fact premised on a dualistic understanding of self and world. A self that is 
whole (absolute) and unique (absolute) is no longer bound by attachments to 
self-concepts, ideology or tangible things. The no-self is precisely this non-
attached self, the pure subject that does not desire to possess. The non-dual 
experience is an overcoming of the inner and the outer and with it we are no 
longer bound to anything, even our own identity. Each thing is its own, 
belonging and bound to no one. Again, we can see clearly that this is precisely 
                                                             
91 Unfortunately, Nishitani Keiji describes this as a ‘field of force’ (RN, 150-151) which we must 





one dimension which Luce Irigaray is putting forward through her image of the 
Buddha. The non-attached/non-possessive man, will allow space for woman to 
become a subject, and not confine her to being an object for himself. 
 
We can recall that the term for “itself” in Japanese is jitai (K.自体) 
which can be translated as itself, one’s own body, one’s self, or as originally, by 
nature, in the beginning, from the start. It is when we are at home to ourselves 
(ourselves as interpenetrative or muga) that the self exists firmly in the ‘middle’ 
realised as its own reality. These terms can be contrasted to jittai (K. 実体) which 
is to understand something as a substance or an object, and also to shutai (K. 
主体) which is the philosophical term used to understand something from the 
position of the subject as in Kantian thought (Unno, 1989, 308). Interestingly 
all of these terms use the kanji for body, posture or physique (体). Hence, in 
Nishitani Keiji’s terms we have a standpoint. It is a bodily perspective, but a 
body understood on a different field of existence, i.e., a divine body. Once again, 
I see this being completely in-tune with Luce Irigaray’s understanding of what 
is required for a man’s emancipation, and moreover, for a pure subject whether 
man or woman.  
 
And now perhaps we can understand the rather cryptic statement that 
Nishitani Keiji wants to make philosophy a thinking non-thinking. This of 





made by a no-self, that is a self no longer bound by the ego, and therefore, no 
longer a philosophy from the standpoint of a self-centred and self-attached 
understanding of the self or Shutai. This is position, I believe, is very similar to 
Luce Irigaray’s pure subject. It is a thinking from the vantage point of non-self, 
a non-dual viewpoint of self-things, self-world, self-other, without negating the 
body or this world where it stands. A standpoint of emptiness is from the 
transformed body, where: 
 
‘all attachment is negated: both subject and the way in which 
things appear as objects of attachment are emptied. Everything is now 
truly empty, and this means that all things make themselves present here 
and now, just as they are, in their original reality’ (RN, 34)  
 
We think ordinarily that we perceive things and ourselves in the right 
manner, whereas Nishitani Keiji’s point is that we see things from the 
prejudiced position of the subject as ego who is separate from the world of 
objects. When this duality drops away, we are not left with relative nothingness 
(this is the interim stage of nihility where all things become non-differentiated, 
a sort of philosophical dark night of the soul) nor are we ourselves nothing and 
non-differentiated in a oneness as Luce Irigaray fears, we are in fact truly 
ourselves for the first time and therefore we can perceive and think clearly for 






‘śūnyatā is the point at which we become manifest in our own 
suchness as concrete human beings, as individuals with both body and 
personality. And at the same time, it is the point at which everything 
around us becomes manifest in its own suchness’ (RN, 90)  
 
This position of the non-self is one of true freedom for Nishitani Keiji. 
A true freedom found in the body, from where we are emancipated from our 
misunderstanding and our conceptual conflicts: 
 
‘for as long as we do not step beyond the field of a fundamental 
separation of subject and object, a conflict between considering the 
object from the standpoint of the subject and considering the subject 
from the standpoint of the object will arise’ (RN, 35) 
  
Nishitani Keiji’s position of no-self, or non-ego, which is in essence a 
self grounded on non-attachment to itself or any concept or thing, because it 
exists as the absolute, right there in the middle and therefore is free from desire, 
is precisely the opposite of the Western liberal view of desire, where the subject 
pacifies itself on the field of self-consciousness with an endless stream of 
distractions (or of course, the other option, whereby we become mere objects in 
a mechanized world beyond our control.) Each of us is detached from any notion 
of our existence, we are unbound and unshackled, we are free from inner and 





misunderstanding ourselves on either the field of duality (self-consciousness) 
or the field of non-differentiation (nihility). This is emancipation according to 
Nishitani Keiji’s Buddhist way of thinking, and this is the realisation of śūnyatā 
as a self who is a non-self, or I might suggest, a pure subject in Luce Irigaray’s 
terms.  
 
So how can we conceive of this relationship between self and things 
without falling back into a dualism with its inherent conflict and dynamic of 
domination/subordination? Nishitani Keiji uses the terms master and 
attendant to explain the paradox and it ultimately is also used to understand 
our relationship to another self and non-self as we shall see in the following 
chapter. Here I succumb to the temptation to quote at length and leave it for the 
reader to fathom his words for themselves:  
 
‘That beings one and all are gathered into one, while each one 
remains absolutely unique in its “being,” points to a relationship in which 
… all things are master and servant to one another. We may call this 
relationship, which is only possible on the field of śūnyatā, 
“circuminsessional” [interpenetrational].  
To say that a certain thing is situated in a position of a servant 
to every other thing means that it lies at the ground of all other things, 
that it is a constitutive element in the being of every other thing, making 





master of itself. It assumes a position at the home-ground of every other 
thing as that of a retainer upholding his lord. The fact that A is so related 
to B, C, D … amounts, then, to an absolute negation of the standpoint of 
A as master, along with its uniqueness and so, too, its “being.” In other 
words, it means that A possesses no substantiality [jittai] in the ordinary 
sense, that it is a non-self nature [jitai]. Its being is a being in unison with 
emptiness, a being possessed of the character of an illusion.  
Seen from the other side, however, the same could be said 
respectively of B, C, D, … and every other thing that is. That is to say, 
from that perspective, they all stand in a position of servant to A, 
supporting its position as master and functioning as a constitutive 
element of A, making it what it is. Thus, that a thing is – its absolute 
autonomy – comes about only in unison with a subordination of all other 
things. It comes about only on the field of śūnyatā, where the being of all 
other things, while remaining to the very end the being that it is, is 
emptied out. Moreover, this means that the autonomy of this one thing 
is only constituted through a subordination to all other things. Its 
autonomy comes about only on a standpoint from which it makes all 
other things to be what they are, and in so doing is emptied of its own 
being’ (RN, 148) 
 
Śūnyatā is the field where nihility itself is negated, leaving us 
thoroughly on a field of non-duality, where each thing is as it is, while being 





other thing. We can see then that this is not a reduction of everything to the 
same; it is to realise that we are constituted by all things and we constitute all 
things, while at the same to realise simultaneously the uniqueness of each and 
every one, and thing. This means that each one of us is both master and servant 
to each thing and each other at one and the same time. This is a paradoxical 




5.9.  Concluding remarks 
What I have focused on in this and the previous chapter are practices 
which effect the relation between the body, the breath and the senses, to nature, 
birth, death and seeing life. It is clear that these practices are effected by 
gender/sex differences, and how we view them depends on our standpoint of 
interpretation as an I-he or an I-she. I am now tentatively able to envision a 
pure male and pure female subject, and therefore, two possible self-
understandings with different paths for working out the subject-object 
configuration, which constituted them as I-he and I-she in the first place.  
 
However, even if an I-he or I-she come to stand on a bridge between 
birth and death, from where either can see life and re-integrate themselves with 
a fluid relation to nature as sexuate on a field of śūnyatā, it is still not completely 





Buddhist infused philosophical practices. We have established that his oneness 
is not mere non-differentiation, but we are still left pondering if sexuate 
difference is erased by the insight of śūnyatā? It appears to be too radically 
inclusive, but I have shown that there is the potential of holding sexuate 
difference on the field of śūnyatā. Finally, to phrase it as a question: is man-
woman another dualism which will be overcome in the realization of śūnyatā? 














































The main aim of this chapter is to analyse Nishitani Keiji’s ‘Eastern’ 
influenced re-interpretation of the myth of the virgin birth, which overcomes 
the division between nature and spirit, and to see where this leaves the two sexes 
in relation to each other in śūnyatā. Nishitani Keiji does not go in to detail here, 
and he doesn’t take this into the realms of articulating any sexuate difference, 
or any relationship between the two sexes, or if the two sexes are neutralized in 
śūnyatā for instance; but he does lay the groundwork for that, along with an 
interesting discussion of virginity. My work here then is to think through how 
the two sexes relate to each other if they are ‘grounded’ on/in śūnyatā. In effect 
I want to take his thought a stage further while going in a slightly different 
direction: towards a meeting between him and Luce Irigaray, where we might 
bring together the insights of sexuate difference as found in Luce Irigaray, and 
śūnyatā as found in Nishitani Keiji, and envision two standpoints of non-he and 






There are two principle points of Luce Irigaray’s thought which we 
must address here in this chapter to complete my creative juxtaposition of her 
and Nishitani Keiji’s thought. The first, is the importance of virginity for the 
establishment of a female subject. The second, is how the myth of Mary, for her, 
offers a different way of weaving together the breath, the body and speech, while 
offering a model for intersubjective relations between two sexes who are 
different, i.e., the couple. These shall be woven together with further 
supplements from Nishitani Keiji’s own thought, specifically concerning the ‘I-
Thou’ relationship, so that we might come to a final position between them, 
concerning virginity, sexuate difference, śūnyatā and intersubjective relations. 
I begin with Nishitani Keiji’s surprising thought on virginity. 
 
 
6.2. Nishitani Keiji: Men and women in puritas 
We have seen already Luce Irigaray’s use of myth, and their 
reinterpretation through the lens of sexuate difference, to elucidate her own 
ideas on the self and our current cultural predicament. However, we have yet to 
touch on one of the most important dimensions of Nishitani Keiji’s thought: his 
re-interpretation of myth to gain insights into our self and reality, and our 
current epoch’s predicaments.  
 
In 1961, Nishitani Keiji wrote a contribution to the ‘Demythologizing 





connection to Rudolf Bultmann’s thesis on New Testament Hermeneutics. We 
shall not examine this debate here, although Nishitani Keiji himself briefly 
analyses it in the opening section of his essay.92 Bultmann is another – this time 
Theologian – heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger, whose demythologizing 
includes existential interpretation:  
 
‘To demythologize meant, in a general way, to strip away from 
the New Testament its antiquated world view, its objectifying 
conceptuality, its spatial and cosmological imagery. To engage in 
existentialist interpretation meant to set free the original understanding 
of existence offered in the New Testament proclamation from its 
mythological conceptuality through an expression in a form conceptually 
appropriate to it, i.e., the existentialist anthropological categories of 
Martin Heidegger’ (Johnson, 1974, 2) 
 
Here we shall focus on the section of the essay concerned with the 
reinterpretation of the myth of the Virgin Mary, and the possibility of what 
Nishitani Keiji calls a horizontal transcendence which overcomes the division 
between nature and spirit, and which is quite simply another name for śūnyatā.  
 
                                                             
92 For an extensive overview of this debate, which is far beyond the bounds of this thesis, 
please see Johnson The Origins of demythologizing: philosophy and historiography in the 
Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (1974). For a further analysis of Nishitani Keiji, see Heisig 





In the essay entitled ‘A Buddhist Voice in the Demythologizing Debate’, 
Nishitani Keiji offers his own thoughts on one of the fundamental myths from 
the New Testament: the myth of Mary remaining a virgin and giving birth to 
Jesus, the incarnation of God on earth. He mistakenly calls this the immaculate 
conception, which we should read as the theological doctrine in relation to the 
birth of Jesus, and not the theological doctrine concerning the birth of Mary 
herself.93 The myth of the virgin birth (of Jesus from Mary) has received 
significant attention in feminist and gender studies both within and without of 
Theological circles. Here I do not intend to critique or comment on the 
Theological tradition as such, nor the feminist critique of this tradition; but 
rather, to limit my own work to Luce Irigaray’s and Nishitani Keiji’s 
interpretations, and how they can supplement each other.  
 
For Nishitani Keiji, myth offers us a manner of recollecting in the 
present, a way of seeing the world which is ‘based on life, or organically 
animated nature’ in a pristine form (PM, 51). It is a form of interpretation 
therefore, which brings us somehow closer to this elusive “thing” we call life. By 
re-examining myth not as something from a remote past, but as something 
which is intuitively closer or more in-tune with life, we can come to glean 
insights for our time. For him, myth is somehow more intimate to our vital 
existence, somehow closer to our organically animated nature. This is because 
for Nishitani Keiji, myth is not some misguided old way of thinking but is in fact 
                                                             
93 As the translator themselves notes and clarifies in a footnote on page 10 of Nishitani Keiji’s 
article ‘A Buddhist Voice in the Demythologizing Debate’ (1991). Nishitani Keiji uses the term 
immaculate conception, by which he refers to the annunciation, that is the conception of Jesus 
through the Holy Spirit and Mary. The Immaculata Conceptio refers to the virgin conception 





‘the fountainhead of the present historical cultural life’ (PM, 52). We see then 
again that shared interest of fathoming, what is life? And interestingly, we see 
Nishitani Keiji discussing it in relation to birth; specifically, virgin birth.  
 
To investigate the myths of various cultures, therefore, is to examine 
the birth of those cultural horizons that in part constitute us, in a way which is 
intuitively and intimately closer to us. Myths, as we saw in Luce Irigaray too, 
allow us to open up the possibility of an interpretation from a standpoint which 
can offer us existential insight into ourselves and our current situation, even if 
those myths originated thousands of years ago. In this sense we can see his 
continuation of Bultmann’s own project and draw clear parallels between 
Nishitani Keiji’s thinking and the field of psychoanalysis, which also creatively 
re-interprets myth to be able understand ourselves in the present era. For him, 
the re-interpretation of myth is ‘to return to the mythical world as the genesis 
of every culture, namely, as an origin from which every culture came, as from 
the mother’s womb’ (PM, 52). An interesting image, considering Luce Irigaray’s 
use of the concept of a cultural placenta, and moreover, that one of his major 
essays on myth affords us a re-interpretation of the myth of the virgin Mary’s 
conception.  
 
In the essay, Nishitani Keiji’s interpretation immediately sets up a 
juxtaposition of two perspectives on the myth of the virgin mary; on the one 
side, it is fundamental to theology and religion, while on the other side, it is 





myth, for it exemplifies the contemporary debate between religion and 
science.94 On the one hand, a virgin birth is the most unacceptable of claims for 
a man and woman to believe in our modern epoch of scientific thinking (BVD, 
10). And on the other hand, it is an origin myth, crucial to theology and 
Christianity, which he sees as an important part of this very cultural horizon 
that constitutes us, and which is unacceptable to our modern scientific ears. The 
main point for us to grasp here is that Nishitani Keiji’s intention is to set up a 
juxtaposition of two different ways of seeing the origin myth of Christianity, one 
spiritual and one material, i.e., one according to theological thinking and one 
according to scientific thinking, which then leads us to an impasse. Therefore, 
what we need is a new interpretation which can hold together both viewpoints 
at once. To deal with this impasse Nishitani Keiji asks if there isn’t a way to give 
this myth a new meaning, he claims: 
 
‘there is a way, but only if the conception resulting from sexual 
relations according to the viewpoint of present day science and 
immaculate conception are recognized as two absolutely contradictory 
but coterminous events. The woman who has conceived and has thus lost 
her virginity, must at the same time remain a virgin’ (BVD, 12-13) 
 
                                                             
94  Nishitani Keiji claims, ‘the problem of religion and science is the most fundamental 
problem facing contemporary man’ (RN 46). Throughout his life, he considered this dialogue 
between the two disciplines (or the impossibility of dialogue between these two disciplines 
owing to their separation by an abyss) to be the most significant debate of his time. It is in fact 
precisely this reason why he has chosen this myth, because it strikes at the heart of the debate 





The example of a standpoint of śūnyatā is set out here through his re-
interpretation of the myth of the virginal conception of Jesus by Mary. For us to 
grasp this I must quote at length Nishitani Keiji’s continuation:  
 
‘The woman who has conceived and thus lost her virginity, must 
at the same time remain a virgin. If we understand this as the new 
“meaning” of the myth, in every “maculate,” or “stained,” woman there 
would always be a final dimension that is wiped of each and every stain. 
It is therefore, unacceptable to split body and spirit into two parts and to 
understand the whole in a spiritual way whereby the woman “stained” in 
the physiological sphere, is unstained in the spiritual sphere. In the 
problem of the virgin birth we are dealing with the locus of the 
physiological-natural, and not the spiritual. The phenomenon that we 
define and attempt to understand with the word “staining” must be seen 
from the unity and the whole that each human being is before it is split 
into the two spheres of the natural and the spiritual. This staining must 
be understood from the ground in which every woman is a whole and 
self-contained human being’ (BVD, 13) 
 
Now, we could simply dismiss the idea of staining and impurity of a 
woman through loss of virginity as being a false understanding and claim that 
all of this is just misguided musings on an out-of-date way of thinking; but, if 
we did that, we might miss something more interesting. We should remember 





necessarily his own position or choice of terms. What he is doing is 
reinterpreting the terms of that tradition and appropriating them according to 
his own insight; and in doing so, rather than rejecting, he rejuvenates tradition 
through dialogue. Therefore, let us continue to follow his trail of thought 
further:  
 
‘The circumstance that the woman, however stained she may be, 
is at the same time unstained, this belongs to that final dimension 
indicated above. When the whole is divided into the two spheres of the 
natural and the spiritual, various distinctions are made. For example, a 
person impure in the area of the physiological-natural can be pure in the 
area of the spiritual; a person can be impure in both areas or pure in both 
areas; a person can be pure in the area of the physiological-natural, but 
impure in the spiritual. But we are discussing a purity that lies in the 
original nature of the person prior to all those distinctions, a purity of 
absolute “non-differentiation.” We are dealing with the absolute purity 
present in the essence of human being in face of all natural purity and 
impurity, all spiritual purity and impurity. A man or woman may lose his 
or her purity in the corporeal and in the spiritual areas, but he or she still 
possesses that original Puritas’ (BVD, 13) 
 
It is a very interesting position that Nishitani Keiji is attempting to 
elucidate through the same terminology of the theological tradition, while 





What he is suggesting is that prior to the interpretation of myth by either the 
scientific or the theological standpoint (or we might add any other partial 
interpretation such as sociological, psychoanalytic, critical theory and so on) 
there is a more fundamental interpretation which is not based on the split 
between nature and spirit, or what we might call the scientific or religious 
perspectives, or in philosophical terms materialism and idealism (these are 
generalisations that Nishitani Keiji tends to make and they are somewhat 
exaggerated.) However, the point is that this more fundamental ground is one 
of non-differentiation, which is not nothingness in its relative sense – nihility – 
but rather nothingness in its absolute sense, that is emptiness or śūnyatā. And 
here, in theological terms, it is absolutely pure, we might say prior to all 
distinctions of purity and impurity, whether those distinctions are made from 
the perspective of spirit or nature. In some sense, what he is trying to get across, 
is that it is probably prior to all interpretation. A place from where a thing, our 
self, another, or the whole are seen in their original purity, prior to words and 
language (Heisig, 2003, 227). This is captured in the Latin term Puritas which 
means purity but also, the quality of being whole or complete. It is a standpoint 
– with all the nuances that Nishitani Keiji gives that word – from which I am 
whole, where, in this case, both sides of the argument are seen as perspectives 
and therefore limited, and from where both can be held with openness, 
simultaneously.  
 
It is therefore, a standpoint which ‘transcends’ the division of nature-
spirit, without leaving the body or the spirit out, or irreparably dividing them, 






‘Our division here has obviously transcended the dimensions of 
the natural and the spiritual. Yet it is impossible for us to imagine 
something in ourselves which, isolated from the natural and the spiritual, 
exists separately for itself. The absolutely unstainable part (of the 
person) does indeed completely transcend the unstained or stained 
corporeal-spiritual being, but in no way does it separate itself from this 
being. It is something entirely different from this being, but it is not an 
entirely different “something.” The absolutely unstainable and the 
corporeal-spiritual being are two and at the same time entirely one; 
entirely one and yet at the same time two’ (BVD, 13)  
 
Here we see Nishitani Keiji’s use of the division of one and two, two 
and one. It is an abstract formulation of the dialectical situation. Metaphorically 
this was expressed in the classical Buddhist tradition as water and waves. 
Nishitani Keiji himself uses it in an earlier essay, in his attempt to clarify this 
elusive concept:  
 
‘The waves and the water, it is said, are absolutely inseparable: 
there are no waves apart from the water and no water apart from the 
waves. And yet, we can neither call the waves “water” nor call the water 
“waves.” Water is not waves and waves are not water … both of them, the 







He goes on:  
 
‘Buddhism therefore speaks about “true emptiness.” This 
“emptiness” is the original ground or non-ground which allows all things 
to be as they exist and to exist as they are. “Emptiness” is nowhere and 
nevertheless there is “emptiness” everywhere that an entity exists in the 
whole and the particular. The water, too, is nowhere and nevertheless 
there is water everywhere that there are ocean waves. The water is 
neither the subjectum which unites all the waves, nor the subjectum that 
is the ground of all the waves’ (RPEB, 10-11) 
 
In the image of the water and the waves, as well as, the one-and-two, 
the two-and-one, the water does not underlie the waves or unite them in a 
substratum or ground - Subjectum here means ‘that which is spread out 
underneath’ (RN, 276) – in the same place the waves do not exist separately to 
the water. Water and waves, waves and water, are inseparable, neither is more 
primordial or separate and neither of them underlies or grounds the other. At 
the same time, there are two: water and waves. If we think in terms of water, we 
negate waves, and if we think in terms of waves we negate water. Water 
therefore, could be seen as the absolute (whole) here, and waves as the unique 






In even more abstract terms then, the one-and-two, the two-and-one, 
as a way of representing non-duality can be seen in the same manner. The two 
in the case of the myth of Mary is the corporeal-spiritual. This presupposes a 
split in the body and the spirit or mind (Heisig, 2001, 227). But more 
fundamental, is the “absolutely unstainable”, a third term which is prior to 
differentiation, that which is non-dual, and below/behind/beyond (none of 
these spatial terms really work) all dualistic interpretations of good-bad, 
internal-external, body-mind, self-other and so on. It is the place, as we have 
seen, where body-mind drop off, where all false distinctions and fantasies fall 
away. At the same time this is not a “something” which is separate from that 
corporeal-spiritual nexus. It is not a substratum or underlying substance. It has 
no independent existence, and it must be existentially realised between two 
opposites, for it to be possible. Before further commentary, I continue to quote 
at length:  
 
‘What consequences can be drawn if we assume in the 
fundamental nature of human existence an unlimited and simple 
immaculateness that transcends both what is stained and what is 
unstained (in body and in spirit), and if we must therefore assume that a 
man or a woman can only be comprehended in his or her true concrete 
wholeness when he or she is seen as a being that bears such a 
fundamental nature in itself? If we think along these lines, we can see the 





unstained body or in “one-ness” with stained or unstained spirit’       
(BVD, 15) 
 
Here we see that the perspectives of nature and spirit, stained or 
unstained, are ‘transcended’ by a standpoint that is realised by the whole 
concrete human being. It is an immanent transcendence, what he calls in 
Religion and Nothingness (1983) a trans-descend, or sometimes trans-
descendence.95 It is in effect a transcending by going down; a passing through, 
rather than a rising above. In other words, it is a going beyond or a surpassing 
of an impasse or a breach without transcending it in the usual sense of that term, 
but rather by going down into it or under it. (Again, these spatial references 
don’t really do justice to what he is attempting to communicate.) The point is 
that this realisation does not take place somewhere else, but right here in the 
middle, where we are. It is śūnyatā.  
 
But surely this is abstract faulty thinking? Or is it not just a deeper form 
of idealism? Or even worse, is it not mere wishful thinking? He asks himself this 
latter question, to which he replies “no” because: 
 
‘Actually, this approach, which produces true self-knowledge of 
a man or woman in the existential return to this dimension and opens up 
                                                             





this dimension by means of a breakthrough along the path of existential 
knowledge, runs like a broad current through the history of the human 
race. This is the approach and attitude of that religion which teaches 
salvation (as a means of liberation) through self-knowledge, namely 
Buddhism. It is also clear that various attempts have been made along 
these same lines in ancient western history as well’ (BVD, 15-16) 
 
For him, it is an existential breakthrough that gives us an insight into 
this immaculate virginal quality that lies at the heart of each of us, men and 
women. Nishitani Keiji favours the Buddhist approach, but he sees from 
testimonies across all traditions cases of such existential insights recorded and 
passed down. This wisdom is, for him, a passage between traditions to use Luce 
Irigaray’s terminology. Therefore, it is not only a Buddhist approach that can 
offer this insight into one’s own nature; but what is required without doubt, or 
beyond doubt, is an insight into our own self-nature (i.e., jinen). A nature which 
for him is egoteki: reciprocal mutual interpenetration. And, as we saw, for 
Nishitani Keiji, this is exemplified by a standpoint of Zen, a standpoint which 
he is attempting to elucidate philosophically; and we might say in more general 
terms, to shift the philosophical hermeneutic approach so that it includes such 
possibilities as existential insight through meditative practice. Here he 
considers that this approach was already widespread in Antiquity and across 
traditions, and that we need to reinvent it for our own times through cross-
cultural dialogue and practice, in order to deal with the lopsided interpretations, 
which prejudice either traditional interpretations and their approach to myth, 






For Nishitani Keiji, the existential insight into our virginal immaculate 
nature is what he calls first in this essay a non-nature and ‘horizontal 
transcendence’. We do not need to struggle to understand this however, because 
ultimately it is of course to be understood as śūnyatā. As he states, ‘this 
standpoint revealing itself in the “horizontal transcendence” is the “Buddhist 
notion of emptiness” (śūnyatā) expressed in the formula: “form is emptiness, 
emptiness is form”’ (BVD, 22). We can recall that Unno clarified this pithy 
saying for us earlier in the thesis:  
 
‘It is not the case that the two are simply merged or collapsed 
into one; rather, when emptiness is affirmed, form is negated; and when 
form is affirmed, emptiness is negated. When this simultaneous negation 
and affirmation occurs not only among two things, A and B, but among 
multiple realities, infinitely and boundlessly, we have what is called 
“non-obstructed interrelationship”’ (1989, 317)  
 
And for Nishitani Keiji, it is a standpoint from where:  
 
‘a fundamental and complete demythologizing of all myths and 
an “existentialist” interpretation of mythological concepts are possible 





absolute “nothingness”’ (BVD, 22) 
 
Therefore, it is this existential breakthrough which appears possible for 
any woman or man, for any mother or child. It is an insight which is open to all 
human beings in their concrete existence, their fundamental existence from 
where their ultimate horizon of understanding is possible. It is a standpoint 
which: 
 
‘brings us face to face with real, concrete human meaning. When 
a man or woman awakens to his or her own Buddhahood, the Buddha-
existence itself awakens out of and in him or her, and he or she becomes 
a truly more original, more concrete human being, a “true human being,” 
to use the expression of the Chinese Zen master Lin-Chi. If such is the 
essence of the human being, then both the child born into the world as 
well as the mother bearing it are completely unstained in their very 
“human” stainedness’ (BVD. 17) 
 
We are all born with this “quality” or potential for our own self-
realisation as śūnyatā irrespective of whether we born as men or women. Or in 
the words of Zen Master Bankei: ‘we are unborn precisely as corporeal-spiritual 
existences, by virtue of our being born from parents’ (BVD, 17). There is no 
insight into the true nature of our existence without being born, and because we 





in fact unborn. It is śūnyatā, understood as reciprocal interpenetration, which 
means that we negate name and form in favour of the formless, which 
simultaneously affirm name and form in their unimpeded (we might say un-
interpreted) formless suchness. We are born (virginal) precisely because we are 
from unborn (virginal) parents. In (non) metaphysical terms, we are śūnyatā 
and at the same time we are name and form. This is the double exposure of our 
existence. If we side with name and form we negate śūnyatā, if we side with 
śūnyatā we negate name and form. We are constantly oscillating between these 
two, none more so than between moments of silent sitting meditation, or when 
simply breathing, or in our dynamic interaction in ordinary everyday activities. 
I would like to draw out two key points here which take us into our comparison 
with Luce Irigaray.  
 
The first is the overcoming of the division between nature and spirit on 
the field of śūnyatā. As we saw in the previous chapter, this overcoming of 
nature and spirit was the main purpose behind Luce Irigaray’s Buddha imagery. 
For Nishitani Keiji too, at the fundamental ground of ourselves as human 
beings, for women and for men, we are neither nature nor spirit; but rather, at 
a more fundamental or elemental level, we are both nature and spirit, we are 
neither nature and spirit, and we are whole or complete concrete human beings. 
To confuse men with spirit and women with nature, setting up a hierarchical 
dichotomy which can be manipulated by the so called higher standpoint, would 
be a confusion on a horizon of understanding which is prejudiced towards one 
side over the other. And what is more, it would lead us to an impasse in our self-





prejudiced field of self-interpretation, which negates at least half of humanity. 
 
The understanding being put forward here is that men and women are 
both nature and spirit and neither nature or spirit. This is a standpoint of 
śūnyatā, and a standpoint which sees both men and women as already whole, 
prior to being differentiated by an interpretation from a standpoint based on an 
understanding from either side of the nature or spirit divide. It is a standpoint 
that supercedes nature-spirit where the fundamental concrete human being, 
whether man or woman, is whole and complete when they realise their virginal 
purity, their absolute unstainedness, that is their true self nature as śūnyatā. In 
short, as we have seen, each one of us is, at our root, reciprocally 
interpenetrating each other at all times (prior to all interpretive distinctions) 
which are based on or from a standpoint of an isolation of one part of this whole; 
usually, the objective scientific position, or the position of an ego-subject in 
Western philosophical terms. It is difficult to not see that this as a similar 
interpretation to Luce Irigaray’s pure subject, with the one qualification that we 
must have male and female pure subjects, and not a neutral pure subject.   
 
We could argue of course that there are other options here, why not 
simply reject the dichotomy out rightly? Because this would most probably 
result in an implicit materialist view (as the prevailing view of our times) which 
is actually a denial of one side of the dichotomy (and what would tend to happen 
in any time, when one side of the dichotomy is denied, i.e., we tend towards the 





Irigaray’s terms, we reduce everything to the same which ends in nihilism). Or 
we could try to argue for one side of the dichotomy, and then ground both men 
and women on that side, for example, the materialist view which is most 
prevalent in Europe today. Or we could try to balance the nature-spirit equation 
by seeing all men and women as nature-spirit, thereby not identifying one side, 
say nature, with woman; and the other side, say, spirit with man – this is in fact 
closer to what Nishitani Keiji is getting at. However, to balance the two, for him, 
we must have an encompassing concept such as śūnyatā. This is a unifying 
concept that mediates the two terms by grounding them in their underlying 
greater reciprocal relationship, and the space between the two terms can itself 
be a place where we stand. It is this what is meant by a ‘double exposure’. I am 
arguing that we need to hold both positions at the same time, while we ourselves 
remain open and untouched in our puritas. We are in the middle, unattached 
to a viewpoint and able to function on both sides, working perhaps towards a 
harmonious position between them or being in a position between them where 
we have already realised in our self-awareness a place to stand that is free from 
duality. In effect, we place ourselves in that between space, a place right in the 
middle, complete as ourselves amidst the world through a negation of both sides 
of interpretation, and through the negation of our limited self-centred self, a 
more original extensive self is affirmed which is at the centre of everything 
(Heisig, 2003, 228). 
 
The second point, which is connected to the last, is that Nishitani Keiji 
considers all women and men to be virgins at the absolute level. And this means 





wholeness as śūnyatā. There is a clear shift in the text, from one interpretation 
as a singular event being an origin myth for Christianity which gives some 
special significance to the birth of the saviour; to another interpretation that 
holds a truth for all of us:  
 
‘In the sense that we have described here, all of us are born of a 
“virgin.” Our physical mother was such a virgin at the time of our 
conception and birth, for even then, when she was no longer a virgin, she 
possessed in the essential ground of her being that absolute unstainable 
character, that pura proprietas’ (BVD, 17) 
 
For Nishitani Keiji, this myth demonstrates something which is 
universal. For him, ‘the fact that we have been born of a mother – this fact in 
itself – has no other sense than to show at the same time that we have all been 
born from a “virgin”’ (BVD, 17). These mythical statements, therefore, are about 
all human beings, not a special human being (BVD, 20). And if they are about 
all human beings then we are getting down to some fundamental structures of 
human existence (modern hermeneutics) and in this case, that fundamental 
existence is described as immaculate or virginal and it is at the ground of both 
men and women: it is a revaluation of birth, and the body. A comparative 
philosophical hermeneutics which leads us to a potentially heretical affirmation 
that we are all on a par (or at least capable of being) with Jesus and Mary. In 
short, they become very accessible models for men and women in this life, as we 






6.3. Luce Irigaray: sexuate difference and virginity  
As we have seen above, Nishitani Keiji combines his thought of 
śūnyatā with the idea of virginity as an original puritas open to both men and 
women. However, contrary to Nishitani Keiji, before we find some original 
purity from where men and women can meet, Luce Irigaray thinks that virginity 
must first be rethought from the position of its value to women, and only later 
from its value to all. For her, the cultivation of a female subject through the 
reclamation of virginity is crucial (Joy, 2006, 93). 
 
Feminine culture must define a woman’s virginity according to her own 
definition (i.e., not a definition imposed from a masculine culture) as she states, 
‘virginity has been discussed above all by men, or by women in relation to them, 
but few women have done so in relation to themselves and in the context of 
female evolution’ (KW, 161). For her, a feminine definition can also be 
enshrined as a civil identity in and through law, thereby establishing different 
rights for women and men within society (JTN, 86-87, TD, 61). It is one of the 
events that marks a woman’s becoming more significantly than a man’s (DBT, 
131-132). But, for Luce Irigaray, it can also be ‘the name for a return of the 
feminine to the self, for the spiritual interiority of woman, capable of staying 
woman and of becoming more and more woman’ (KW, 161). Virginity then is to 
be understood as something particular to a woman’s bodily becoming, her 
rhythm, her civil identity, and also her spiritual identity, i.e., becoming divine 





same for a man as it is for a woman, and for her it needs to be re-thought from 
a feminine cultural perspective first.  
 
However, Luce Irigaray goes further than these initial philosophical 
positions. For her, in the second instance, virginity is also understood as the 
fidelity of men and women to their own respective gender, and as the ground or 
space (or silence) between two who are different to be able to respect each other 
as different (TBT, 111). With this definition I think we come closer to Nishitani 
Kejiji’s own understanding of sexual difference which we saw above. Luce 
Irigaray outlines two points for a woman’s spiritual and material development. 
Firstly, she states that,  
 
‘What I’ve found to be most important to sustain spiritual 
progress in my life as a woman can be summarized in the following way: 
‘The idea that I was born a woman but I must become the spirit or soul 
of this body I am. I must open out my female body, give it forms, words, 
knowledge of itself, a cosmic and social equilibrium, in relation to the 
environment, to the different means of exchange with others, and not 
only by artificial means that are inappropriate to it’ (JTN, 116) 
 
Here we see then that first, a woman’s pathway is one specific to her 
body and her gender – it is a path of sexuation which is appropriate to her and 





that is, something divine and in the body. (Both of which I discussed earlier.) In 
the same text, Luce Irigaray goes on to elaborate a second point, the role that 
virginity plays in a woman’s sexuation: 
 
‘The idea that virginity and maternity involve spiritual 
dimensions that belong to me. These dimensions have been colonized by 
masculine culture: virginity has become the object of commerce between 
fathers (or brothers) and husbands, as well as a condition for the 
incarnation of the masculine divine. It has to be rethought as a woman’s 
possession, a natural and spiritual possession to which she has a right 
and for which she holds responsibilities’ (JTN, 116-117) 
 
Here we see that for her, a woman’s natural and spiritual possession 
can be conceived by her as her virginity. Previously, it has been possessed by 
masculine culture, and it needs to be reclaimed as a territory which she can 
claim for herself, and one which demarcates her identity which is different to a 
man’s (see Joy, 2006, 93). Nishitani Keiji’s thought of śūnyatā as puritas or 
virginity for both men and women then, is clearly unacceptable for Luce Irigaray 
as it is a woman’s identity that she is concerned with cultivating here. She goes 
on: 
 
‘Virginity must be rediscovered by all women as their own bodily 





collective identity status (and, among other things, a possible fidelity in 
their relationship with their mother, which would thereby escape the 
commerce between men). Maternity must be thought of in its spiritual 
dimension, not only its material one. This is perhaps easier to imagine 
and carry out. Though not between mothers and daughters?  
 
Women must develop a double identity: virgins and mothers. At 
every stage of their lives. Since virginity, no more than female identity, 
isn’t simply given at birth. There’s no doubt we are born virgins. But we 
also have to become virgins, to relieve our bodies and souls of cultural 
and familial fetters. For me, becoming a virgin is synonymous with a 
woman’s conquest of the spiritual. And it’s not always a matter of gaining 
something more but one of being capable of becoming less. Feeling more 
free vis-à-vis your fears, fantasies about others, freeing yourself from 
useless knowledge, possessions and obligations’ (JTN, 117)  
 
  Virginity therefore, is a possession for women, which marks her as 
different, if claimed and cultivated for herself; but it is not something a woman 
is born with, in the usual material or physiological sense that it is meant. 
Virginity as a cultivated possession is, a negation of fears, fantasies, useless 
knowledge, possessions and obligations. This second sense of virginity slowly 
starts to sound similar to her hermeneutic of naivete, and also, similar to 
Nishitani Keiji’s puritas. Elsewhere, Luce Irigaray expands on this idea of 






‘does not signify defensive prudish virginity, as some of our 
profane contemporaries might take it to mean, nor does it signify an 
allegiance to patriarchal culture and its definition of virginity as an 
exchange value between men; it signifies the woman’s fidelity to her 
identity and female genealogy’ (JTN, 19) 
 
Here she is discussing virginity in relation to female identity and 
genealogy through an analysis of Greek myth and the element of fire, as found 
in the home at the hearth, which is attended to and preserved by women. It is 
fidelity to the genealogy of women and their gender with which she uses the 
term here. This is seen in the re-establishment of maternal genealogy, and a re-
interpretation of maternity, from a feminine perspective (Joy, 2006, 91; 
Cornell, 1991, 76-77). As well as her own demythologization, where she draws 
out structures of existence specific to a woman, a great part of this re-
interpretation is once again practice based. Luce Irigaray draws again on her 
yogic and tantric background, by relating it to the practice of breathing as a 
means of returning to one’s body and cultivating one’s soul as a woman: 
 
‘emphasizing breathing instead of wording can also render to 
engendering its spiritual dimension and it could explain what is a 
virginity which does not amount to keeping a physiological hymen. If a 





breathing which serves not only survival, but to be and become a human, 
which always includes a spiritual dimension’ (CON, 96) 
 
We can see again here that the cultivation of breathing, as we have seen 
in chapter four, is central to her thought. It is essential for the cultivation of 
one’s self, and to becoming human, if not even divine. It is ‘cultivation of the 
breathing as a manner of gathering with and internalizing oneself’ (CON, 94). 
This form of meditation is not the contemplation of something, for her it is a 
gathering in, which is a ‘turning back before all representations and words to 
find or find again one’s own self. This can provide all that which we are doing 
with a meditative dimension’ (CON, 94-95). This practice is necessary for 
‘spiritual virginity, of the feminine’ (KW, 161) to be discovered and cultivated. 
And this turning back to one’s self sounds very much like a practice such as 
Zazen, where we gather ourselves in to rediscover our original nature. For her: 
 
 ‘being, staying or becoming a virgin, is to keep oneself 
• I and myself (I gather myself together) 
• I and you-she 
• I and you-he 
• I among female them 






Keeping one’s virginity means not losing oneself in the 
attraction for the other, nor letting oneself be ruled by the other, but 
without being aggressive, or simply critical towards this other. It is to 
give oneself a feminine mind or soul, an internal dwelling, which is not 
only physical but also spiritual: linked to the breath, to speech, to the 
mind’ (KW, 161) 
 
We see here then that virginity is far more than the act of losing 
something at one’s first sexual encounter. Luce Irigaray redefines virginity in-
line with her thought on breathing and speech, while keeping it as a specifically 
feminine cultural phenomenon. We can note that it is fundamentally 
intersubjective and not only based on a practice of sitting alone. Although it 
does appear that there is room for this to be available to both men and women, 
when she states it is a sense of keeping oneself, one’s autonomy, not letting one’s 
self be ruled by the other and so on, she closes this down by maintaining the 
need for a feminine specific virginity. Elsewhere however, we see how at another 
level it does relate to both gender’s and their fidelity to their gender, as well as 
the relation between two who are different: 
 
‘sketching this new horizon in philosophy [sexuate difference], 
founded upon an inappropriable truth, involves, as a first gesture, a 
necessary respect for the virginity of the other. It is a prerequisite for 







Now at this stage it sounds as if we are still possibly speaking about a 
woman’s virginity as necessary for us to locate or sense this difference between 
the two sex/genders. But we see how important virginity is for Luce Irigaray, it 
is a prerequisite for sexuate difference, the foundation of her philosophy. But, 
in the final sense, I suggest that virginity is indeed for all, as she herself states: 
 
‘If this were to come about, virginity would not be reduced to a 
natural reality, would not be ascribed only to the feminine or to the 
neuter, but would be the other name for the fidelity of each gender to 
itself, with a respect for the other gender’ (TBT, 111) 
 
Here we see then that it is not limited to the feminine when a culture 
of sexuate difference is established, but in the last sense virginity is another 
name for the fidelity of either subject to her or his own gender. The subjective 
fidelity to their own sexuate specific objectivity, through a process of breathing 
and recollecting or gathering oneself is virginity. It is the necessary condition 
for any possibility of intersubjective communication between two genders who 
are different: 
                                                             






‘Virginity is, in fact, the necessary condition for the existence of 
a word which is present here and now between us: woman and man, 
women and men. Virginity is the other face of an aporia inhabiting a 
word which heeds sexual difference. The absence of a like discourse 
suitable for the two genders, the need for an almost absolute silence 
between them so that they might begin truly to speak to each other: these 
things which are impossible to say must be said in order to respect the 
virginity of each person as a proper identity conscious of its limit’ (TBT, 
111-112) 
 
And so, we return to the significance of the sexed couple, the 
intersubjective relations between man and woman, which is only possible 
between two subjects who are virginal. In the final sense of virginity as 
understood by Luce Irigaray here there is no doubt that we come close to 
Nishitani Keiji’s own understanding of virginity as puritas. But we see that in 
his thought these different levels are clearly not included – virginity is for Luce 
Irigaray, first of all, essential to a woman’s subjective constitution as different 
to a man’s; but later, in the final sense, virginity as Luce Irigaray uses it, is 
similar to that sense of puritas as we saw in Nishitani Keiji.  
 
For him, it was a term interchangeable with śūnyatā, which pointed to 





intersubjective relationship between two human beings (men). For her, this 
correlates to her understanding of the pure subject of the Buddha. In its final 
sense, for Luce Irigaray, virginity in the sense of the Buddha as pure subject, 
appears to be a necessary pre-requisite for each subject to pass through, along 
with sexuation as I-he or I-she, so that both subjects can then realise themselves 
through mutual recognition, as two who are different but now capable of love. 
It is for this reason that she ultimately prefers the model of a sexed couple, such 
as we saw with (Siva and Parvati) although the Buddha and the flower is also a 
good model for men in our current epoch, and perhaps a stage we must all pass 
through along with sexuation. Still, the virgin Mary offers us a different model 
to that of the Buddha. It is a model of two subjects who are different, and who 
speak to each other.  
 
 
6.4. Luce Irigaray’s Eastern interpretation of Mary 
We can recall, that in her work between east and west (2002) Luce 
Irigaray claimed that, at this time her practice of yoga had taught her four 
things. One of those concerns the interpretation of the position of Mary in the 
Christian tradition, especially the interpretation of the Annunciation. In 
between east and west (2002) she juxtaposes the traditional patriarchal 







‘The Annunciation, which precedes the birth of Jesus, can be 
interpreted in at least two different ways: as the substitution of the word 
of the celestial Father for corporeal relations, notably of breathing, 
between two lovers or as the fact that, in order to engender a spiritual 
child – a possible saviour of the world – the conception of this saviour 
must be preceded by an announcement through speech and by a 
response from Mary. It is not a question then of a miraculous birth by a 
woman who is supposed to have kept her hymen, but of an engendering 
preceded by an exchange of breath and of words between the future 
lovers and parents’ (BEW, 52)   
 
Whereas Nishitani Keiji focused on the question of virginity in the 
conception of Jesus, Luce Irigaray focuses on intersubjective relations between 
a man and a woman – because the Lord is conceived as male, and he asks Mary 
to have his child, to allow him to incarnate himself, i.e., we have a dialogue 
between a divine man and a divine woman, which produces a divine child (albeit 
a boy). For Luce Irigaray, along with a dialogue between two divine sexuate 
subjects, it is the dual quality of Mary as virgin and mother, and the relation 
between body, breath and speech in dialogue with another, which are most 
important here. For Luce Irigaray, the patriarchal tradition codifies words into 
texts and discourses, forgetting the living quality of speech, because of a failure 
to understand the relation between the body and breath, silence and words:  
 





religion centred on speech, without insistence on breathing and the 
silence that makes it possible, risks supporting a nonrespect for life…. 
Unfortunately most patriarchal philosophical and religious traditions act 
in this way: they have substituted words for life without carrying out the 
necessary links between the two’ (BEW, 51) 
 
Here we see a direct link to her thought on the Buddha. For her, and as 
we saw in the Buddhist tradition too, the Buddha’s practices of breathing and 
sitting in silence were the most important, along with his most important 
gesture: to return to the natural (or vegetal) where he could honour his rhythm 
within the macrocosm as a pure subject who renounces objective discourse. 
Here, with the virgin Mary, we see a model more concerned with mediation. For 
her, mediation is crucial as a way of ensuring a flow between subjects who are 
different (men and women), dialectical categories, the body and nature, breath 
and words. This is because, much like the Buddhist understanding of 
interdependent origination, no “thing” exists in isolation, cut off from 
everything else. As we saw with her thought on nature and the body, and as we 
see here, each and everything flows into another. However, as we saw, words 
and discourses can punctuate this flow between things and stultify our 
existence, leaving us lifeless. A return to ourselves, and an understanding of the 
flow between ourselves and others, things, etc. are the two models we find here 
encapsulated in the Buddha and the Virgin Mary respectively.  
 





Mary and the Lord, are ‘the angel, the bird, the ray of sun, and speech’ (BEW, 
52). The aim is that the body is not substituted by words; rather a flow between, 
body and speech, which recognises and preserves both, creating a spiritual 
engendering through the ‘play of breathing and the controlled expression of this 
breathing between lovers’ (BEW, 52). We can see then that it is the 
intersubjective quality and the play between body and speech, which includes 
breath and silence, is most import for her model of Mary and the Lord.  It is not 
the issue of Mary’s virginity as such, but rather the mediations and quality of 
the relationship between Mary and the Lord. This is interpreted as the 
relationship between a divine man and divine woman. This leads us to her 
understanding of the between two or the couple as a model for sexuate 
difference. Here the example is of a divine couple. Elsewhere she succinctly 
offers us an interpretation of the Annunciation, as God’s question to Mary, as 
two lovers, and which is tied together with the breath and tantric thought of 
chakras: 
 
‘Mary, you who, from adolescence, are divine, because you were 
born of a woman faithful to herself – Anne, the one said to have 
conceived without sin – you who are this capable of intersubjectivity, the 
expression of love between humans, do you want to be my lover and for 
us to have a child together, since I find you worthy of this even though 
you are young, inexperienced and without possessions. It is only thanks 
to your yes that my love and my son may be redemptive. Without your 
word, we may not be carnally redeemed or saved. Such an interpretation 





tradition of the physical and spiritual centers of the body, the chakras’ 
(ILTY, 140) 
 
Here we have a very different interpretation of the Annunciation made 
by Luce Irigaray. Once more I re-iterate that my interest in not in analysing this 
in comparison to the theological tradition, but rather in bringing it into dialogue 
with Nishitani Keiji. Much like Nishitani Keiji’s interpretation then, it is an 
alternative interpretation with Eastern influences. Here, the focus is that Mary 
is divine and born of a virgin: being a virgin and being born of a virgin is linked 
to becoming divine (Joy, 2006, 70). Luce Irigaray points us towards seeing 
Mary as a partner in dialogue with the Lord: she is asked, and an exchange takes 
place between them. Moreover, she is the lover of the Lord. As we saw with 
Nishitani Keiji also, this points to a raising up of Mary to a parallel with Jesus. 
It could even be seen as going one step further by Luce Irigaray, however, as a 
move to place Mary in a more important position than Jesus within the 
Christian tradition, because the incarnation is dependent on Mary’s own divine 
origin (virgin birth) and her verbal consent as a lover of God. 
  
There is one more key claim which Luce Irigaray puts forward here 
which we must take note of. It concerns the intersubjective quality of the 
relationship; because the Lord knows his own desire, interiorizes it and shares 






‘a figure surpassing or accomplishing Buddha: the awakened 
one who is compassionate, agrees to speak, love and engender in order 
to redeem, as a couple, the whole of the macro and microcosmic universe. 
With this gesture the Lord actually renounces having, the object, power, 
in order to accede to being-man and to the realization of intersubjectivity 
with the being of woman, who is able to retain her virginity. And that 
alliance, a dual then communal alliance, could incarnate the finality of 
History, or at least lead the way to another era’ (ILTY, 141) 
 
Here we see then a comparison between her own reading of Buddhism 
and Christianity, where the Annunciation (not the birth of Jesus) is the most 
significant event. Moreover, it is an event which surpasses the achievement of 
the Buddha. The same qualities of compassion and non-attachment are there, 
but because of its intersubjective quality between two sexuately differentiated 
subjects in dialogue, the Annunciation, for Luce Irigaray, offers a model of 
sexuate difference. It is a model which surpasses the pure subject of the Buddha 
as a non-attached subject, because it is one which involves this dialogue 
between two subjects who are who are different – the divine couple. We might 
say in fact, that it is one between two pure subjects who are different (a non-he 
and a non-she). This question and answer between two who are different, the 
silence and the breathing between two lovers, who meet each other without 
attachment or domination, is for her a divine model for intersubjective relations 
for our time (Joy, 2006, 125). Now, Nishitani Keiji himself also has an 
intersubjective model, and it would be unfair not to discuss it here in relation to 






6.5. Nishitani Keiji’s I-Thou 
Nishitani Keiji bases his model for intersubjectivity on the relation 
between two Zen masters, or between Zen master and disciple. These relations 
are distinctly bodily and involve often radical or absurd actions and words 
(Heisig, 2003, 233). For Nishitani Keiji intersubjective relations must be 
understood through authentic encounters, as Heisig states Nishitani Keiji:  
 
‘saw in these exchanges not only the spirit of Zen but a paradigm 
of all authentic encounter between one person and another: namely, an 
encounter that realizes – actualises and becomes aware of – the reality 
of the self as it is. As long as one or both parties do remain on the ground 
of the ordinary ego, only words and ideas can be exchanged. Sharing in 
experience, speaking “mind to mind” or “heart to heart,” requires rather 
a standpoint of non-ego’ (Heisig, 2001, 233) 
 
The Zen encounter therefore, is an encounter between two pure 
subjects to use Luce Irigaray’s terms. Nishitani Keiji lays out this model for 
authentic intersubjective relations by once again bringing the Zen tradition into 
dialogue with Western philosophy, this time, Martin Buber and the I-Thou 





two people, self and other, or self and God. It was first used by Martin Buber in 
the important and influential text of the same name written in 1923.97   
 
In his essay ‘The I-Thou relation in Zen Buddhism’ (1969) Nishitani 
Keiji examines three typical ways in which relationships between people 
(ningen) are usually understood philosophically. The first, is a sort of survival 
of the fittest where each man is a wolf out to devour the other. The second, is 
exemplified by Immanuel Kant, where some kind of universal law mediates the 
relations between subjects. The third, is found in Martin Buber’s thought on the 
I-Thou, where a self is fundamentally transformed by the experience of the 
absolute other.98 For him, these three different ways of viewing the 
relationships between human beings claim that the individual is absolute, and 
that each subjectivity cannot be replaced by another; while at the same time, 
there is an understanding based on some universal which does in fact obstruct 
absolute individuality, as he states:  
 
‘This universal may take a variety of forms. Where men 
encounter each other as wolves, the state or its laws might serve to check 
their individuality. For the ethical man, this function may be performed 
by practical reason or by moral law. For the religious person, an Absolute 
                                                             
97 Space does not allow here for a thorough analysis of Martin Buber see Zank, M. and 
Braiterman, Z. (2014) 
98 For Nishitani Keiji, this position is the highest of the three and is the take off point for his 
own thought: ‘with Martin Buber the interhuman encounter has come to be seen as a personal 
relationship between “I” and a “Thou.” Although the approach no doubt has its own validity, it 
is far from exhausting the hidden depths of the person-to-person, I-and-Thou, relationship. 





other or divine law may act as the universal ground for the relationships 
between human beings. But in each case, the general structure of those 
relationships is conditioned by the universal, and so takes on a kind of 
halfway quality. The problems this presents is that on the one hand the 
individual has an irreplaceable subjectivity and hence complete freedom, 
while on the other, he is simultaneously subordinated to some universal 
or other. Insofar as all individuals are so subordinated, this would seem 
to imply that any one individual could take the place of any other’           
(IT, 41-42) 
 
Nishitani Keiji’s analysis here is direct and so condensed that we could 
easily miss the point: each individual is sovereign or absolute, and that our 
subjectivity is essentially our absolute uniqueness, our inequality to the other, 
which is for him our inherent freedom – in Luce Irigaray’s terms we might say 
our autonomy. The problem is, that when we come to philosophize our relations 
with each other, we have either a clash between these absolute individuals, or 
we bring in a mediating principle which in fact denies that absolute 
irreplaceable nature of each of us, which then robs us of our absolute freedom 
that is our radical difference to each other. What all three of the positions have 
in common then, is that they compromise absolute individuality and absolute 
freedom by placing a universal demand on that absolute individuality (Heisig, 
2003, 233). In other words, our absolute freedom as an absolute individual is 





between ethical or religious men to take place.99 
 
Nishitani Keiji elucidates this same point from a number of different 
angles in his essay (The I-Thou) but, one which is especially useful for us here 
is to understand this in terms of equality and sameness. For Nishitani Keiji, 
equality implies the possibility of substitution, whereas, freedom implies its 
impossibility. We should remember here that freedom is uniqueness, our 
absolute individuality. In contemporary philosophical terms we might equate 
the term freedom with difference. It is our absolute difference to all others that 
makes us who we are. We are irreplaceable. This is for him the freedom or 
meaning of subjectivity: the inability for ourselves to be substituted for or by 
another. For him, on the one side, a mixture of equality with freedom or 
difference, ‘implies that freedom [or difference] is imperfect’ (IT, 42), as he 
explains: ‘as soon as the individual is subject to a universal, he is relativized and 
loses his absoluteness’ (IT, 42). And on the other side:  
 
‘this imperfect freedom implies as well an imperfect sameness 
or equality. Subordination to a universal cannot totally absorb or destroy 
the freedom of the individual as individual. To recover that freedom, 
unimpeded by law, he may have to escape from the prison of the 
                                                             
99 Here I use the term religious to mean someone who adheres to a certain creed which 
informs his or her way of life. It is not religious in the sense that Nishitani Keiji uses the term, 
as we discussed above. I also use the term men, because all of these philosophical positions are 





universal’ (IT, 42) 
 
In all his previous examples, Nishitani Keiji puts the impossibility of 
their accomplishment: the state, will never turn the wolf man into a citizen; the 
moral law, can never fully extinguish a man’s self-love; and divine law or God, 
can never curb a man’s appetites nor guarantee that he will not turn his back on 
God once more (IT, 42). To summarize these two sides of equality and 
difference, he states that:  
 
‘for the individual relativized by some universal, both equality 
and freedom are imperfect. This means that where interhuman 
relationships are subordinate to such universals, with the result that 
equality and freedom accompany one another in their incompleteness, 
no authentic encounter between human beings is possible’ (IT, 42-43) 
 
Let us remember that this authentic encounter between different 
people was the key rallying cry of his East-West encounter. And for an authentic 
encounter to take place between individuals, according to his thinking, we can 
explicitly posit that: 1) that our freedom or our difference remains absolute, and 
2) that any principle which mediates between human relations shall in no way 
impede the absolute freedom or difference of each individual. We might say, 
that any universal must instead guarantee the recognition of each and every 





individuals simultaneously. This of course leads us to an impasse. What is 
required for us to overcome this impasse is:  
 
‘an equality in which the negation of the individual and his 
freedom would become the absolute affirmation of the individual and his 
freedom. This is of course quite inconceivable, unless seen from the point 
of view of absolute nothingness, śūnyatā – nonbeing in the Buddhist 
sense of the term’ (IT, 43) 
 
Once again then we see that Nishitani Keiji wants to use his standpoint 
of śūnyatā, this time in order to establish a place for the philosophy of self-other 
relations, and ultimately a non-dual love based on the inherent reality of that 
absolute self/other relationship. The problem is quite simple, for him:  
 
‘two factors need to be kept firmly in mind. First, the I and the 
Thou are absolutes, each in its own respective subjectivity. And second, 
both I and Thou are, because of their relationship to one another, at the 
same time absolutely relative’ (IT, 41) 
 
According to him then, we are at one and the same time absolute in our 
difference, while being absolutely relative to each other. Each of us is absolute 





a multiplicity of absolutes within an absolute. For Nishitani Keiji, as we have 
seen, there are two ‘conditions that effect I and Thou as subjects: namely, that 
they are each absolutes and at the same time absolutely relative’ (IT, 44) and for 
him, ‘unless we go back to this point we will be unable to realize either true 
individual freedom or true universal equality’ (IT, 44). He admits, as does 
Heisig (2001, 233) that this sounds like nonsense, like a contradiction which we 
cannot accept. Surely, such a position results in the wolf-man, that each man 
attempts to devour the other? For him this is the source of the suffering of men, 
the fact that a human being is absolute, but at the same time, they live together 
as relative absolutes. It may be theoretically impossible, but existentially for him 
it is a fact: we are each one of us absolute individuals, while at exactly the same 
time, we are each one of us relative absolutes to each other.  
 
Nishitani Keiji attempts to demonstrate this unlikely position through 
a Zen dialogue in the I-Thou relation essay.100 He essentially wants to show us 
that the I-Thou relation is based on the non-attachment of the self to itself, or 
in this case its non-attachment to name and form. This non-attachment to self, 
or self-detachment is where the subject as ego is not clung to, and therefore no 
split occurs between me and you. If I am completely free from attachment to 
something which is myself, then when we meet each other on the field of 
śūnyatā, we are free to communicate without hesitation or reservation or fear. 
                                                             
100 Kyozan Ejaku asked Sansho Enen, “What is your name?” 
Sansho said, “Ejaku!” 
“Ejaku!” replied Kyozan, “that’s my name.” 
“Well then,” said Sansho, “My name is Enen.” 
Kyozan roared with laughter.  






We are united in our non-attachment to ourselves. We exist together on a field 
of śūnyatā as a unique point on that field which is itself (both us and it) empty. 
This is in essence the same position which Nishitani Keiji put forward 
concerning the relationship between self and things as discussed in the previous 
chapter. We are each one of us at home in our own nature (jitai) and we are 
empty of any prejudice or attachment to ourselves or desire for things (muga). 
It means that we exist right there in the middle, and so do you as the other I 
meet on that same non-dual field of śūnyatā. 
 
A Zen dialogue is a literary example of when this absolute recognition 
of each other occurs in our everyday existence, as he states elsewhere, ‘what is 
opened up in a Zen encounter is a place which in every way serves as the 
ultimate locale for a meeting between people’ (PAZ, 29). When two people meet 
on the field of śūnyatā, it is as if they meet in a place of mutual self-negation 
and mutual recognition simultaneously. In short, an instantaneous reciprocal 
recognition. This can only occur when we drop our attachment to ourselves as 
an ego, a concept, an object or a something. It makes possible a direct 
communication or a true meeting between a ‘you’ and an ‘I’. I call out to you and 
you call out to me and for a moment we meet and recognise each other as 
absolute without fear or reservation or attachment. We could call this mutual 
recognition in absolute self-negation, but we must remember that absolute self-
negation allows for absolute self-affirmation in that moment of mutual 
recognition. I negate myself as subject or ego, and you return that very negation 
to me in your affirmation, and vice versa, simultaneously. (We could say the 





in mutual self-negation and mutual self-affirmation while in dialogue.) We both 
exist on the same field absolutely as ourselves when we realise ourselves on the 
field of śūnyatā, a field free from desire, attachment and ego self-centredness. 
This is (mutual) ego-self-negation resulting in (mutual) non-self-affirmation. It 
is the paradoxical nature of our actual existence which can only be realised 
together on the field of śūnyatā, which is an actual place, right here in our 
ordinary everyday existence and activity.  
 
Any fixation by us on one side or the other, causes a basic 
misunderstanding of ourselves in relation to things and to others. This fluidity 
of self-relationship and other-relationship is vital for mutual recognition, 
friendship and love. It is ‘to speak of love as non-ego in which the other is 
“present” as other and not simply as “a projection of one’s own ego”’ (Heisig, 
2001, 234). And how are we to enable such an immediate and reciprocal 
interchange? For Nishitani Keiji: 
 
‘all parties must be in full possession of a strong confidence, but 
at the same time they also require a very fundamental openness for the 
encounter with the other’ (ENR, 144) 
 
Here we see a very clear and everyday understanding of what it means 
to stand in the middle as one’s self while at the same time totally unattached to 





nature (jitai) secure and certain through the self-realisation of egoteki or muga; 
which necessarily means that at the same time, we are radically open to the 
things of the world, the other and the world as a whole. This radical openness 
of ourselves as non-self or interpenetrative self, is the field of śūnyatā. A field 
of non-dualism, unbound by prejudices, attachments and self-centredness 
which allows for the ‘I’ to be truly an ‘I’ for the first time, while being completely 
open to a ‘you’ who stands before me. ‘Non-I’ am certain (affirmed) in my own 
non-self (ego self-negation) which allows me to affirm ‘non-you’ in your own 
non-self (ego self-negation). It is a meeting of non-selves, although this term 
makes no sense whatsoever! It can only be said that it is a meeting on the field 
of śūnyatā where both parties are recognised for their true selves owing to both 
parties being secure in their own self-negation of the false sense of self which is 
based on ego-self centeredness, attachment and desire, which arises 
inescapably when we exist on a field of duality.  
 
 
6.6. Concluding remarks: virginity and the pure subject 
Ultimately, the issue of the virgin Mary being truly a virgin becomes 
somewhat redundant in Nishitani Keiji’s thought. She is pure and impure, but 
on the more fundamental level she, along with any woman, or any man, is 
beyond any stain or its absence. She (or He) is already always pure at the 
deepest level, that is, untouched by any interpretation. Our original face, our 
true-self, is empty of any substance, stain, guilt or sin. In our original nature we 





The overcoming of nihilism is the realisation of one’s self as reciprocally 
interpenetrative and recognising one’s self and another as fundamentally 
grounded on this same reality. We might call this innocence, purity, maybe even 
naivete or being a pure subject, but here it is virginity as śūnyatā.  
 
On the one hand, this means that śūnyatā understood as absolute 
virginity, is available for both men and women; while on the other hand, it is 
not necessarily about conceiving and giving birth anymore (although birth is 
necessary for us to realise the ‘unborn’ as we saw.) In the end Nishitani Keiji 
takes away virginity as an important natural-spiritual defining factor of being a 
woman, and risks covering over the importance of understanding birth and 
sexuate difference for our own relational process of self-understanding. For 
Nishitani Keiji, any distinction between men and women, that might be posited 
by someone like Luce Irigaray, could be lost on the field of śūnyatā.  
 
However, I suggest that each man and woman at the deepest level is in-
tune with themselves and reality in accordance with śūnyatā. The issue of the 
virgin Mary being a virgin becomes a means to understand this. She is pure and 
impure depending on the standpoint of theology or science; but on the more 
fundamental level, she, along with any woman is beyond any stain or its 
absence. She is already always pure at the deepest level, that is, untouched by 
any interpretation. Our original face, our true-self, is empty of any substance, 
stain, guilt or sin. In our original nature we are untouched and untouchable and 





woman, precisely because she is not a woman. She is concrete and whole, when 
she realises śūnyatā, that is, when she is a non-she – a pure female subject. 
 
But then, how are we to hold these distinctions of man and woman? In 
short, on the field of self-consciousness/nihility men and women are different, 
for reasons such as the ability to give birth; on the field of emptiness they are 
united, in themselves, and possibly with each other. In Nishitani Keiji’s terms, 
we can suggest as a way forward, that on the field of self-consciousness/nihility 
there are men and women, who are born, who are ego-centred desiring subjects, 
who act and speak and think, and who all walk above an abyss of nihility. On 
the field of śūnyatā men and women are no-thing, non-attached, absolutely 
free, virginal and untouched, or pure male or pure female subjects to use Luce 
Irigaray’s terms.  
 
We are all born and unborn, we are men and women as name and form, 
and we are formless reciprocally interpenetrative phenomena. In a sense, we 
can say that men and women are equal in śūnyatā as concrete whole human 
beings, but still sexuately different when seen from a standpoint on the field of 
self-consciousness – such as the two standpoints of nature and spirit (neither 
of which being definably masculine or feminine.) This could be stated as men 
and women are different from the standpoint of sexuate difference, but the 
same from the standpoint of śūnyatā. However, we want to phrase it, it is 
ungrounded if not touched or tasted by each of us in our own self-realisation, 






I hope it is clear then, that although Nishitani Keiji misses the 
intersubjective quality of the myth he in many ways jumps directly to the final 
sense of virginity, which Luce Irigaray herself arrives at. The need for the prior 
stages, however, are made apparent in Luce Irigaray’s work, along with the 
importance of intersubjectivity of pure subjects or divine couples as sexuately 
differentiated. Luce Irigaray includes a phase of sexuation, and by doing so 
offers us an authentic existence as a pure subjects in relation to another who is 
different – a model of the pure male and pure female subject who are always 
already entwined as intersubjective. Finally, for her, that intersubjective quality 
is most important (as I have shown, the virgin Mary offers a better example than 
the Buddha.)  
 
However, in Nishitani Keiji’s example of two Zen masters, we also see 
the necessity of non-self for any encounter to take place. This also operates on 
the level of the body and dialogue. It is another example of the reciprocal 
relationship which effects each subject to demonstrate their purity or the 
standpoint of śūnyatā. For him, this is also necessary for love to be possible. 
Ultimately, both he and Luce Irigaray recognise the fundamental relational 
quality of our existence and the need for our cultivation in-line with this, for any 
encounter to take place, and for the possibility of love.  
 





working through the necessary stages for different sexuate subjects to develop 
from birth to (sexuate) maturity to existence as a non-self or pure subject. The 
danger of this, is that we remain in a global discourse between men and continue 
to slip into the very nihilism which he is trying to creatively overcome, at least 
according to Luce Irigaray’s diagnosis. Even if half the world somehow 
miraculously becomes a pure subject, to use Luce Irigaray’s terms, becoming a 
non-self, or realising śūnyatā alone, may not be enough without the inclusion 
of the dynamic of sexuate difference and sexed pure subjects both non-he and 
non-she.  
 
Firstly, then, I want to make clear that we need to reach śūnyatā from 
our starting-points in which we are sexuate, and therefore get to śūnyatā from 
sexuation, not by attempting to bypass or somehow lose sexuation altogether, 
but rather, to proceed through it. Sexuatation therefore, is essential to śūnyatā. 
 
 Second, non-duality doesn’t involve the total elimination of dual 
phenomena; rather, their re-incorporation into a broader field of 
interpenetrations (śūnyatā) which does of course lose (what is normally 
regarded as) the absolute fixity of their dual status, but not in such a way that 
everything is merged into a oneness of nothingness as understood by Luce 
Irigaray. In fact, as I have shown, non-duality can incorporate sexuate 
difference in a way whereby duality is also surpassed, by no longer being a 





Without the two standpoints of non-she and non-he, sexuate difference 
will remain under the critique of essentialism, and śūnyatā will remain blind to 
the fundamental relational quality of sexuate difference, and we, men, women, 
philopsophers and feminists, east and west will fall into a global nihilism of the 
same. Creative pathways for self-creation are required, and Eastern practices 
combined with Western philosophy offer a new way of life which includes the 










































This thesis has laid out a process for the liberation of the self by 
juxtaposing the thought of Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji. This juxtaposition 
has involved a close hermeneutical reading within the parameters of the 
emerging discipline of feminist comparative philosophy.  
 
Through this juxtaposition I have argued that the formation of the self 
must go from the alienated subject, to the sexuate subject, to the pure subject 
(which transdecends while still including the sexuate) as stages of development 
in the awareness of a liberated subject who is no longer alienated from 
themselves. Liberation, therefore, is from alienation, while the process is 
through relational self-understanding. This liberation is possible because of the 
inclusion of Eastern practices in a global philosophy, as well as the inclusion of 
sexuate difference as a philosophical dialogue between men and women in a 
global philosophy. Global philosophy thereby becomes a vehicle for the 
unfolding of awareness of both I-he and I-she (as two subjects who are different) 
and then proceeds to a self-understanding of two pure selves as non-he and 
non-she who are always sexuately two, and always intimately related, as 







By reading Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji alongside each other, I 
located a shared critique of the contemporary understanding of the self which 
is focused around the objectification of the subject and leads to the problem of 
nihilism (understood as the loss of values and the inability to create new values). 
At the most basic level, I agree with Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji that the 
objectified and mechanical self is a misunderstanding which leads to alienation 
and nihilism, and I agree with them both that the default self-position in 
contemporary culture is an isolated subject (understood as the ego) who is 
objectified and mechanized, and therefore, bound to fall into alienation and a 
nihilistic world view. 
 
Furthermore, I pointed out that for both Nishitani Keiji and Luce 
Irigaray it is how we conceive, understand and live the relationship between the 
internal and the external world which is the bottom line for why we fall into 
alienation and nihilism. For Nishitani Keiji it is a mistake in the relationship 
between the internal and the external world which causes the objectification of 
the self and the cultural nihilism which he perceives as all pervasive. For Luce 
Irigaray, it is precisely this difference in how the subject relates to subjects and 
objects in the external world which is fundamental in the formation of the 
sexuate subject, and how that masculine or feminine subject speaks and thinks. 
For her, this causes a fundamental impasse between men and women as two 
subjects who are different. My main point here, therefore, is that our 
understanding of the relationship between the internal and the external world, 





field of the internal and the external, is crucial in forming ourselves as a subject 
among other subjects.   
 
On the one hand, I have shown that for Luce Irigaray, the subject 
understood as neutral and non-sexuate is a fundamental motor in the 
objectification of women and men, and our descent into a nihilistic self-
understanding. Whereas in Nishitani Keiji’s work, we see almost no recognition 
of sexuate difference and the role which it plays in alienation and nihilism. For 
him, men (and women?) suffer from alienation and nihilism. Nishitani Keiji’s 
analysis, therefore, runs the risk of being too abstract, and he uses neutral 
language which overlooks the dynamic which sexuate difference plays in 
alienation.  
 
On the other hand, even though I agree with Luce Irigaray, that men 
perpetuate the objectification of women through domination, while they 
themselves fall deeper into a nihilistic world which she expresses as 
nothingness. At the same time, we have seen that Luce Irigaray’s thought fails 
to fully account for how sexuate difference as a fundamental difference between 
two subjects can be grounded non-essentially, and therefore, still risks falling 
into the alienation of the isolated subject when read alongside the insights of 
Nishitani Keiji. This is because, for Nishitani Keiji, a subject cannot be 
constituted on anything trivial or transient or permanent. A subject must be 
constituted on its home ground of mutually interpenetrative phenomena (which 





sexuate difference under scrutiny from the perspective of Nishitani Keiji, in 
order to ensure its non-essential quality, which I believe Luce Irigaray is in fact 
looking for.  
 
My basic starting position, which is based on joining together Nishitani 
Keiji and Luce Irigaray’s thought, is that men and women will experience 
alienation differently, according to whether they are formed as sexuate subjects 
in relation to other subjects and objects, and this must be taken into account 
whatever our solution to the problem of nihilism might be, because a solution 
such as śūnyatā might work for men, but merely perpetuate the domination, 
objectification and suffering of women. In short, both men and women suffer 
from alienation and nihilism, and the role sexuate difference plays in that 
suffering should be made apparent, if our solution to the problem is to be 
effective. It is from this position that I work towards holding sexuate difference 
and sunyata simultaneously.   
 
By bringing these two philosophers of nihilism together, I show how we 
can better understand the state of alienation for both men and women and I 
argue that we must take into account both Luce Irigaray’s and Nishitani Keiji’s 
thought to comprehensively handle the problem from both sides. The dialogue 
created by this juxtaposition of Luce Irigaray with Nishitani Keiji on the shared 
critique of alienation and its cause in self-misunderstanding found in 
contemporary philosophy and culture, heightens our awareness of the role 





platform for further fruitful dialogue to be created between them. Moreover, it 
begins to layout the possibility of a self-understanding which is based 
simultaneously on śūnyatā and sexuate difference, and leads to the liberation 
of the self from alienation and its perpetuation.   
 
Liberation, in the way which I use it, is a process from this state of 
objectification which I call alienation, towards a relational self-understanding 
of the self, based on the conjoining of Luce Irigaray’s sexuate self and Nishitani 
Keiji’s non-self. For Nishitani Keiji, a self-understanding based on the concept 
of śūnyatā overcomes this mistaken self-understanding which is based on the 
wrong conception of the divide between the internal and the external world. For 
him, a form of non-dualism (śūnyatā) is necessary. However, as we saw, it is 
precisely in this relationship between the internal and the external world where 
Luce Irigaray perceives a fundamental difference between the formation of the 
sexuate subject. For this to be possible, a form of dualism is necessary because 
Luce Irigaray wants to establish the sexuate subject according to the different 
ways the subject and object are related to. This difference in formation means 
she can develop a philosophy of sexuate difference between two subjects who 
are different, and it is through the fundamental duality of human existence that 
she can offer a pathway for the liberation of the self from alienation and 
nihilism.  
 
The problem which arises here of course, is the problem of how exactly 





(biological) or essential (based on an unchanging and substantial form.) I think 
that Luce Irigaray’s thought is implicitly non-dual, or as has the possibility of 
being held within a non-dual framework, such as śūnyatā. She herself is 
dismissive of claims that her philosophy is essentialist, and she also has a poor 
understanding of non-duality as found in Eastern traditions. By drawing on 
Nishitani Keiji’s thought therefore, I can supplement her own thought, and 
place it within a fuller understanding fo non-dualism.  
 
Śūnyatā, as we have seen, helps us to understand the fundamental 
relational quality of all existence, therefore, making any claims of essentialism 
empty. If I can show that the sexuate self as I-he and I-she can still be 
understood on the field of śūnyatā as non-he and non-she, then we have a non-
essential sexuate self-understanding available to us, as a process for liberation 
from the alienation and nihilism of contemporary culture. In fact, even the 
possibility of such a process, offers an open-ended pathway which gives life 
purpose. We engage in a process of self-understanding which means we keep 
growing and transforming throughout our lives, creating ourselves through 
mutual transformation. This is because of the necessary open-ended quality of 
śūnyatā, as an everchanging and interpenetrative relational understanding of 
self and world. This offers a way of creating meaning and value in our lives, 
thereby overcoming nihilism as both Nishitani Keiji and Luce Irigaray 






However, as I have shown throughout this thesis for Nishitani Keiji and 
Luce Irigaray this path is not only philosophical. The presentation of their 
thought, along with my own, takes place through philosophical dialogue, 
critique and a unique style of writing, which works with the tradition of Western 
philosophy, in order to understand ourselves in the cultural position we find 
ourselves in an emerging global world, but this philosophy and writing is 
underpinned by Eastern practices. Nishitani Keiji is in fact, one of the first 
people to really engage in this philosophical dialogue from the position of other 
as a Japanese philosopher, but his thought is, as we saw, underpinned and 
heavily informed by his life time of Zen meditation practice.  Luce Irigaray on 
the other hand, presents her own philosophy as a path of sexuate difference 
which is prior to any cultural difference. For her, sexuate difference is global 
and so it must be included in, or more strongly stated, given priority, in our 
emerging global dialogue. To do this, she engages in a dialogue between East 
and West which for her is mainly around the practices which can supplement 
her self-understanding, such as Yoga and Tantra. These practices are 
fundamental to her thought and writing. The kind of global philosophical 
dialogue between men and women which I set up between Nishitani Keiji and 
Luce Irigaray was one which necessitated the inclusion of Eastern bodily 
practices, just as my own ideas and thought is strongly informed by my own 
engagement with Eastern practices.  
 
Feminist comparative philosophy is a discourse which engages in the 
dialogue between men and women and across cultural differences however, I 





hermeneutics of self-understanding) must be one which recognises the different 
sexuate states of alienation, and attempts to move out of them, and that it must 
also include bodily practices to directly experience one’s self, i.e., an authentic 
self-experience, which are also appropriate for our sexuate difference. Or, at 
minimum, that within feminist comparative philosophy, there must at least be 
a pathway which offers this perspective, because the bodily experience cannot 
be excluded from the process of liberation. I have shown that Luce Irigaray and 
Nishitani Keiji consider bodily practices essential for self-understanding, and I 
claimed that they have both had such experiences on a certain level and that 
these underpin and inform their respective philosophical developments. The 
role of the re-integration of ourselves into nature, through our bodies, was 
shown too be crucial to this.  
 
I have claimed that liberation from alienation and nihilism cannot only 
be political or theoretical, it must be directly experienced in our body, and 
Eastern practices can help us on that journey, which then may inform our theory 
and our political organisation. This is, in short, my understanding of existential 
thought and practice. Combining philosophical hermeneutics, cross-cultural 
dialogue, dialogue between men and women and Eastern practices gives us a 
comprehensive pathway for such a liberation: a pathway that essentially returns 
us to ourselves. This again is clearly shared by Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji. 
The fundamental difference is the importance of sexuate difference as a bodily 
difference for Luce Irigaray. How sexuate difference affects the effects of the 
practices we engage in is important to be aware of and perhaps wary of, as well 






The key point would once again be, that certain Eastern practices might 
erase sexuate difference in favour of a non-dual understanding of reality. What 
we need therefore, is a cautious approach to Eastern practices, which takes into 
account bodily differences between men and women as understood in Luce 
Irigaray’s philosophy of sexuate difference. Practices found in Tantra, Yoga and 
Zen, need to be scrutinised and not adopted blindly. The problem is, that we 
must practice them in order to do this. We cannot dismiss them without first 
trying them for a suitable period. This is a risky endeavour, especially for women 
as most of these traditions are embedded in the dominant masculine and often 
patriarchal culture, language and thought in which they are found.   
 
Sexuation comes to light owing to the critical and philosophical work of 
Luce Irigaray. For her, it is foundational in the formation of a subject as a living 
subject who speaks from their body. At first, Luce Irigaray problematises 
woman as a subject who speaks, and then in her later work she goes on to think 
through the philosophical engagement between men and women as subjects 
who are fundamentally different. This difference provides the possibility of an 
ethics between two, man and woman, and it is through our bodies, as living 
breathing sexuate human beings that we can come to this self-understanding. 
Eastern practices are foundational to this return to the body and nature, as I 
have demonstrated. I have shown that for Luce Irigaray, this is not only a 
pathway for women to find a position as a speaking subject in a man’s world. 
Sexuate difference, along with her meditations on the breath, provide a vehicle 





objectified and neutral self-understanding which causes nihilism. The 
development of what Luce Irigaray calls an I-he and an I-she is based on the 
experience of one’s self as a body, in nature, breathing and speaking, and who 
is sexuate from birth. This, for her, guarantees a relational understanding of the 
self, and, it is through her exposure to Yoga and Tantra that she was able to 
come to such a philosophical position between what she calls East and West.  
 
But, as I have suggested, even the sexuate phase of self-understanding 
must be pushed further onto the field of non-duality. By bringing in the thought 
of Nishitani Keiji, I have shown that śūnyatā would transdescend, and 
therefore, include sexuation, guaranteeing a relational understanding of the self 
as non-he or non-she, i.e., as a mutually interpenetrative sexuate self-
understanding entwined on a non-dual understanding of reality. This is because 
a non-dual understanding such as Nishitani Keiji’s is a transdescendence, a 
going down through the body, and a return to the body, and our bodies are 
sexuately different. However, this insight into our relational self-existence 
comes about by passing down and through the (sexuate) body to a more 
complete self-understanding of our relational existence as a part of a greater 
whole or web of reality. But we always return right back to this (sexuate) body 
which is now transfigured through a direct experience of mutual 
interpenetration. I consider that this is what Luce Irigaray means by entasis, a 
transdescendence in the body and this world. And because it passes through the 
body, never leaving it (as Nishitani Keiji states clearly) it must also be sexuate 






Although I agree with Nishitani Keiji that the fundamental relational and 
interpenetrative nature of existence means that ‘I’ as a subject is a limited and 
restrictive self-understanding, which leads us towards a nihilistic global culture 
based on the separation of the internal and the external, or the self and the 
world as ego and other. The juxtaposition of his thought with Luce Irigaray, 
quickly brings to light the fundamental problem of śūnyatā and a non-dual field 
of the non-self: such a self-understanding is once again neutral, and perhaps 
risks masking the alienation of one’s self as a living breathing speaking and 
sexuate bodily existence. This is because a non-self is once again a neutral non-
self, and potentially an erasure of sexuate difference. It is for this reason I 
suggest the non-he and non-she as subject positions in bodily experience, 
speech and thought.  
 
For the most part, Luce Irigaray has a poor understanding of non-
duality, at least as expressed in her texts, and a more nuanced understanding of 
non-duality as it pertains to the self and the problem of nihilism, as found in 
Nishitani Keiji’s thought, goes a long way towards remedying this. By placing 
sexuate difference within a broader framework of non-duality, we can 
paradoxically hold these two insights simultaneously, because they both exist 
right here in this world. They are a transdescendence through self-
understanding and in the body, not a transcendence to some ‘other’ world, 







What I have argued in this thesis, therefore, is that we need to include an 
understanding of sexuation (the fundamental duality of man and woman as two 
subjects who are different) in our understanding of sunyata (as a field of 
relational interpenetration of all things). The two of sexuate difference, is 
simultaneously the one of śūnyatā. Sexuation may prevent alienation, as well 
as remedy it to a certain level, but the I-he and the I-she must go a step further 
and become the non-he and the non-she, which I suggest offers a way of 
understanding ourselves as always sexuate, and always on the field of mutually 
interpenetrative existence, i.e., sunyata.  
 
Finally, a true liberation from alienation and nihilism, is one where 
śūnyatā includes the sexuate difference of men and women, understandable as 
two subjects who are different, but who on the field of śūnyatā are absolutely 
intertwined with each other. Men and women live in the same world, but they 
perceive and interpret it differently, which creates at least two worlds or at least 
two cultures (masculine and feminine) depending on their collective relational 
positions on the field of non-duality. In other words, the non-he and the non-
she provide two sexuated subject positions which are based on an 
understanding of reality as completely inter-relational, while at the same time, 
taking into consideration the fundamental difference specific to human 
existence (ningen) that men and women have specific differences which are also 






By bringing together Luce Irigaray and Nishitani Keiji, I create a unique 
pathway for the liberation of the self as alienated, to the self understood as both 
sexuate (two) and śūnyatā (none/one) simultaneously. This offers the best of 
both worlds by giving a clear natural and living bodily being, which recognises 
the relational difference between men and women, while at the same time 
understanding that we live in a shared world of mutually interpenetrative 
existence that conjoins them. The problem of nihilism, therefore, is our 
problem, both I-he and I-she, and we have the potential for a liberated existence 
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